Sampson standing westward with his slow squadron received the first news of Cervera's ar rival in the Caribbean at 3.30 A.m. 15 May while off Porto Plata, San Domingo. He then learned that Cervera was on the 14th off Curacao, and that the destroyer Terror was at Martinique. The telegram announcing this directed him to proceed with all possible dispatch to Key West, whither Commodore Schley's squadron was also ordered from Hampton Roads. Cervera's slow ness of movement had been a surprise to all concerned on the American side at least. The two large liners Harvard and Saint Louis had been dispatched, on his departure from the Cape Verdes, to cruise on a line 73 miles north and south about 100 miles east of Martinique, until noon of 10 May. Had the orders read until 11 May, they would in all probability have sighted the Spanish squadron at sea. As it was the Harvard reached Saint Pierre, Martinique, at 9 A.m. of the 11th and the destroyer Furor Fort de France, the capital of the island, at 5 P.M. The news reached the Navy Department early 12 May by telegram from Captain Cotton of the Harvard. The broken-down destroyer Ter ror came into Fort de France next morning and remained there until 25 May when she went to San Juan, where sh.- will be later heard from. The presence of Sampson at San changed Cervera's course. Had the American squadron been slower by two or three days in reaching San Juan, Sampson's surmise would have proved correct. He would have found and destroyed the Spanish ships there, where they were ordered to go, instead of at Santiago. Cervera's infor mation regarding Sampson's movements caused him to shape his course from Curacao, 290 miles away, in hope of obtaining much needed coal, and picking up the vagrant colliers Roath, Twicken ham and Restormel, which had been chartered by Spain. These, however, failed him, but the Curacao authorities allowed him 500 tons for the Teresa and Vizcaya, and he was enabled to obtain fresh provisions. At 5.15 P.M. 15 May he left for Santiago de Cuba. The Saint Louis which had joined Sampson the morning of 15 May was ordered with the armed tug Wompa tuck to Santiago to cut cables, and left the squad ron for that port almost at the same hour as Cervera. Captain Goodrich, commanding the expedition, succeeded 18 May in cutting one cable in over 500 fathoms of water, engaging the batteries at the same time. Having suc ceeded, as he supposed (mistakenly), in de stroying the Santiago-Jamaica connection, he left for Guantanamo for the purpose of destroy ing the French cable leading from there, but an engagement of 40 minutes with the Spanish gunboat Sandoval compelled him to desist, the very vulnerable character of his own ship, wholly unfitted for fighting, rendering this necessary. At this time, 8 A.M., 19 May, Cervera was entering Santiago Harbor only 40 miles away, having taken three and a half days to traverse the 600 miles from Curacao. Sampson reached Key West at 4 p.m. of the 18th and found Commodore Schley's squadron, which had arrived at midnight. All but the smallest vessel off Cienfuegos were ordered by the Navy Department to be withdrawn. The telegrams received showed that the Washing ton authorities were convinced by information received that the Spanish squadron was sup posed to carry munitions of war essential to the defense of Havana, and that it must reach this port or one connected by rail with it, not ably Cienfuegos. The flying squadron was thus, with such additional armored and other vessels as Sampson should suitable, to proceed to Cienfuegos, Havana, being covered by the remainder of the fleet. Sampson was to have choice of command off Cienfuegos or Havana; Schley, however, to keep the flying squadron. He generously gave the opportunity to Schley, who having coaled, sailed on the forenoon of the 19th with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and Scorpion with orders to establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay. Shortly after leaving Key West he passed the Marblehead and Eagle returning from Cienfuegos, Commander McCalla of the Marblehead having withdrawn the whole force on his own responsibility. McCalla communi cated the situation there by sending the Eagle to speak the Scorpion. Much was made of his failure to mention an arrangement of signals he had made with the considerable Cuban force west of the harbor in case these latter wished to communicate, but as will be seen later this was of no consequence. The Iowa, the collier Merrimac, the Castine and the torpedo boat Dupont left on the forenoon of the 20th to join Commodore Schley, thus making a force much more than able to meet the Spanish sciadron. A telegram was received from the Navy Department at 12.30 A. M. of this day saying, ((The report of the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct; so the department strongly advises that you send immediately by the Iowa to Schley to proceed off Santiago with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos . . The peculiar phraseology of the telegram, taken in connection with the Navy Department's in sistence upon the necessity of Cervera's coming within reach of Havana, ,aused doubt in Samp son's mind, and he thus determined to hold the status quo until further information should be