Moral Philosophy

desire, nature, woman, society, means, feelings, duty and equally

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It is by no means necessary, then, that the pursuits of the man and of the woman should be similar, in order to secure mutual regard. They must indeed be actuated by the same grand moral feelings ; there must be the same regard to truth, honour, and principle—the same anxious desire to promote each other's comfort ; and after this, it matters not how dissimilar their occupations may be. They will rather injure their interests by at tempting an approximation in any other respect : and Hercules, with the distaff of Omphale in his hand, is not more ridiculous, and out of character, than the virago, who affects the manners and pursuits appropriate to men. Qua fitgit a sexu, vires amat.

Nothing surely is better calculated to promote the general improvement of the species than that principle of love which leads the two sexes to desire and consult the happiness of each other. In the rudest state of so ciety it has its influence. In such a state, indeed, woman is comparatively disregarded : her weakness and de pendence render her completely subservient, and make her the degraded drudge of her rough and unpolished yoke-mate. In a state of ease, comfort, and affluence, woman becomes an object of greater consequence, but chiefly as an instrument of pleasure ; she then studies the accomplishments which minister to luxury, and, per haps, acquires considerable influence in society. But she is still in a state of moral degradation ; and her beauty and accomplishments are valued by her lord as he values his plate, his equipage, and his furniture ; that is, merely as the means of feeding his vanity and pro moting his pleasure.

It is in the Christian system alone that woman as sumes her true rank in society : for whilst it unfolds the virtues which confer the highest lustre on human nature, it shows that woman is equally susceptible of them with man, or rather, that her nature appears bet ter adapted than that of man for the reception of them. Her feelings harmonize more readily with the mild and benevolent spirit of this religion : and human excel lence being shown to consist in the cultivation of vir tuous and pious affections, the female who is distin guished by these qualifications may justly aspire to the highest estimation in Christian society ; and being, equally with man, the sharer of immortal hopes, she is entitled to the same consideration in the ordinary rela tions of life.

From what has been said, we think it will evidently appear, that our duty as moral agents may be inferred from the constitution of our nature, and the relations in which we are placed. We may say, with safety,

that, to a certain extent, nature points out the line of duty : for we have seen that our appetites, desires, af fections, &c. point most distinctly to certain ends, the attainment of which is considered necessary for happi ness. But whilst our natural feelings impel us infallibly and irresistibly to desire certain gratifications, they do not point out, with precision, the means by which the end may be attained. These means are learnt by in struction, example, experience, and reason ; and after the mind is thus informed, it perceives that the means of obtaining the enjoyments which we desire, though varied, are yet perfectly defined, and that we cannot neglect or abuse them without compromising our own happiness.

\Ve may perceive, then, that the author of our na ture has fenced in the path of virtue by numberless safeguards and securities, and which way soever we turn ourselves, we will find monitors of duty, and re straints imposed on vicious indulgence. Yet, with all these advantages, we need not be surprised at the struggles which are so frequently felt between inclina tion and duty. Such struggles are absolutely unavoid able, for the appetite is blind and indiscriminating ; it may impel us to desire what we have no right to aspire to, and which cannot be ours without violating the rights of another. To feel hunger, and desire food, is perfectly natural, and, therefore, cannot be wrong : but it is contrary to justice to gratify this desire at the ex pense of another. To desire a beautiful woman may be equally natural, but it is wrong to seek the gratification of this desire, if she is already become the property of another. In short, our appetites, passions, and desires, require to be corrected by a consideration of the relations in which we stand to God and to society ; and it is a considerable time before these are so distinctly per ceived, as to operate surely and expeditiously in regu lating the conduct.

Man's moral character results chiefly from his social connections, and these are not adventitious or fortuitously formed. Our analysis of some of the prominent feelings and circumstances of human nature had for its object to show that society, in its various forms and modifications, necessarily results from them ; that man is made for so cial relations, and is gradually trained to discharge the duties required in them, by the moral and intellectual perceptions arising from the constitution of his nature.

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