This holds undoubtedly true with regard to physical evil ; for if there be nothing in external circumstances which has a direct tendency to affect our happiness, then it is idle to talk, as the author has done at so great length in the first part of his book, of the physical evils of hunger, disease, death, acc. And Leibnitz has shewn no less clearly, that if the mind choose without a motive, there can be no moral evil ; for moral evil consists in a wrong choice, and if there be nothing to direct the choice, how can it be wrong ? " Dans le fond, bien loin que ce suit montrcr la source du mat moral, c'est you Ioir qu'il n'y en ait aucune. Car si la volont6 se deter mine sans qu'il y ait rienoi dans la persoanc que choisit. ni dans l'objet qui est choisi, qui puissc porter au choix, it n'y aura aucune cause, ni raison de cette election : et comme he mal moral consiste dans he mauvais choix, c'est avouer, que le mal moral n'a point de source du tout. Ainsi dans les regles de la bunre mctaphysique, it fraudroit qu'il n'y ent point de mal moral dans la na ture ; ct aussi par la memc raison, it n'y auroit point de bien moral non plus, ct toute la moralite scroit detruite." Remarques our la Livre de l'Origine du Mal.
Hume has observed, and there is undoubtedly truth in the observation, that we can trace a general course of human conduct almost with as much certainty as we can trace a general course of nature ; that is, we may pronounce that men will act in a certain way in given circumstances with as much confidence, as that trees will grow in a given situation : and he justly considers this determination which the conduct receives from circumstances as subversive of that liberty for which many contend. Yet, unless we can remove this influ ence of motives, that indifference which is reckoned essential to liberty is completely destroyed. And how is it possible to remove this influence ? It is directly contrary to the whole scheme of our philosophy to sup pose it possible ; for we have assumed it as an unques tionable principle, that the general course of nature in fluences hoth our moral and intellectual associations : that with regard to intellectual attainments, the mind does little more than methodize the facts, and treasure up the relations presented in the course of nature ; and the whole of this article has been conducted on the sup position that our olitions are influenced with infallible certainty, by the circumstances of our nature, and the visible arrangements of providence. The beautiful or der which we observe among the works of God is in tended to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, and render the path to the temple of science attractive and delightful ; and it is equally intended to influence our volitions and our moral perceptions ; for it would be a most extraordinary inconsistency, to affirm that God has formed arrangements for human happiness, and yet that men act at random, without any regard to the manifest will of heaven.
The advocates of liberty contend that the scheme of necessity renders means, exhortations, promises, and threatenings, altogether unavailing. Without stopping to obviate this, at present, we would merely observe, that their own plan must produce this effect in a ten fold degree, for it lies at the foundation of their scheme, that motives do not influence ; for if they did, there would be an end of liberty ; and if motives do not in fluence, what is the use of exhortations, promises, or threatenings.
But will any man, whose ideas are unsophisticated by a philosophical or theological system, pretend to say that the mind is not influenced by instinct, education, association, habit, passion, prejudice, Sec. Scc. ? And if if it be thus influenced, there is an end of indifference of choice, and with it of liberty. Law, in his commen tary on King's Essay, supports the principle of indif ference by the following reasoning. " Let a thing ap pear never so pleasant and agreeable, never so reason able, fit, and eligible to us, yet there is still a natural possibility for us to will the contrary, and consequently the bare power of willing is in itself indifferent to either side." There is a fallacy here. In perception, the mind is almost wholly passive, and simply receives the impressions made upon it through the medium of the senses ; in volition it is wholly active. Volition does not, like perception, impart any feeling to the mind ; it is merely the organ or instrument, by means of which the manifests its determinations; and the will never can be indifferent when it is in action ; when it is not in action, it is in nonentity. And with regard to what this author says, that there is a natural possibility for the mind to form a choice, in opposition to every perceived advantage, and every preponderating circumstance, the fact is admitted by every enlightened necessitarian, and lie only wishes this author, and all who favour his senti ments, to keep in mind the distinction between physical and moral impossibility. These arc generally, perhaps industriously, confounded by the advocates for liberty, with a view to bring odium on the opposite doctrine ; and they represent the scheme of necessity as resembling a tyrant, who should bind a man to the ground with fetters, and then punish him because he does not, in these circumstances, obey the rise and walk.