There cannot be a grosser misrepresentation of the doctrine. In the supposed case the mind is free, but the body is subject to physical restraints, which pre vent volition from issuing in action. But in all moral delinquencies, the mind is indisposed or enslaved ; and the inability to act proceeds only from its own want of inclination. No restraint whatever is laid on the mind ; it goes wrong, not in consequence of any perceived con straint, but merely by yielding to the bias of its own in clinations. However strong any temptation may be, no man can say that it is absolutely irresistable ; were it so, it would amount to physical impossibility, and would ex empt front all blame, and from all moral impossibility. But the man who yields to temptation is only subject to a moral inability, induced by bad habits, which he has no inclination to resist. In short, he wills to go wrong, and with his own full and perfect consent runs headlong into vice or folly. Physical restraint is always palpable ; moral restraint cannot be so : for the evil rests in the will itself, or, to speak more properly, in the mind which actuates the will : and it is not sensible either of restric tion or constraint whilst it is following the decided bent of its inclinations.
Would it not, then, be in the highest degree absurd, for any man to complain that his liberty is impaired, when he is both willing and acting as he pleases. And this species of liberty, and it is the only one of which we have any conception, is left entire by the advocates for necessity. But the liberty of indifference, so much contended for, is incomprehensible. If it consists in act ing without motives, there can be no more merit or de merit in the actions than if they proceeded from blind fate or accident ; or if it consist in the power of acting contrary to motives, it cannot surely be thought a very enviable prerogative to have the privilege of acting in opposition to reason.
That we are influenced by motives is certain : the person who despises them is not entitled to the appella tion of a rational being : and that God has intended that we should be influenced in a particular way, is no less certain ; for our instincts, appetites, and passions have distinct and definite objects, to which they arc adapted ; and the whole course of nature and providence co-ope rates with them in directing our conduct to particular ends. So far, then, we may say, without hesitation, that the liberty of indifference is destroyed by the decree of heaven ; and that God himself, by the arrangements of his providence, has controlled the volitions and the con duct of men.
Shall we then ascribe to God the sins of men, and the various aberrations of human conduct ? This conse quence would be unavoidable, were men swayed by a physical necessity, and did their reason tell them that it is absolutely impossible to resist the suggestions to evil. But the case is directly the reverse. Instead or
being constrained to do wrong, by a physical necessity, it is quite apparent that God has done every thing, as far as is consistent with the moral responsibility of man, to cast the balance on the other side, and to con strain human beings to walk in the paths of virtue. The miserable consequences of transgresssion, con science, reason, sympathy, together with every original or accessary feeling of our nature, concur in lending their influence to strengthen the obligations of moral duty. They, in fact, do all but absolutely compel us, to make us virtuous and happy. And so far from feeling ourselves, in any instance, constrained to do evil, the compunctions of conscience are sharpened by the conviction, that we have acted in opposition to the most obvious inducements to virtue. Whatever necessity, then, there is arising out of the appointments of heaven, it is all on the side of virtue ; and the sell-condemnation of the offender arises from the consciousness of having resisted it. Every thing presented in the economy of the Divine government is either positively good, or ca pable of being turned to good. Riches, power, and ho nours are designed by heaven to be the rewards of in dustry!bravery, or virtue : and no man can say that God has misled him, if he aspires to the reward by means which are not consecrated by the appointment of heaven ; and he has no reason to complain, if he finds misery and disgrace, instead of the pleasures t‘hich he anticipates. He cannot say that he mistook the means ; it is evident that lie understood them perfectly, by exhibiting the sem blance of those virtues which God delights to honour: but he expects to reach the end by a shorter way than that which is prescribed by the course of Providence ; and he reaps misery as the reward of his furtive attempts to elude the decrees of heaven.
No man can say that he is constrained to do evil by the circumstances in which he is placed : for, as it has been said, every thing has two handles, .and, according as it is employed, may he the means of good, or the instrument of evil. A man's virtue and happiness are ruined, we shall suppose, in certain circumstances; and it is common for him to say, and for the world to believe him, that had he not been placed in such circumstances, he would have been happy and good. But it is not his circumstances, nor consequently the appointments of heaven, which he ought to blame ; for he may see thou sands, both virtuous and happy, in the same circumstan ces in which he ceased to be either.