obtained. He thus wrote Commodore Schley to that effect, sending a personal letter and an official dispatch by the Iowa and a duplicate by the Dupont, which vessels also carried copies of a memorandum prepared by Commander McCalla regarding the Cuban forces west of Cienfuegos which showed that he had com municated with them, and mentioning a con venient landing place some 13 miles from the port. Corroboration of Cervera's arrival coming the evening of the 20th through the Key West cable office from an employee in Havana who had also sent the first, a dispatch was prepared to go by the Marblehead, supposed ready to leave for Cienfuegos, saying, "Spanish squadron prob ably at Santiago de Cuba — four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you arc satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port. . . ." As it appeared during the night that the Marblehead might be delayed, Sampson upon arrival off Havana in the afternoon (21 May) sent the Hawk as the fastest of the squadron with a copy of the dispatch, and an additional memorandum, the tenor of which urged the utmost dispatch as did also the verbal instructions which Lieutenant Hood of the Hawk was ordered to communicate. Sampson moved with the available force on the north side of Cuba to Nicolas Channel, in order to have an advanced position in case Cervera should move toward Havana from the east. Hood ar rived off Cienfuegos at 7.30 A.M. 23 May, de livered his dispatches and repeated the verbal instructions. He returned the same day, reach ing Havana 25 May with dispatches from Schley which reached Sampson at 9.30 P.M. of the 26th by the Dolphin, whose failure to pick up the squadron earlier was a startling instance of the difficulty of finding even a large force at sea. Schley wrote that he was by no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfue gos, giving a number of reasons for his belief, one of which was his having heard guns the afternoon of 21 May (when about 40 miles from Cienfuegos), which he took to be a wel come to the Spanish fleet. Lights, which turned out to be signals by the Cubans as arranged with Commander McCalla, had been seen to the westward of the harbor, but this arrange ment, not having been communicated to Com modore Schley, was not acted upon, though the fact of the presence of Cuban troops in that vicinity was known from the memorandum previously mentioned. The report of Captain Dayton of 20 July when blockading Cienfuegos would seem to show that it was not necessary to apply to the Cubans for knowledge regard ing ships in the harbor. Dayton says (p. 219 Appendix to Report of Chief of Bureau of Navigation 1898) : eDuring the afternoon I made as close an inspection [of Cienfuegos Harbor] as practicable. From aloft could de tect in the inner harbor four large steamers flying Spanish colors, one with four masts and one smoke stack, one with three masts and one smoke stack, and two with two masts and one smoke stack; also two fair-sized gun boats, the larger being apparently of the E,smer alda class. . . . The four-masted steamer was surrounded by lighters and appeared to be dis charging cargo." The arrival of Commander McCalla, how ever (with the Marblehead, 24 May), who at once found the Cubans at the point which had been designated in his memorandum settled the fact that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos. Com modore Schley thus left that evening with his squadron making, however, such slow progress that he was not off Santiago, 315 miles from Cienfuegos, until the afternoon of 26 May. The Yale, Saint Paul and Minneapolis were at the moment off Santiago by orders of the Navy Department to watch the port, and on the morn ing. of 25 May the Saint Paul had captured the British collier Restormel with 2,400 tons of coal which had already touched at Porto Rico and Curacao from which latter place she had been ordered to Santiago. The Harvard which had also been there had gone to Saint Nicolas Mole to send a dispatch received by the Scorpion 24 May from Commodore Schley. The three other ships, sighting the smoke of a number of ships to the south, had steamed in that direction, thus leaving the port without any observing ship, a fact which as will appear later might have had most serious consequences. It was found that Commodore Schley had determined to return to Key West and at 7.45 P.M., signal being made to that effect, the squadron headed westward with the collier Merrimac in tow of the Yale. The frequent breaking of the towline caused little progress to be made. The Harvard on the morning of 27 May reached the squadron and delivered a telegram received from the Navy Department at Saint Nicolas Mole the pre ceding morning (26 Mav), the more important part of which was that directing him to pro ceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer present off Santiago de Cuba as follows: *All Department's information indi cates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The Department looks to you to
