When the war came the regular army of the United States had but 2,116 officers and 25,706 enlisted men. There were 25 regiments of in fantry, 10 of cavalry and 5 of artillery. The bill approved 22 April declared all able-bodied male citizens from 18 to 45 liable to military duty; that the President might call upon each State and Territory for troops in proportion to its population; that the regimental and company officers should be named by the governors of the States, the general and staff officers by the President. On 23 April a call was made for 25,000 men. On 26 April additional enlistments in the regular army were authorized tempo rarily to a total of 62,597 men. In May the en rolments amounted to 124,776 men. A second call 25 May for 75,000 caused the volunteer army to reach in August its highest number, 216,256. Immediate steps were taken by the War Department toward concentration, chiefly at Chickamauga, Tenn., Camp Alger, Va., and at Tampa, Fla.; the last being selected as the point of departure of the invading force for Cuba, though many, including its general-in chief advocated strongly making no move to invade the island until October on account of its supposed deadly summer climate. Historical precedents were brought to bear showing the fearful losses of expeditions of earlier cen turies; with as much reason might one have deprecated living in London because it once suf fered from the plague. It was, as we came to know from the experience of the marines at Guantanamo, a question of care; but this care could not he given without experience on the part of officers and men, and the officers of the regular force were too few to count as against the rawness and ignorance of the vastly greater number of volunteer officers who had never known anything of the care of troops. The zeal and spirit of the army of volunteers, composed, as much of it was, of the best blood and intelli gence of the country, were far from being an offset to their inexperience in the field. The army corps numbered eight, but the sixth was never organized. The fifth, under Major-Gen eral Shafter, at Tampa, numbering about 15,000 men; and a part of the eighth, Major-General Merritt (some 11,000 out of a total of 16,000 at San Francisco) were those actively employed before hostilities ceased. Shafter received crders 9 May °to move his command under protection of the navy and seize and hold Mariel on the north coast of Cuba, where ter ritory is ample to land and deploy army," troops to be fully equipped, abundance of am munition and food for men and animals for 60 days. Such orders indeed point a moral in the circumstances, and in themselves stand an all-sufficient reason for the general staff now in being. An expedition under Col. R. H. Hall had landed some arms and supplies for the insurgents and this was followed 11 May with one under Captain Dorst with 100 men of the First Infantry who attempted a landing 40 miles west of Havana hut were repulsed. The fail ure -was due partially to newspaper publicity, partially to the use of the Gussie, a very con spicuous and rather ridiculous looking side wheel steamer, as well known along the Cuban shore as Morro Castle. Sampson received a telegram 28 May announcing the intention to send 10,000 troops to Santiago which he was expected to convoy in person, and the War Department had at once begun to collect trans ports at Tampa. General Shafter telegraphed 1 June that he was progressing rapidly with loading transports and that he expected to be ready to start Saturday morning (4 June). The gunboats Annapolis, Helena, Castine and Hornet were at Tampa; when all should he ready the fleet to rendezvous to westward of Dry Tortugas, where it was to he met by the battleship Indiana, the Detroit, Bancroft, Man ning, Wasp, armed tugs Wompatuck and Osce ola; the whole naval force to be under the command of the senior officer, Captain Taylor of the Indiana. On 9 June, however, Sampson received a dispatch from Key West via Nicolas Mole that the armed yacht Eagle had on the night of 7 June, when 15 miles north one-half cast of Bahia de Cadiz light, sighted to the north northwest an armored ship, a protected cruiser and two destroyers in fleet formation, and that the Eagle had scouted abreast °until character of Spanish vessels was ascertained. . . . One deep sea torpedo vessel chased Eagle for a short time. . . Resolute con firms it." The next day Sampson received a telegram from the Navy Department that the army expedition was stopped temporarily on account of the report Eagle and Resolute: that the convoy was distributed to scour the straits and re-enforce the blockade, and he was di rected to send two of his fastest armored ships to search through Nicolas Channel, and then to re-enforce the convoy. The telegram asked °Are you sure all four Spanish armored cruisers are at Santiago?" The only action taken by Sampson was to telegraph that he had no con fidence in the report and that he considered it very unwise to suspend operations on this ac count, °but even if it is found correct there is sufficient force to furnish convoy. Armored vessel was probably Talbot which was sighted Thursday at 9 A.m. by the Scorpion standing east; am confident no large ship escaped from here. . . ." His view was correct, the ar mored ship as