The argument may be carried farther still. ig If it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself, yet it is not com monly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions : although what is natural is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the will whatever. Thus, for instance, if a man ap pears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the common sense and ap prehension of men, that such dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium, or dishonour, or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. Its being natural for men to act thus, is often ob served by men in the height of their indignation ; they will say, It is his very nature ; he is of a vile natural temper ; it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe ; he cannot help serving the devil.' But it is not thus with regard to hurtful, mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occasions of by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. Thus, it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of ne cessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions."' In the second place, it is said that the scheme of ne cessity is inconsistent with the use of means, and that if virtue or vice come to pass by necessity, it must be useless to employ any means to obtain the one or avoid the other. This is a very groundless objection, and may, with great advantage, be retorted on the opposite scheme. The whole scheme of necessity proceeds on the idea, that there is a necessary connection between means and ends, antecedents and consequents. " Ita que tantum abest, ut prxdeterminatio seu prxdisposi tio ex causis necessitatem inducat contrarian contin genti vel libertati aut moralitati; ut potius in hoc ipso distinguatur fatum Mahon:am:um a Christiano, absur dum a rationali; quod causas non curant ; Chris tiani vero et quicunque sapient, cffectum ex causa de ductint. Turcx silicet, ut lama est, (quanquam non °miles sic dcsipere putem,) frustra pestem et alia mala cvitari arbu•antur ; idque co practextu quod futura vel decreta cventura sent, quicquid agas aut non agas, quod lalsum est : cum ratio dictet eum qui certo peste mori• turus est, etiam certissime causas pestis non esse evi• taturum. Nempe, ut recte Germanico proverbio dici tur, morn vult haberc causam." Leibnitz.
It is, then, evidently inconsistent to object to the ne cessitarian that his scheme renders means unavailing, when he holds that there is a necessary connection be tween means and ends, motives and action : that when certain means are employed, certain ends will follow ; and that certain motives will as certainly lead to parti cular actions. With much greater justice may it be said, that the opposite scheme supersedes the use of means ; for if there be no fixed and established connec tion between means and ends, and the advocates for ]ibcrty are bound to maintain that there is not, for on any other supposition, their scheme falls to the ground ; then, it would follow, that it matters not what means are employed, or whether any are employed at all. There could be no such thing as acting with wisdom or pru dence, if we did not see an established connection be tween certain actions or events in the shape of means, and others which depend upon them as their conse quents.
We apprehend it is time to close this discussion. We readily admit that the scheme of necessity which we have adopted has often been abused and perverted, by bad men, to the worst of purposes : the Turkish view of predestination is neither more nor less than a gross abuse of the doctrine of necessity : and it is certain that ignorant religionists have perverted it in the same way in many Christian countries. We have endeavoured to vindicate the doctrine from such misconceptions : and though we readily admit that there are many difficul ties on the subject of moral agency, which we cannot pretend to explain, yet we think there are fewer on the scheme of necessity, when rightly understood, than on the generally received views of liberty.
Our readers will thank us for presenting them with the opinion of a very acute writer* on this subject, who conveys much weighty matter in small compass:, and states some important considerations, which ought to be taken into view by disputants on both sides of the ques tion. " So far as these necessarians maintain the cer tain influence of moral motives, as the natural and suffi cient means whereby human actions, and even human thoughts, are brought into that continued chain of causes and effects, which, taking its beginning in the operations of the infinite mind, cannot but be fully un derstood by him ; so far they do service to the cause of truth ; placing the great and glorious doctrines of fore knowledge and providence—absolute foreknowledge, universal providence, upon a firm and philosophical foundation." Thus far we profess ourselves the advo
cates for necessity, and we assent fully to the following observations, which are both just and profound. " But when they go beyond this, when they would represent this influence of moral motives as arising from a physi cal necessity, the very same which excites and governs the motions of the inanimate creation--here they con found nature's distinctions, and contradict the very principles they would seem to have established. The source of their mistake is this, that they imagine a si militude between things which admit of no comparison —between the influence of a moral motive upon the mind, and that of mechanical force upon matter. A moral motive and a mechanical force are both indeed causes, and equally certain causes each of its proper ef fect ; but they are causes in very different senses of the word, and derive their energy from the most oppo site principles. Force is only another name lor an effi cient cause ; it is that which impresses motion upon body, the passive recipient of a foreign impulse. A moral motive is what is more significantly called the final cause, and can have no influence but with a being that proposes to itself an end, chooses means, and thus puts itself in action.- It is true, that while this is my end, and while I conceive these to be the means, a definite act will as certainly follow that definite choice and judgment of my mind, provided I be free from all ex ternal restraint and impediment, as a determinate mo tion will be excited in a body by a force applied in a given direction. There is in both cases an equal cer tainty of the effect ; hut the principle of the certainty in the one case and in the other is entirely different, which difference necessarily arises from the different nature of final and efficient causes. Every cause, ex cept it be the will of the Supreme Deity, acting to the first production of substances—every cause, I say, ex cept this acting in this singular instance, produces its effect by acting u/ion something ; and whatever be the cause that acts, the principle of certainty lies in a ca pacity in the thing on which it acts. of being affected by that action. Now, the capacity which force, or an efficient cause, requires in the object of its action, is ab solute inertness. But intelligence and liberty consti tute the capacity of being influenced by a final cause— by a moral motive ; and to this very liberty does this sort of cause owe its whole efficacy, the whole certainty of its operation ; which certainty never can disprove the existence of that liberty upon which it is itself founded, and of which it affords the highest evidence." The following observations also, by the same author, on the general aspect of the question, are both mode rate and judicious, and highly deserving of the atten tion of every one who engages in this controversy. " The liberty of man and the foreknowledge of God are equally certain, although the proof of each rests on different principles. Our feelings prove to every one of us that we are free : reason and revelation teach us that the Deity knows and governs all things—that even the thoughts of man he understandeth long be fore,' long before the thoughts arise—long befo,,i the man himself is born who is to think them. Now, when two distinct propositions are separately proved, each by its proper evidence, it is not a reason for denying either, that the human mind, upon the first hasty view, imagines a repugnance, and may perhaps find a difficul ty in connecting them, even after the distinct proof of each is clearly perceived and understood. There is a wide difference between a paradox and a contradiction. Both, indeed, consist of two distinct propositions, and so far only are they alike : for of the two parts of contra diction, the one or the other must necessarily be false ; of a paradox, both are often true, and yet, when proved to be true, may continue paradoxical. This is the ne cessary consequence of our partial view of things. An in,ellect to which nothing should be paradoxical would be infinite. It may naturally be supposed that para doxes must abound the most in metaphysics and divi nity, for who can find out God unto perfection ? Yct they occur in other subjects ; and any one who should refuse his assent to propositions separately proved, be cause when connected they may have been paradoxical, would, in many instances, be justly laughed to scorn by the masters of those sciences which make the highest pretensions to certainty and demonstration. In all these cases there is generally, in the nature of things, a limit to each of the two contrasted propositions, beyond which neither can be extended without implying the falsehood of the other, and changing the paradox. into contra diction ; and the whole difficulty of perceiving the con nection and agreement between such propositions arises from this circumstance, that, by some inattention of the mind, these limits are overlooked. Thus, in the case before us, we must not imagine such an arbitrary exer cise of God's power over the minds and wills of subor dinate agents, as should convert rational beings into mere machines, and leave the Deity charged with the follies and the crimes of men, which was the error of the Calvinists : nor must we, on the other hand, set up