His squadron was composed of the following: The ships carried also 36 six- and three pounders, 40 smaller guns and 19 torpedo tubes; the crews numbered 1,743 men. The revenue cutter McCulloch, lately arrived, had been joined to the squadron, but was lightly armed, and could not be considered as adding to his fighting force. At Manila, under Rear-Admiral Montojo, these ships were available for action : Two 2.9-inch, two 2.7-inch, 27 six- and three pounders, 19 smaller guns and 17 torpedo tubes, with crews amounting to 1.695 men, were car ried by the ships just mentioned. Besides there were the Velasco of 1,139 tons with two of her four guns at El Fraile and two gunboats, the Correo and General Lezo of 525 tons and three 4.7-inch guns each. All these were under repairs and took no part in the coming action, the crew of the Velasco manning the hastily built batter ies at the entrance of the bay 25 miles from Manila. The Castilla, a wooden ship, built in 1881, had to be towed, as she could not use her engines. It must be admitted that the Spanish outlook was a sorry one and fully as hopeless as the report of Admiral Montojo indicates it to have been in his own mind.
The Baltimore had arrived at Hongkong 22 April and was allowed by the Hongkong au thorities to be docked. On the 25th the British governor requested Dewey to leave and the squadron went to Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant on the China Coast, where it awaited the arrival of 0. F. Williams, the American consul to Manila, whose local knowledge was regarded valuable. He came 27 April and that after noon the squadron left in accordance with the Navy Department's telegram, sent 24 April, announcing that war had begun and directing Dewey to operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy.* The telegram ended utmost endeavors,* words which might have been spared. On the same day that the American squadron went to Mirs Bay, Mon tojo left with the Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon and the Marques del Duero for Subig Bay, an excellent defensive point 50 miles distant from Manila, and one where batteries had been be gun by Spanish army engineers. The bay was the site of a proposed new Spanish naval ar senal, some buildings for which had already been erected. Montojo towed the Castilla. Three vessels had been sunk in the eastern en trance to Subig Bay and it had been hoped to hold the western with the batteries and ships. But the batteries were not ready. The failure of the admiral to have this knowledge before hand was in itself a startling instance of the inefficiency of Spanish administration. Re ceiving a telegram 28 April that Dewey had left for Manila, Montojo held a council and returned, mooring in a general east and west line in Cafiacao Bay, just north of the spit on which was the small naval arsenal and village of Cavite and abreast the small batteries mounting, on the sea front 4.7-inch B. L.; on Sangley Point two 5.87-inch B. L.; at Cavite three 62 inch muzzle-loading rifles. At and near Manila were 36 guns; none of these were of great range and most were ineffective. There were, how ever, four 9.45-inch breech loaders and eight of 42-inch and 5.87-inch converted to breech loaders, which might have aided Montojo's de fense had he lain close in shore off the city.
Dewey arrived off Subig the afternoon of 39 April, reconnoitered Subig with three of his ships and informed his captains assembled in consultation of his intention (the Spanish ships not being found in Subig) to stand on slowly and arrive at Manila at daybreak. He stood for the Boca Grande. The mouth of the bay, which is half way between Subig and Manila, is 10 nautical miles broad and divided by the island Corregidor two miles from the mainland on the north, which thus forms the Boca Chica (narrow mouth). On the north side of this entrance were two batteries ; one (Punta Gorda) mounted 7-inch muzzle loading rifles, the lower, two 6.2 inch B. L. Hontoria rifles. On Corregidor itself were three 7-inch muzzle loaders looking north. Two miles southeast of Corregidor is Caballo island on which were three 5.87-inch B. L. Arm strong rifles. Three and a half miles from Caballo is El Fraile, on which was a battery of three naval 4.7-inch guns taken, two from the General Lexo, one from the Don Antonio de Ulloa. All these batteries were built and manned by the navy. There were no torpedoes, the channel being too broad and deep for min ing. The squadron naturally selected the broad passage between El Fraile and Caballo, which was reached at midnight. Signals from Cor regidor showed that they were discovered and two shots were fired from El Fraile which were answered by three of the ships, and the squadron headed at slow speed for Manila, 25 miles distant. At 5.15 it was fired at from the Manila and Cavite batteries as it approached; the Spanish ships being sighted to the south ward, the American squadron turned south and opened fire at 5.41. The ships moved in column three times west and two east, about parallel to the Spanish line and at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards. At 7 the Spanish flagship made a futile effort to leave the line and attack, and at 7.35, it being erroneously reported that but 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch battery, the American squadron hauled off and the commanding officers called aboard the flag ship for consultation. The crews were given breakfast. Nothing was known at the moment of the effect of the attack, but somewhat later this was evident when the two largest Spanish ships were seen to be afire. Being assured as to the ammunition supply, the attack was re newed at 11.16 and continued until 12.40 when the American squadron returned and anchored off Manila. The Reina Cristitta, Castilla and Don Antonio de Ulloa had sunk; all the others were burned by a party sent in from the Petrel after resistance had ceased and the ships been aban doned. The Spanish loss was 167 killed and 214 wounded ; there were of the Americans 7 slightly wounded. While the American squadron was more powerful, the difference in character of ships and numbers of types of guns cannot ac count for this immunity from loss on the Amer ican side. All the ships were vulnerable to all but the very lightest of the Spanish guns. The only reasonable supposition is that the Spanish by want of practice and through temperamental excitability could not shoot with any accuracy whatever. There was courage in abundance, but no training.