ascertain fact and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action.. . .° This was answered (sending the Harvard to Kingston for this purpose and for coal) in a telegram, the main parts of which are as fol lows: *. . . Merrimac's engine is disabled and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely un able to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of squadron. . . . It is to be regretted that the Department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West via Yucatan passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy. . ." This was a very unhappy tele gram in view of the facts that the Iowa, Massa chusetts, Castine and Dupont had coaled from the collier at various times and that the Texas and Marblehead took coal the evening of the day the dispatch was sent; that while it was but 790 miles to Key West, the Massachusetts had sufficient coal to steam, at 10 knots, 2,371 miles; the Iowa, 2,028; the Texas, 1,459. The Brooklyn had enough to have blockaded 32 days; the Massachusetts, 24; the Iowa, 18; the Texas, 14, and the Marblehead about 6 days and still have enough to go to Gonalves Bay in Hayti (Testimony Schley Court of Inquiry, p. 535). There was, moreover, the splendid and commodious harbor of Guantanamo but 40 miles east of Santiago, to be had, so to speak, for the asking. Had the squadron gone to Key West, it would still have had to coal at an anchorage in the open sea. Nor was any real endeavor made to get information as to the presence of the Spanish squadron. Most fortunately the next day, 28 May, Commodore Schley, now 38 miles west of Santiago, decided to return and go off the port. He arrived there the same evening and the question of the presence of the Spanish squadron was fixed by discovering the Colon moored near the harbor entrance; and another man-of-war and two destroyers near her. Cervera had been twice on the point of leaving Santiago for San Juan, Porto Rico, and steam was actually got up on the evening of 26 May, and every preparation made to leave, when his heart failed him at the report that the swell was sufficient to cause danger of the Colon's strik ing a rock off Point Morillo on which there was but two and one-half feet of water more than the Colon drew. With the American squadron so far (20 miles at 8 p.m.) to the south and with the intended departure so near nightfall, it is very probable the Spanish squadron would have got away unnoticed. There is no need to dwell upon the sensation such an escape would have made.
Schley's telegram of 27 May produced con sternation at Washington. Sampson on the north side of Cuba had occupied Nicolas Chan nel 25 May. The force in the beginning was a very meagre one, the New York and Indiana being the only armored ships; with these were the gunboats, Newport, Vicksburg, Mayflower, Machias, and the torpedo boats Rodgers and Foote. If the Spanish squadron should be met it was expected that the gunboats should be sacrificed in the general attack. In the afternoon of the same day, however, the fast and excellently armed cruiser New Orleans joined, and by the 25th were added the Montgomery (with the broad pennant of Commodore Watson), the Cin cinnati, Detroit, Miantonomoh, Puritan, Terror, Amphitrite, Wilmington. Wasp and Vesuvius ; a powerful force if the Spanish squadron would only wait an attack, but amounting to little if it should use its speed to escape. This hetero geneous collection of ships was fitly called by the men the "Bargain Countero squadron. The dispatches brought by the Dolphin in the night of 26 May, announcing that Commodore Schley had not moved from Cienfuegos, caused the Wasp to be dispatched to him with an order to proceed "with all possible dispatch to Santiago to blockade that port. If on arrival there you receive positive information of the Spanish ships having left, you will follow them in pur suit." This, of course, was not delivered, the Wasp having found that Commodore Schley had already gone. Sampson supposed this might be the case,•as appears in his telegram of 27 May to Washington, and his supposition was confirmed by a telegram sent by the torpedo boat Dupont 24 May by Commodore Schley to Key West for transmission to Washington. in which he mentioned that he would east ward tomorrow" (25th), though in fact he left that night. The mention of this delay, how ever, decided Sampson to go himself to Santiago. The New Orleans was ordered there with the collier Stirling, and her commander, Captain Folger, was ordered to communicate with Schley "and direct him to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that port? He also carried directions to use the Merrimac to block the harbor entrance, a suggestion for do ing so also coming from the Navy Department. Though somewhat criticised, this was wise from the point of view at the time. The tele gram of the Secretary of the Navy of 5 May directed Sampson not to so risk his ships against fortifications "as to prevent from soon after ward successfully fighting the Spanish fleet composed of the Pclayo, Colon, Teresa and four torpedo boat destroyers if they should ap pear on this side." Spanish reinforcements were thus regarded possible; there were two destroyers in Santiago and the danger to ships on blockade of being torpedoed would be con stant; to hermetically seal a powerful squad ron in the port, the entrance channel to which was less in breadth than the length of a ship of moderate size, thus leaving our own force free for other operations, was sound policy and so held by every one consulted.
