It is evident from this, that there must be some grie vous misunderstanding on the one side or the other ; for without this, it would be impossible to conceive that men of learning and ingenuity, as the disputants in this controversy generally are, should arrive at such oppo site conclusions on the same subject. Whether we shall be able to untie this Gordian knot to the satisfaction of our readers, we think is very doubtful. We shall en deavour, however, to give a lair view of the question, and shall state without reserve our own opinion.
The advocates for liberty are hard pressed by the ar gument that the will is influenced by the last determina tion of the understanding, or by previous habits, or by that which appears at the time most desirable. If they admit this, the question is decided ; for that liberty which they reckon essential to moral action is destroyed. This is confessed by Archbishop King,* who brings the matter to a very distressing dilemma ; For he says, that if the will is influenced by reason, it is not free ; and, if it is not thus influenced, it acts irrationally. One would not think it easy to escape from the horns of this di lemma ; but this author attempts it by a method almost peculiar to himself; for, with the exception of his very able commentator, we scarcely know any who has adopt ed it. His scheme is, that " things are not chosen be cause they are good, but become good because they are chosen." We would here notice the strange idea that this author, and indeed almost all the advocates for liberty, entertain respecting the nature of human freedom. According to their notion, a perfectly wise and good man, who cannot possibly will what is foolish or wicked, is subject to a ne cessity destructive of virtue and moral responsibility. On the same principle, it might be said that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he cannot but do that which is wisest and best. This, as Dr. Clarke observes, is a necessity, not of nature or of fate, but of fitness and wisdom ; a necessity consistent with the greatest free dom and most perfect choice ; for the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise being to act foolishly. " Though God is a most perfect and free agent, says the same author, yet he can not but do always what is best and wisest on the whole. The reason is evident ; because perfect wisdom and good ness are as steady and certain- principles of action, as necessity itself ; and an infinitely wise and goad Being, endued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted ; it being as great an absurdity and im possibility in choice, for infinite wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect." We may apply this subject to human agents in the words of Mr. Locke. rt 'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the. very naprf,vement and benefit of it : it is not an abridge ment, it is the end and use of our liberty ; and the farther we are reiw,ved from such a determination, the nearer are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not &lei minable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would he so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would he as great an imper fection, as the want of indiffer ency to act or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. It is as much a perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will ; and the certainer such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good we choose ; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity, by his constitution as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing, by his own thought and judg ment, what is best for him to do ; else he would be un der the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will in every determination follows his own judgment, is to say that a man wills and acts for an end he would not have, at the same time that lie wills and acts for it. For if he
prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it berme any other ; unless he can have, and not have it, will, and not will it, at the same time ; a contradiction too mani fest to be admitted. If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the vol se, be liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men. Yet I think nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." King gives up all idea of vindicating the freedom of the human will on any other principle than that which he has adopted, viz. that things chosen derive their value from the choice of the mind ; and we think it may be fairly concluded, that the cause is lost if it has no better support. He complains that the friends of the opposite doctrine deal in subtleties, and in arguments remote from common feeling and common apprehension. But the charge may with justice be retorted on himself, and it may he affirmed, that none has ever advanced such a paradoxical argument on the subject, nor maintained it by such subtle and paradoxical reasoning. It is indeed gratifying to think of the mind's omnipotence, and of its superiority over the circumstances of time, place, and accident ; and there can be no doubt, that, with proper regulation, it may be the fabricator of its own happiness. But this is not to be effected by a mere independent fiat of the will, and by the creation of means to secure happiness; but by a judicious application and proper use of those cir cumstances which are presented in the arrangements of Providence. Before the mind can have that indepen dence on circumstances which this author assigns to it, it would require to be not only omnipotent, but omni scient. It must either be omnipotent, to model event; by a simple volition, as the Almighty did, when he call ed all things into existence; or it must be omniscient, that its volitions may not interfere with the established order of nature: but the author claims neither of these attributes for it, when he asserts its independence on na litre, judgment, association, and reasoning. All that he claims fur it is, that it should be able to discern the things which arc possible from those which are impossible, and thus provided, it has its happiness completely in its own power. " That person must be happy," says he, " who can always please himself; but this agent can evidently do so. For since things are supposed to please him, not by any necessity of nature, but by mere election, and there is nothing which can compel him to choose this rather than another ; it is plain that the agent endowed with this power may always choose such things as it can enjoy, and refuse, that is, not desire or not choose those things which are impossible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great importance it is, whether that whereby things become agreeable to the appetite, be established by nature, or effected by the agent him self. For if good and evil proceed from nature, and be inherent in objects, so as to render them agreeable or disagreeable antecedent to the election, the happiness of this agent will always depend upon them ; and unless the whole series of things be so ordered, that nothing can happen contrary to his appetites, he must fall short of happiness." Now, though we certainly should be sorry to coun tenance the doctrine, that a man's happiness is entirely at the mercy of external circumstances ; (for there are many rational considerations which tend to diminish the influence which adverse circumstances would other wise exert over our happiness ;) yet we affirm, with per fect confidence, that there are pains, trials, and disap pointments, which must produce unhappiness, unless they arc counteracted by reason, hope, or religion. Ac cording to the doctrine which we are combating, a man when placed on the rack ought not to be unhappy ; for the mind is altogether independent on such circum stances. But • certainly there is no man whose feelings are not paralysed by disease, but must feel pain in such circumstances ; and if pain be not an evil, then the in genious author should have given a different form to his very important, though in many respects very eccen tric, Essay on the Origin and Tendency of Evil ; and should have endeavoured to show that no such thing as evil exists in the universe.