The loss of Lemberg opened the way for Brussilov to the Carpathian passes and to Hun gary; and it made possible the extraordinarily rapid Russian advance toward Cracow along the two main railways which run west from Lemberg by way of Jaroslav to the north and by way of Przemysl to the south. Cracow is the key to Vienna through the Moravian gaP where the Carpathians flatten out, and to Ber lin through the valley of the Oder River. Once in possession of Cracow, Russia might hcii to strike a Napoleonic blow at either of the Teu tonic capitals. A Russian invasion of the Hun garian Plain through the Carpathian passes would endanger the transportation of the in valuable oil supply which Germany was buy ing Tor her vast automobile transport service; for the oil wells of neutral Rumania were now the only considerable source of oil left to the Germans after their loss of the Galician sup ply. Politically also such an invasion of Him gary.would gravely embarrass Austria; for the dominant Magyars in Hungary cared little for the Dual Monarchy, but much for their own in dependence. With their regiments badly disor ganized at Lemberg and Rawa Russka and the sacred soil of Hungary trodden by the Cos sacks, they might become dangerouslx lulce warm in their allegiance to the Teutonic Alli ance. It was this political danger after Lem berg which made Germany assume an ever-in creasing control over the direction of the Aus trian forces and ultimately forced her to trans fer to the Eastern Front some of the best Ger man divisions, although they were sorely needed in France. After Lemberg, accordingly, Hin denburg virtually took over the suprerne com mand from the Archduke Frederick and his chief-of-staff, Hoetzendorff, who were partly responsible for the Lemberg disaster. They had made the strategic mistake of dividing the two Austrian armies in such a way that they advanced on divergent lines and were opened to Russky's quick thrust between them. They had also underestimated the speed with which Russia could mobilize and advance to the fron tier. Dankl and Auffenberg also fell under a cloud and had to accept the direction of Ger man staff officers assigned to their armies. The change not only gave Austria abler leaders, but it.gave an even greater unity to the strategy with which the Central Powers conducted the war—a unity which was still sadly lacking in the unco-ordinated actions of the Allies on the Eastern and Western fronts.
To repair her losses in Galicia, Austria had speedily to recall from Alsace four of her best army corps which she had too confidently con sented to send to the Western Front. And in Serbia also she was forced to abandon the of fensive and draw behind the frontier the rem nants of another army which had been de feated at the Jadar River (23 August). It may be noted that the Austrian defeats at Lem berg and Rawa Russka coincided with Gertnan repulses and retreat at the Mame. Except for Samsonov's unhappy disaster at Tannenberg, the second week in September would have seen all the armies of the Central Powers in re treat or rout. Had Tannenberg not released Hindenburg's army, it would have been from her trenches in the West that Germany would have had to draw army corps to repair the Galician situation- In the fall of 1914, how ever, she was content to use mainly the troops already on the Eastern Front. She relied on the
effect which she hoped Hindenburg could se cure by moving these troops rapidly along Ger many's frontier railways for attacks on War sal.v. Before turning to these attacks on War saw, the Russian advance toward Cracow, fol lowing the battles of Lemberg and Rawa RussIca, may be briefly related.
After Lemberg and Rawa Russka there was no pattse in the Russian advance toward Cra cow. This great Austrian fortress was the main strategic objective of the Russians, who now made some shifts in the commanders. Russky, wbo had commanded so brilliantly at Rawa Russica and was noted for his strategic ability, was shifted to the cornmand of the Warsaw area. Here, at the centre of the great Russian Front, which now extended nearly 900 miles from East Prussia to the Carpathians, he at first merely flung out Cossack patrols west of Warsaw toward Lowicz and Lodz, but kept the znain part of his troops east of the Vistula. Meanwhile Ivanov began to devote his whole attention to directing the Southern Army Group advancing through Galicia to ward Cracow. Ivariov himself personally com manded the army which formed the right wing, Radko-Dmitriev cotnmanded the centre; and Brussilov still had charge of the left wing. Malt ing use of the great amount of Austrian rolling stock captured at Lemberg, Ivanov moved his infantry rapidly westward along the main rail way in northern Galicia and captured Jaroslav on 23 September. This fortress was sur rounded by 20 redoubts and had been expected to offer a stout resistance. Its capture was an important gain for Russia, because, in addi tion to being a considerable city on the main railway, it controlled a branch line running 20 miles south to the even gre,ater fortress of Przemysl. Jaroslav offered, in fact, an excel lent base for the investment and siege of Przemysl from the north. Przemysl also was a first-class modern fortress surrounded by a strong group of outlying concrete forts and by a further defense line of entrenchments and fortified positions. It sat astride the Upper San, and, being on one of the main lines from Lemberg, it controlled supplies going east or west In it had been accumulated a huge quan tity of ammunition which was to have served as Auffenberg's reserve supply. Its ordinary garrison was 30,000 men, but it was increased by 100,000 more of Auffenberg's retreating men who sought safety behind its walls — in viola tion of the military maxim that aa fortress should be defended in the field)) As the dan ger of a siege became likely, some of the civil ian inhabitants were sent out of the city, but it soon appeared that there were still far too many mouths to be fed. Przemysl was also strategic ally important in relation to the Carpathian passes. South from the city, ran a railway which split into two at the watershed between the San and the Dniester, the western branch running through the Lupkow Pass, and .the eastern branch running through the Uzsok Pass to join the network of railways in the Hungarian Plain. Przemysl was, therefore, a strategic point of utmost importance, to which the Austrians should have been able to send re serves. from Hungary. They were only pre vented from doing so by the speed with which Drnitriev and Brussilov struck westward after the fall of Lemberg.