Sampson arrived at Key West at 2 A.M. 28 May and found the Oregon, which had com pleted her brilliant voyage of 16,000 miles, 26 Hay. She was reported ready for any service and left during the day for the squadron in Nicolas Channel. At eight Sampson received the telegram announcing the intention to send 10,000 troops to Santiago and that he was ex pected to convoy the transports, going in per son; but about midnight the department's telegram arrived, reporting Schley's intention, expressed in his telegram of the 27th, to re turn to Key West and asking Sampson how soon he could reach Santiago with the New York, Oregon, Indiana and some lighter ves sels, and how long he could blockade there, sending his ships singly to a coaling point. Sampson answered this at 3 A.M. (29th), that he could reach Santiago in three days and could blockade indefinitely; that he thought he could occupy Guantanamo; and that he "would like to start at once with the New York and Oregon, arriving in two days. Do not quite understand as to the necessity of awaiting the arrival of Schley but would propose meeting and turning back the principal part of the force tinder his command if he has left. Try to bold him by telegraph. Watson will he in charge of everything afloat. Does the Depart ment approve proposed action?" About noon, no reply having been received, Sampson sent another telegram urging immediate reply. A little latter came one from Commodore Schley direct and also the substance of the same re peated from the Navy Department, showing that he had arrived off Santiago and that he would remain "until coal supply of larger vessels has given out . . ." ; and also announcing the capture of the collier Restormel by the Saint Paul. Sampson replied to this "Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade at all hazards, especially at night; very little to fear i from torpedo boat destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever conditions permit. Send a ship to Guantanamo with view to occupying it as base, coaling one heavy ship at a time. Ap praise captured coal, use if desired and after ward send ship in as prize." In the afternoon the desired permission to go to Santiago was received and at 11 P.M. the New York, having finished coaling, left for Nicolas Channel, reaching the squadron at 7 A.M. Commodore Watson was conferred with and at 9.07, signal being made to the Oregon, Mayflower and torpedo boat Porter to form column on the New York, Sampson stood east ward at 13 knots. The squadron arrived off Santiago at 6 A.M. 1 June (in less than two days) having met in the Bahama Channel the Yale and Saint Paul. From Captain Sigsbee of the latter, the admiral received copies of several telegrams from Commodore Schley taken by the Saint Paul to Nicolas Mole, which showed that the enemy's ships had been seen in port, and that the situation would be held. As the squadron arrived, the Colon and one of the Vizcaya class were seen about seven eighths of a mile within the entrance, but they moved out of sight almost at once, which, in the case of the Colon, could be done without unmooring, by veering the hawsers attached to the shore and heaving in on her chain, the distance to go to take her out of view being very slight (her log mentions leaving, her moor ings at this point at 10.35 A.m.). The day pre vious (21 May) Commodore Schley had gone aboard the Massachusetts and with the Iowa and New Orleans had fired upon the Colon and the batteries at the entrance. The ships passed the entrance twice at a speed of 10 knots and the ranges, as stated in the Iowa's log, at first 8,500 yards, increasing to 11,000. The total time of firing stated by the Massachusetts was 7 minutes 35 seconds. One shell, reported in the Colon's log as exploding near the stern, did some slight damage, but a battle between ships at the ranges reported in the log of the Iowa, 8,500 to 11,000 yards (from nearly five to over six miles), or even at 7,000 (four miles), the range first proposed, and lasting the time re ported by the Massachusetts, could not be effective.