Events thenceforward marched rapidly. Congress and the people of the United States both became very hostile in sentiment to Spain. As early as January the government had taken steps to cover eventualities, as far as the navy was concerned, by ordering that the time ex pired men should be retained, and after the Maine disaster ships were concentrated; the North Atlantic squadron at Key West, the Asi atic squadron at Hongkong (ordered 25 Feb ruary). Congress 9 March voted $50,000,000 for national defense; merchant vessels and yachts were purchased and armed; colliers and two hospital ships equipped; the four large ships of the American Line taken over for service and the two cruisers built at Elswick for Bra zil, purchased and renamed the New Orleans and Albany; the latter, however, was not far enough advanced to be used during the war. An American merchant ship which had been converted into a cruiser by Brazil was also bought, as also the Diogenes of 1,800 toils, built for Peru and never delivered, renamed Topeka; a small torpedo boat purchased in Germany and named the Somers, which did not reach the United States until after the war. The Treasury Department turned over to the navy 15 revenue cutters and four lighthouse tenders, all of which did good service. Coal in quantities was forwarded to Key West, which rapidly assumed the prominence of an import ant naval base, the command of which was as signed to Commodore Remey. A squadron was formed at Hampton Roads of the Brooklyn (flag) and battleships Massachusetts and Texas, denominated the flying squadron with Commo dore W. S. Schley in command.
The two navies stood as follows: The war was necessarily to be mainly naval. Whoever should control the sea would win. Spain could only hold Cuba by being able to send thither troops and supplies. As Mahan well says: "A million of the best soldiers would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea.)) The United States could not in vade Cuba unless the navy was strong enough to control the neighboring waters and make transport to and fro perfectly safe. Spain had, in the squadron under Rear-Admiral Cervera. four fine armored ships of 20-knot speed and good armament, with which in speed and arma ment the United States had but two to cope, the New York and Brooklyn. So long as this squadron existed, Spain had a powerful mili tary asset which would aid the war's continu ance. The Carlos V of like character was also counted, even by the Spanish Minister of Ma rine, as available, as also the Pelayo, a second class battleship, overhauling at La Seyne (near Toulon) where she had been built. In the East were two squadrons, facing one another, but neither was of a character to play a decisive part in such a war; neither could face a squad ron of armored ships without expecting de struction. The disquieting element to the United States was thus Cervera's squadron which it was expected at the time would be increased by at least the two other armored ships men tioned; and it was a reasonable disquiet. It was very possible for this squadron to have appeared upon the United States coast, causing much apprehension and some damage and to have taken refuge in Havana, to emerge again under the guns of what' became, as time went on, powerful batteries. But as we know from Admiral Cervera's reports, the inefficiency of his ships made such action hopeless. Spain had started a small torpedo flotilla to Cuba in early March, but the sea was too rough for the smaller boats and all took refuge at the Cape Verdes, returning later, except the three tor pedo boat destroyers, to Spain. The Vizcaya had been sent to New York in February as an offset to the visit of the Maine to Havana, whither she shortly went. She was joined there by her sister ship, the Oquendo, the arrival of the two adding greatly to the enthusiasm of the Spanish party. But this action was ill
considered. Neither ship had been docked for many months and when they left 1 April to go to the rendezvous east of Porto Rico to meet the expected torpedo flotilla and, failing the rendezvous, had to go to the Cape Verdes to join Cervera, they had crossed the Atlantic twice, had severely tried their engines and boil ers, and had had no chance for a much needed overhauling of their machinery. They thus started on a third transatlantic journey, bot toms foul, machinery in bad condition and ill equipped in almost every respect except in gal lant spirit, to meet a foe who was in the high est state of preparation. The advice and prophecies of Cervera were unheeded. When war had declared itself a large number of offi cers high in the navy met at Madrid 24 April and decided that his squadron should at once proceed to San Juan, Porto Rico, its later move ments being left to his discretion. The decision revealed an utter lack of preconceived plan and ignorance of the conditions of the problem. The ultimatum signed by' President McKinley 20 April 1898, demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, was practically a declaration of war and the Spanish government sent the American Minister his passport the next day without awaiting the presentation by him of the fateful resolution.
In the early morning of 22 April, Captain Sampson, then rear-admiral by the authority vested in the President in time of war, sailed with such of the ships as could be made ready to leave, with orders. to blockade the Cuban ports. The ships at or near Key West which • could be drawn upon for this first move were (armored) New York, Indiana, Iowa; (moni tors) Puritan, Terror, Amphitrite; (cruisers) Cincinnati, Marblehead, Detroit; (cruiser-gun boats) Wilmington, Machias, Castine, Nashville, Newport, Helena, Dolphin and auxiliary May flower ; (torpedo boats) Dupont, Porter, Foote, Winslow, Cushing and Ericsson; (armed tugs) Nesinscot, Samoset, the armed lighthouse tender Mangrove and supply steamer Fern. By the afternoon of 23 May 20 of these were on the blockade, which was established from Cardenas, 85 miles east of Havana to Bahia Honda, 55 miles west. It had been Sampson's wish to at tack Havana at once and the order of battle was prepared, but the Navy Department refused consent, holding that the heavy ships should not be risked against batteries until the Span ish squadron should be met. This was un doubtedly correct in principle, but Sampson's knowledge of the conditions was more complete than that of the officials in Washington. Had Sampson had his way he would have taken Havana at once, without loss or serious injury to his fleet. It is an extraordinary fact that the disposition of the batteries was such that beginning at the southwest there was but one six-inch gun which could reply in that direc tion. The batteries could have been enfiladed, one by one without any return fire whatever. Sampson's plan of attack, though more frontal, would in the writer's opinion have been perfectly successful. He could, after silencing the bat teries, have anchored in the bight west of the Morro and awaited the coming of an army of occupation as did Dewey at Manila. It was his intention to go within 800 yards of the bat teries, the water being extremely deep to the shore itself ; it would have been impossible for the men in the batteries, exposed as they were, to stand to their guns under the fire of the mul titude of small guns carried by the small ships. Sampson yielded to the department's views with great reluctance. Commodore Dewey, who had relieved Rear-Admiral McNair in command of the Asiatic station, had concentrated, by order of the department of 25 February, all the ships of his squadron at Hongkong.