is now known was the English cruiser Talbot which left Havana that evening and was sighted by the Eagle at the same time with the Armeria and Supply under convoy of the Scorpion. Sampson sent for the log of the Scorpion, determined her position at the time and so telegraphed the Navy Department. To set the matter completely at rest Lieutenant Blue, who volunteered for the service, was landed 11 June at Aserradero, 15 miles west of Santiago, whence he went inland with guides furnished by General Rabi to a hill overlooking Santiago Bay. He reported aboard his ship, the Suwanee, again the morning of the 13th, after a journey of 70 miles (the same officer made a similar journey 25 June to locate each ship). Sampson's telegram and Blue's report fixed the question of starting the army expedi tion and on the 14th the force, 819 officers and 15,058 men, was under way. There is no need to dwell upon the shortcomings of transport or organization for the movement of so large a body of men over sea; such difficulties are the natural outcome of the want of organization which existed for so many years. Almost the worst feature of the whole was the clothing worn ; the men landed in the tropics in that in which they came from our coldest climates. The expedition arrived off Santiago the morn ing of 20 June, stopping by arrangement 20 miles south of the port. Captain Chadwick. chief of staff, was sent by Admiral Sampson in the Gloucester to see General Shafter, and took with him a chart of the harbor to ex plain to Shafter Sampson's views with regard to his proposed assault and capture of the har bor entrance in order that the fleet might enter. General Shafter at the time entirely agreed with this view, as indeed his orders of 31 May from the War Department suggested. His ship, the Seguranca, then steamed up to the squadron; Sampson and his assistant chief of staff Staunton, came aboard and a visit was paid to Garcia's camp near Aserradero. gen eral Shafter apparently dropped the scheme of assaulting the batteries and determined to land at Daiquiri, 17 miles east of Santiago, used as a port for the shipment of ore by an American mining company. There were, how ever, no conveniences for landing, beyond a very small wooden wharf ; the place was a mere indentation in the coast line giving some pro tection from the usual southeast swell. Cap tain Goodrich of the Saint Louis was put in charge of the landing beginning 22 June. a task which was executed with great success. In all 29 boats, of which 12 were steam launches, were furnished from the fleet besides the 23 of the Saint Louis. A feint was made by the fleet and 10 of the transports of disembarking at Cabanas Bay, two miles west of the harbor. General Rabi with 500 Cubans was also to make a demonstration near by. The New Or leans, Detroit, Castine and Wasp were sta tioned off Daiquiri, the Helena, Bancroft and Hornet at Siboney (seven miles nearer Santiago than Daiquiri), the Gloucester and Eagle at Aguadores (three miles east of the port) and the Texas, Vixen and Scorpion at Cabo iias: the extent of coast line covered was 32 miles. Great difficulty was experienced through the wretched conduct of many of the transport captains who were under no proper control and wandered over the sea at will. Hours were spent in finding some of them and when found they would insist upon lying miles from a shore which they could have approached with safety within a ship's length. By sunset 6,000 men were ashore with the loss of two drowned by the capsizing of a boat. The immediate de sertion by the Spaniards, under the fire of the fleet, of all the points about Daiquiri and Si boney, but 10 miles from Santiago, caused the transfer to the latter points of landing opera tions, and this was thenceforward the army base. Wheeler, the senior officer ashore (Shafter remaining aboard until the 29th), ordered Young to make a forward movement on the 23d, which brought about the skirmish of Las Guasimas, in which the 1st and 10th Cavalry and the Rough Riders, all of course unmounted, were engaged. The American loss out of the 964 in the fight was 16 killed and 52 wounded. The Spaniards retreated leaving 11 dead. On 24 June the last of the troops had been landed and two days later the field bat teries were ashore. Shafter sent a telegram to the War Department gracefully acknowledging the services of the navy: them I could not have landed in 10 days and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost many boats in the surf?) More difficult, however, was the question of getting supplies ashore as the fleet's boats with their crews had to return to their ships; and the army had a hand to mouth existence for days which must have been a serious element, through ill nourishment, in the development of the sickness later. On the 25th and 26th Garcia's force of 2,978 was trans ported from Aserradero; on the 27th the 33d and part of the 34th Michigan arrived under Brigadier-General Duffield from Camp Alger and went into camp at Siboney. By 30 June the American force was in face of the Span ish positions to the east and northeast of Santiago and in the afternoon a council was called in which plans were made for the battle of next day, 1 July; Lawton's division to assault El Caney at daybreak, and afterward take position on the right of Wheeler's and Kent's divisions and assist in the general attack on the lines to the east of and near Santiago. It is impossible in the space to deal with the details of these actions, which reflected the greatest credit upon both victor and vanquished. The
