But the recurrence of an idea or practice, however frequent, does not necessarily constitute habit. Though we wash our face every morning, or, every morning say our prayers, this is not habit. It is a regular custom, founded on expediency or reason. Neither do we ap ply the name of habit to any of those practices which result from the general constitution of our nature, and are observed by all mankind. We do not say that a man has a habit of taking his breakfast, or dinner, though he does so every day of his life, and has a most decided inclination to the practice. By a habit of eat ing, we would understand gluttony ; as a habit of drinking always implies drunkenness. A man may have a habit of sleeping in his chair after dinner : we never talk of the regular repose of sleep as a habit. Perhaps there is as much of habit in the art of walking as in most things ; yet, walking appears so natural, that we never consider it as a habit ; but if a man limps without being lame, or slouches, or swaggers in his walk, we say he has acquired habits.
It is evident, that we apply the term habits to certain practices a little out of the ordinary way, when they obtain a very prominent influence ; or to natural practices when carried to habitual excess.—Our moral habits may be explained in the same way. Particular circumstances give more importance in our imagination to one duty than to another. It has, for instance, been particularly enforced by the friend whom we admire ; it has been recommended by some very interesting concomitants, or by some powerful considerations of public or private advantage : from these, and similar circumstances, it appears of paramount importance ; and in our situation it may, in fact, be so ; but we ought not to denounce, as deficient in moral sensibility, those who do not view it with the same rapturous feelings.
All prejudices are habits arising out of contracted education, illiberal society, or the example of those who have more influence than sense. All prejudices have a certain degree of moral obliquity attached to them : but, as the defect originates chiefly in the understand ing, they may be called bad intellectual habits. We do not, in general, view such habits with much moral dis approbation. We are rather amused in tracing their origin ; and regard them as the subject of ridicule, rather than of rigid censure. They have, however, a very extensive, and very pernicious influence on the happiness both of individuals and of society, as they obviously impair general benevolence, and obstruct general improvement.
To love the country in which we are born better than any other is not a prejudice : it is a natural, irre sistible feeling : and the man who is a stranger to it, must be unacquainted with all the finer sensibilities ol our nature. It is impossible to reflect on the scenes with which our recollections of youthful happiness are inseparably associated, without the most decided par tiality : it is impossible to think of the place which contains the graves of our fathers, and of the compa nions of our early days, without feelings of the deepest interest : and a general predilection for our native country must arise in every well regulated mind, from a recollection of the social, civil, and religious ties which have so intimately connected our hearts with the coun try and community in which we have been brought up. Such feelings as these are not prejudices : for they arise out of natural and unavoidable associations ; and there is a defect in the heart of every man who is a stranger to them. But if love to our country and con nections leads us to despise other communities, or to hate and dislike those who differ from us in political institutions, in civil customs, or in national manners ; in that case, we are under the dominion of the most nar row and hurtful prejudices, and will never be able to exhibit a single feature of general philanthropy, or of genuine christian spirit.
Prejudices in the case of certain contracted minds, and limited understandings, may be useful. They are a sort of substitute for steady principles ; and we should be afraid that, were a weak man to renounce his pre judices, he might never find any principles so likely to secure consistency of conduct. On this ground, we are not displeased sometimes to see an obstinate man re sisting enlargement of understanding, for he might lose what he would never be able to replace ; and his mind might be set afloat without a single light to direct him. We have seen melancholy exemplifications of these ob servations in the case of many who have been trained up under the prejudices of religious education ; we say prejudices, for their impressions never rose to the rank of rational principles.
When once they have been laughed out of that vene ration which they had been accustomed to entertain for sacred subjects, they become the most disgusting profligates ; and, by their nauseous licentiousness, ra ther do good than harm, to the cause which they mean to injure.