Sampson at once made preparations for sinking the Merrimac, Naval Constructor Hob son being put in charge, as he had been previ ously directed, as an expert, to study the ques tion of the best steps to be taken to sink her quickly. Hobson was finally allowed to take the ship in. Many were as eager to go as he, the officers and men volunteering by the hundreds, but Sampson was moved to let it fall to Hobson from a sense of fairness, in that he had done the whole work of preparation. It was breaking day when the ship finally started and it became so light that she was recalled and sent in the night following; but her steering gear being shot away, she drifted. before sinking, too far up the channel to block it in any degree. Had her how taken the east side of the channel at the point proposed, her stern would have swung with the tide (running flood) in such a way that the channel would have been closed almost as a caisson closes a dry dock. It was fortu nate, of course, in the light of events that it was otherwise. Hobson in his graphic and most excellent account says that he would more certainly have succeeded had he not been recalled on his first start. The writer is now inclined to agree with him and rather the more as an amend for his share in causing his recall. But the fame of an heroic act is Hobson's all the same, and the failure made the third of July victory possible.
Sampson on arrival had found the Flying Squadron moving in east and west in face of the port. He changed this, placing the ships with their heads toward the harbor en trance on a six-mile radius, which made a semi-circle of about nine miles. (This was later reduced to four during the day and three at night, with much less for certain ships). An order of battle was issued 2 June dividing the fleet into two squadrons, one (to the east) un der the personal command of the commander in-chief, the other (to the west) under Com modore Schley. This order enjoined: the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any ma terial injury to battleships." On 6 June the batteries were actively bombarded. The next day Guantanamo Bay was occupied by the Marblehead and Yankee and thenceforward was Sampson's base; the fort at the head of the deep water bay was destroyed 15 June by the Texas, Marblehead and Suwanee, the two former coming in contact each with a heavy gun cotton mine, but, in the pious language of Captain Philip, in his report, 'rowing to Divine care neither of them exploded." While every combatant is ready to suppose Providence on his side, some credit ought to be given to the barnacles which had grown so actively that the mine machinery could not operate. On the 10th, the marine battalion arrived in the Pan ther and at once went into camp, where from 11 May to the 14th it underwent a severe fire from the enemy, occupying a commanding posi tion, in which some lives were lost. On the 14th, however, a force of two companies of marines and 50 Cubans, under Captain Elliott, attacked some 500 of the Spanish and destroyed their only water supply, from which time the bay and vicinity remained undisturbed though there was a force of over 7,000 Spanish at and near Guantanamo town, 12 miles from the bay head.
On 7 June a memorandum for night duty was issued ordering three picket launches to be placed one mile from the Morro, the Vixen, Suwanee and Dolphin on a two-mile radius from the Morro, the larger ships to come within a four-mile radius. The memorandum con tinued: again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close blockade of this port, es pecially at night and in had weather. In the daytime, if clear, the distance shall not be greater than 6 miles; at night or in thick weather, not more than 4 miles. The end to he attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The es cape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige and to a speedy end of the war. . . .° Memo randum No. 14, issued the next day (8 June), had a most important hearing upon the final successful result. It directed the battleships to take turns of two hours each, beginning at dark, in illuminating the harbor entrance with a search light. Later a second battleship was kept close to the illuminating ship so that the former could do any firing necessary without disturbing the illumination. The ship using the search light was kept not beyond two miles from the Morro and was ferquently nearer. The effect was a complete lighting up of the harbor entrance, making it impossible for the smallest craft to appear without being seen. It was the main element, as Admiral Cervera nientions, in preventing any attempt to leave at night. Memorandum 20 of 15 June directed that the distance of four miles from the en trance during daytime should under no cir cumstances, even when coaling, be exceeded. The next day the batteries were again bom barded. It was clear to the admiral's mind that in themselves they were not to be taken as a serious obstruction to the fleet. The Vesu vius had arrived 13 June and from this time forward for many nights shook the vicinity with the explosion of her shells. While it cannot be said that they produced much actual damage, as there was so little to sustain dam age, the batteries being hut small objects for such practice, they certainly had a very marked moral effect upon those in the vicinity of their fall, the Pluton, by Spanish accounts, being so violently lifted once that every one was thrown off his feet. The New Orleans and Texas had each by order of the admiral en gaged singly the batteries and it was clear that they alone were not an obstruction to the fleet; but the mines had to be reckoned with and Sampson urged the sending of the army, tele graphing that with 10,000 men the city and squadron could be captured in 48 hours. His only view of the case, and the correct ,one, was to land in the vicinity of the entrance, capture the batteries and occupy the adjacent positions, so that the fleet could at leisure lift or destroy the mines and enter the harbor.