Let no man then blame necessity for his sins. Ile is almost constrained to be virtuous : if the constraint were complete, he would not be a moral agent, nor the same being that he now is.
We readily admit that there are many things in the economy of the Divine administration which it is quite impossible for finite understandings to comprehend ; and to no subject is this observation more applicable than to the one we are now considering. For we admit most readily, that could we even demonstrate the i iew of the subject we have adopted, and which we think might be brought as near to demonstration as any point in morals or icligion can be, yet even then difficulties would not be wholly removed : nor will we presume to say that we can satisfactorily explain all the ways of God on our plan. We believe the same admission will be made by every candid disputant on the other side; and the ques tion comes to be, which scheme presents fewest difficul ties, and solves the greatest number of doubts. The doctrine of necessity is by no means the most popular, but we are fully convinced that it is by far the most phi losophical, and that its antagonist doctrine cannot stand before it in point of argument. The objections to neces sity are all of a popular cast; and in removing them it will generally appear that we demolish the opposite doctrine.
If the advocates for liberty say that it consists in a nian'a willing what he pleases, and this is their common language, no necessitarian can have any dispute with them on this point : the proposition is intuitively true, or rather it is a truism—for a man never can will any thing but what he pleases, unless it were possible for him to will and not to will the same thing at the same time. Whatever a man wills roust, at the moment, please him, or he must consider it most eligible at the time—in fact, the expression is tantamount to saying that a man chooses what he chooses. Whatever volition the mind forms must be consistent with its choice, for choice and volition are the same thing : they imply the de termination or election which the mind has formed, and, therefore, whenever volition is exerted, liberty is at an end. The mind has already received its impulse—it is already in action, and the quiescence, and indifference, supposed to be essential to liberty, have completely va nished.
The proper question then is, What is it that induces the mind to will ? And we think it ought to be admitted as an axiom, that if it is swayed by any thing external to it, and independent of it, or even if it is swayed by any thing essential to its own nature, in neither of these views can it be said to be free, in the sense in which freedom is usually understood, as applied to the human mind. Indeed, it seems to be a most unreasonable free dom that is contended for ; it must arise without a cause from the self-determining power of the mind. Now, a
self-determining power cannot be influenced by any thing, otherwise it is not self-determined; and if it is not influenced by any thing, then it is a power existing with out a cause, of which we can have no conception, except in the case of the Supreme Being.
Considering the subject speculatively, one might per haps be at a loss to determine which of the two schemes is most likely to be abused ; for we think it should equally exempt a man from responsibility, to suppose that he has insufficient motives to influence his conduct, or that he is bound by absolute irresistible necessity. If the author of our nature has not given us sufficient in ducements to rectitude of conduct, or, in other words, if he has not presented motives sufficiently powerful to influence our will, we cannot well see how we should be answerable for the want of proper volitions ; if, on the other 'hand, our wills are absolutely controlled, there could be no such things as virtue or vice in the world.
As we have ventured to take a side in this very dif ficult question, we shall rest satisfied with vindicating our peculiar views from the objections which have fre quently been urged against them. And, first, it is said that necessity is altogether inconsistent either with praise or with blame. Physical necessity, or coercion, is undoubtedly inconsistent with praise or blame. But this is not the case with moral necessity, otherwise we could not ascribe praise and glory to the Most High, who undoubtedly acts under a moral necessity, for it is impossible for him to do evil; not that he wants the power to do so, but because it is impossible for a being infinitely wise and good, ever to have an inclination to do evil ; and, according as a man advances in wisdom and goodness, he comes so much nearer to a moral ne cessity of doing what is right, which, instead of being a defect, constitutes the perfection of his nature. Ha bits and prepossessions in favour of virtue, which un doubtedly destroy the equilibrium of indifference, and consequently impair or destroy the freedom of the will, so far from lessening our ideas of the worth of the agent, increase them in the highest degree ; and where we see a fixed and determined bias to virtuous actions, there we place our highest veneration and esteem. On the other hand, a man who is habitually vicious, and so strongly biassed and inclined to evil, as to be incapable of virtu ous exertion, is always viewed with additional abhor rence, instead of being considered as excused by the moral inability under which he labours. Moral inability, then, is never considered as any excuse for wickedness, and the nearer it approaches to moral impossibility, the character is considered as so much the more infamous.