Drnitriev, pushing westward north of the Dniester along the Lemberg-Sambor Railway, succeeded by 23 September in shutting off Przemysl on the south, just as Ivanov, by cap turning _Taroslav, was preparing to shut it off on the north. Not caring to risk the loss of life and die delay which would have been involved in an attempt to take the fortress by assault, Dmitriev left part of his infantry to sit down before Przemysl and starve it into submission. Having thus masked the fortress, he joined the rest of his forces to Ivanov's and continued to press westward along the railway toward Tar now and Cracow. On 29 September his cavalry was at Dembica, only a hundred miles from Cracow.
Meanwhile Brussilov, at the extreme south ern end of the Russian Front, occupied Stryj and pushed forward so rapidly toward the west ern Carpathians that he was able to seize the Dukla Pass on 28 September. His Cossacks even penetrated a short distance into the Hun garian plains. By the end of Septetnber, the Russian advance in Galicia seemed irresistible; the gateway into Hungary was opened; the fall of Przemysl was momentarily expected; and it seemed that Cracow would soon be reached.
At this moment Hindenburg came to the rescue of Austria. He began the first of his great strategic attacks on Warsaw which were meant to place the Germans east of the middle Vistula and thereby force a Russian retirement from western Galicia. For, if the Russians were driven out of Warsaw and forced back toward Brest-Litovsk, it would be unsafe to have the Russian left wing in Galicia protcud ing so far beyond the Russian centre. Ivanov and Dtnitriev would have to draw back to the San or the Bug to align themselves with Russky's centre. This was the aim of Hinden burg's three successive assaults on Warsaw, in grand Napoleonic style, in October and Novem ber 1914. Though he failed each time to take Warsaw, he partly succeeded in checking the Galician advance and in preventing the trans fer of troops from the Russian centre to the Russian left. This is the simple explanation of the apparently confused movements in west ern Poland in the fall of 1914. If kept con stanly in mind one may easily follow the three assaults on Warsaw and note their interrela tion with events in Galicia.
5. Hindenburg's Frontal Attacks on War saw, October-December, Hindenburg had the invaluable military quality of giving up a plan quickly the moment he was convinced that it was not likely to succeed. Instead of holding on doggedly to a doubtful effort, he would quicldy work out mid put into operation some new scheme which would surprise the enemy in another quarter. In his supreme at tacks on Warsaw, he was able to use the net work of railways which run around oh the Ger man side of the frontier to move troops back and forth around the edges of the Polish salient in the great arc from East Prussia to Cracow.
The Russians had no good air service and could not learn of these movements until they were well advanced, and when they learned, their transportation service was so poor in Poland that it was difficult for their troops to move quickly to the threatened area. Though the Germans moving on outer lines always had many more miles to travel than the Russians, moving on the inner lines, nevertheless Ger many's strategic railways always gave Hin denburg a great advantage. But if his sur prise attack did not succeed quickly it was dciomed to failure, since the delay would give the Russians time to concentrate a sufficient number of. troops for the defense. A quick surprise attack,. by shifting troops on the stra tegic railways, is the key to Hindenburg's three frontal attacks on Warsaw, as it was the main factor in his great victory at Tannenberg.
Assistance to the Austrians in Galicia and Hung.ary, though the main, was not Hi,nden bures only, motive in trying to talce Warsaw. This city,.with its population of three-quarters of a million, was the administrative and his toric capital of Poland. If he could occupy it, the Poles, who were not enthusiastic for Rus sian domination, might yet be won over to the Teutonic League by a promise of Polish inde pendence or a revived Poland might be brought indirectly under German control, by the establishtnent of a Gerrnan prince as king of Poland. If such political aims proved im possible, at any rate Warsaw would form ideal winter quarters for the German army. Possess ing three bridges across the Vistula and being the centre of the Polish railway lines, such as they were, Warsaw would form an excellent advaneed base, far in the enemy's territory, from which an advance could be made in the spring to Russia's Brest-Litovslc line of de fense. The capture of Warsaw would put the Germans east of the Vistula, deprive Russia of this great river as a line of defense and ren der untenable the Narev-Bobr line of fort resses. East Prussia, as well as western Gali cia would then be relieved from further dan ger from a Russian invasion. How did Hin denburg propose to take Warsaw by a frontal attack from the west? By 1 October Hindenburg had decided that he could not break through the Niemen line of defense. He, therefore, withdrew from the Kovno-Grodno front to positions within the F,ast Prussian frontier, where he left only a few troops to serve as a screen. No large num ber was necessary to protect this frontier, be cause he could bring the main body of his troops back again quicldy by. rail if the Rus sians should make any considerable attack— just as he had done at Tannenberg. Further more, Prussia was aself-containe& since the lakes, swamps and forests made it difficult to operate in the whole region from the Masnrian Lakes to the Niemen.