American force was greatly superior in num bers, the force under Generals Lawton, Chaffee, Ludlow and Colonel Miles (commanding a brigade) reinforced during the day by Bates' command attacking El Caney, numbering 6,654, against about 500 Spanish, who, occupying a strong defensive position, maintained them selves most heroically, losing 300 killed and wounded and 150 captured. Among the killed were General Vara de Rey and his two sons. The American losses at this point were 88 killed and 355 wounded. The action was most ill-advised: Had Lawton merely contained the small force at El Caney and joined on the right at once, Santiago, in all probability, would have been carried at once. The attack upon the main Spanish lines east of and near the city, along the crest of San Juan Hill, was made by the dismounted cavalry division under General Wheeler and the first infantry divi sion under General Kent, the whole force num bering 8,336 men. Lieutenant Miley, of Shaf ter's staff, gives the numbers of the Spanish as 750 in the most advanced position on San Juan Hill and 3,500 immediately in the rear. There were about 1,000 men ashore from the Spanish squadron under Cervera's chief of staff, Cap tain Bustamente, who was mortally wounded. San Juan Hill was occupied by the Americans after a most courageous and bloody struggle with the loss of 144 killed and 951 wounded. The casualties of the day were thus over 10 per cent of the force engaged. It may con fidently be said that few armies would have won success under the immense disadvan tages to which Americans were subjected. Suddenly transported to a tropical climate, with clothing of a character in itself to madden a man into illness, with the scantiest of rations for days, subjected daily to torrential rains, fighting through the thickest of jungle, op posed by an entrenched foe with smokeless powder, it required to win men such as com posed this force, the finest in the writer's opin ion, through its practical experience and train ing, ever put into the field. Nor must the dis abilities of the Spanish be overlooked. They were ill-fed, had long undergone the,depressing effects of the tropics and were in no condition to meet a determined foe. They showed the obstinate courage always shown by their race when on the defensive, and sustained to the full its honor.
Admiral Sampson, at the request of General Shafter, had supported, on the 1st, a demon stration at Aguadores by a force commanded by General Duffield; the few Spanish seen hav ing disappeared, the New York and Oregon fired a number of eight-inch shells over the hills in the direction of Santiago and the ships in the bay. The evening of this day Colonel Escario with 3,500 men entered Santiago from Manza nillo, a reinforcement which in the existing destitution but added to the difficulties of the Spanish. Sampson at Shafter's request bom barded again the batteries at the entrance 2 July. Shortly after, Shafter sent a message urging Sampson to force an entrance, to which reply was made that this was impossible until .en trance was cleared of mines; a work of some time after the forts should be taken. Shafter stated it was impossible to say when he could take these and if as difficult as what he had been pitted against, it would require time and great loss of life. gI am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men, to cap ture the forts along the bay." Sampson at once replied that the forts could not prevent his en trance but that it was a question of mines, to attempt to go over which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more ships, thus pre venting further progress by the fleet. He said: was my hope that an attack on your part on the shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes. If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in the attempt.* The Resolute, carrying 40 mines, was at once ordered from Guanta namo and Sampson purposed, as soon as the arrangements could be made for countermining, to bring up the battalion of marines, with which and with those of the squadron, about 1,000 in all, he proposed to assault the western side of the entrance, the army to take the eastern. His chief of staff went to Siboney to arrange for a consultation respecting this combined action be tween the two commanders-in-chief. This con sultation was set for the next morning, Sunday, 3 July. During the night there were several large fires on the distant hill tops, evidently the burning of block houses. The Massachusetts, as soon as her searchlight duty had ended at 4 A.m. (3 July), left for Guantanamo for coal. The ships present were in order from east, the Glou cester, Indiana, New York, Oregon, Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn, Vixen; the armed yacht Hist; the torpedo boat Ericsson and the transport Resolute carrying the mines, which had been brought the day previous from Guantanamo. At 8.50 A.M. the New York had begun to turn toward Siboney, but seven miles from her posi tion, to carry Sampson to the meeting with General Shafter. She had been fairly on her course from 30 to 35 minutes when, attracted by the sound of a gun from the Socapa battery, the Spanish ships were reported leaving the harbor. The flagship, then seven and a half miles east of the harbor entrance, at once turned, hoisting the signal, °Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels.* On account of the position of the sun, behind the signal, it is not probable that this signal was read by either the Gloucester or the Indiana, both of which were nearer to the New York (the former less than half the dis tance at the time of the latter's turning) than to the Brooklyn. The Teresa and Colon, the one flying the admiral's flag, the other unmistakable because of her peculiar features, were named by the signal quartermaster as they came out. After the fourth (the Oquendo) there was a very appreciable interval before the destroyers appeared, the last emerging about 10 o'clock. Several of the ships hoisted almost at the same time the signal °Enemy's ships escaping)) though the Iowa seems to have been the first, as from her position she had the best view into the har bor. All the ships at once closed in and began firing upon the escaping Spaniards who stood west close in shore. The American ships natu rally converged to the north, taking up a more westerly course as the Spanish ships moved westerly. The Brooklyn, however, made at this juncture a turn with the port helm, opening the way to the west to the Spaniards, and endanger ing the Texas, which backed her engines to avoid collision. One after the other the Teresa and Oquendo were seen to turn inshore afire and they were beached, the Teresa five and one -half, the Oquendo six miles west of the harbor entrance. The destroyers Pluton and Furor were fired upon by the Indiana and Iowa, but were destroyed the small bight four miles west of Santiago largely by the fire of the Gloucester which engaged them with the utmost intrepidity. They were also fired at by the New York. The Vizcaya and Colon were still steaming west but the former hauled down her colors and turned in to the beach at Aserradero, 143/4 miles from the harbor, crossing the bows of the New York within a few hundred yards. The flagship signaled the Indiana to return off the port. The Iowa remained near the Vizcaya with the Ericsson and Hist to rescue the Viz caya's crew. The Gloucester rendered the same service to the Teresa and Oquendo, assisted later by the Indiana, Iowa and Hist, a duty which was rendered under great difficulties and danger. The chase of the Colon continued, the ships in pursuit the Brooklyn, Oregon, Vixen, Texas and New York (taken in order from sea ward). The Oregon began firing her 13-inch guns at 10,000 yards range and the shot went over; her eight-inch guns were also tried but fell short as did the Brooklyn's. The Oregon reduced the range to 9,500, to 8,500, then 9,000, when at 120 the Colon hauled down her colors, turned inshore and an her bows on the steep beach where empties the little river Turquino under the mountain of the same name, the high est in Cuba (8.400 feet). The nearest ships had still over five miles to run to reach this point and on arriving near, Captain Cook of the Brooklyn boarded the Colon and received her surrender. He stopped on his return and re ported aboard the New York which was the third ship to arrive, having passed the Texas and Vixen.* The Oregon was ordered to take charge of the Colon. The ship, however, was clearly sinking. All her sea valves had been opened and though every effort was made to save her, and when the rising tide had floated her during the evening she was pushed hard ashore by the New York, she turned over on her side as she sunk and there remains. The Resolute, ordered by the commander-in-chief to report at Guan tanamo the exit of the Spanish squadron, had met off Daiquiri an Austrian man-of-war whose flag was so similar to that of Spain that a warn ing memorandum had been issued in expectancy of a visit from the Maria Theresa, which this ship turned out to be. The Resolute, taking the ship for Spanish, turnedwestward, warned the Harvard at Siboney, which also sighting the stranger stood west with the same news. The Resolute arrived at Rio Tarquino with the news, the Brooklyn was ordered to investigate the report and proceeding to the eastward met the Austrian vessel and after some delay ascer tained her character. The distance from the Santiago entrance to the point where the Colon was beached is 52 nautical miles. Taking the ships Successively from the east to west posi tions, the New York was 59Y2 miles, the Oregon 53, the Texas sog, the Brooklyn miles from this point when the Spanish ships came out. Allowing five minutes to get headway and two miles for changes of direction of the Brooklyn, the speeds of the Oregon and Brook lyn to 1.20 P.M., when the Colon surrendered and these ships as established by the Oregon's gun ranges were four and one-fourth miles east of the Colon's turning in point, were for the Oregon 13.37 knots and for the Brooklyn 12.06; for the New York to the time of stopping at 2 P.m. at the point of beaching (allowing five minutes to turn) 13.73; the Texas to the same point, and allowing one mile lost in backing and her time of arrival as 2.05, 11.72 knots.