General Samsonov entered the war as a popular and highly-esteemed general. He had commanded the Siberian Cossacks with great distinction at the battle of Liao-Yang in the Manchurian campaign. He had a high repu tation among Russian common soldiers. He had accordingly been given command of the 2d Russian Army which started north frotn the Narev River toward the western end of the Masurian Lakes soon after Rennenkampf crossed the Prussian frontier from the east. Like Rennenkampf's army, Samsonov's con sisted of four army corps and several divisions of cavalry, i.e., nearly 200,000 men. It ad vanced on a front of about 20 miles toward the railway quadrilateral at the corners of which are the four Prussian towns of Eylau, AI lenstein, Soldau (just south of Tannenberg) and Ortelsburg. Within this area are the swamps and forests of the western Masurian Lalces. Samsonov had placed the 13th and 15th Anny corps in the centre with the heads of their vanguards in line and in close contact with each other. On the outside flanks of these central army corps, at a distance of about a half day's march and marching slightly to the rear, were the 6th Army corps on the right and the 1st Army corps on the left. It was understood that the main attack was to be borne by the two cen tral army corps, i.vhilst those marching slightly to the rear on the flanks were to serve as a pro tection from envelopment In case the central army corps were held up by battle, the flanking corps could in their turn move ahead to get round the flanks of the enemy, which was holding up the two central army corps. But these plans, owing in part to tactical errors on the part of the corps commanders on the flanks, were never carried out And in the end the two corps in the centre were left entirely without support. They were surrounded by a living wall of Germans and had no option but to lay down their arms and surrender, as the French had done at Sedan just 44 years belore.
At first Samsonov had had unusual success in threading his way through the tangle of forest and lalces in the Allenstein quadrilateral. His cavalry patrols met with little serious opposition until 20 August, when he found the vanguard of the German 20th Army corps from Allenstein strongly entrenched in the centre of the qqadrilateral in a line running from north east to southwest. But using his artillery to cover the attack, Samsonov had his troops rush the German trenches with hand grenades and cold steel. After severe fighting, by noon of the next day he had completely routed the Germans. Some fled toward Koenigsberg and some west toward the Vistula. The Cossacks pursued with vigor and took many prisoners. Samsonov then pushed rapidly forward and on 27 August was able, as we have seen, to occupy the town of Allenstein. Its citizens were ordered to supply 120,000 kilograms of bread, 6,000 lcilograms of sugar, 5,000 Icilograms of salt, 3,000 kilograms of tea and to have them ready in the market place by eight o'clock on the following morning.
By this time the victorious advance of Ren nenkampf and Samsonov had virtually put out of action the first field army of East Prussia; all that was left of it was either in retreat or was being shut up inside the Koenigsberg lines. The Russian patrols were advancing toward the Lower Vistula. Panic-stricken fugitives, with wild stories of universal burnings and slaugh ters, were beginning to arrive in Berlin, spread _ ing general consternation throughout Germany. At die same moment on the Western Front fugitives fleeing from von Kluck's army were beginning to arrive in Paris. It was clear that the German authorities had miscalculated the whole eastern situation and that something must be done, and done quickly, to save East Prussia.
For the Germans there were many reasons why East Prussia must be freed from the in vader at once, if possible. If the panic-stricken fugitives from the regions east of the Elbe were allowed to spread through Germany they might dampen German spirits and weaken German morale, despite the apparently extraordinary German victories in Belgium and France.
From a strategic point of view no German ad vance in Poland was possible so long as Rus sians stood in East Prussia on the northern flank of the Polish salient Moreover, a great part of the officers in the German army came from the Junker families, with estates in the invaded region, which they were keen to re cover. Sentimental reasons also urged the immediate deliverance of the sacred soil of East Prussia; for this was one of the oldest provinces of the Hohenzollerns. It had been conquered by the blood and sweat of the Teu tonic Knights nearly 700 years ago. It was the cradle of the Prussian monarchy, and in the capital ICoenigsberg, a Brandenburg elector ha.d first placed on his head the royal crown. To the kaiser it came as a personal affront that his hunting lodge in the forests at Rominten, where he used to spend some weelcs every autumn, should be desecrated by Cossack bands. For these reasons the German general staff ordered at once the concentration behind the Vistula of a relieving force, made up probably of reserves drawn from central Germany, and not, as Gourko frequently asserts, from troops taken from the Western Front. It speaks highly for the lcaiser's intelligence, or for the excellence of the German military machine, that he was able to pielc out of obscurity and retirement to coin mand this relieving army, the one man in all Germany who was probably best capable of coping with the critical situation.
Outside of a small military circle ,in Ger many Hindenburg ivas practically an unlcnown man when the Great War broke out. Born of an old Prussian military family, near the middle of the 19th century, he received at the age of 18 a lieutenant's commission in the Prussian War against Austria in 1866. In 1886 he was promoted to the position of professor in the War Academy and lectured for several years on applied tactics. As he had meanwhile been a staff officer at Koenigsberg and became inter ested in the problem of the defense of East Prussia, it was quite natural that in his lectures he gave much attention to the Masurian Lake Region. He worked out theoretical battles there with his students, and so came to have a perfect theoretical as well as a good practical knowledge of the region where three of his greatest battles were to be fought. He never wasted time, as so many German officers were accustomed to do, in playing cards and idling. He is said to have boasted that" he never read a poem or any other literary work after the Franco-Prussian War. All his time was ab sorbed in military studies. In the evenings he would sit pondering over maps spread out be fore him, marlcing movements.of troops, direct ing armies and fighting imaginary battles. In takng walks across country he would still play the soldier, ordering his boy to carry out evolu tions with imaginary troops, or halting the family party on ridge to unfold his plans for a battle there. It was his dream to lead an army corps against the enemy. But in 1911, having already reached the rank of commanding general and being 64 years of age but still in full strength and vigor, he resigned his com tnission, in order, as his brother has assured us, ((to make room for the younger men.* He retired to Hanover to live on lus pension. When the war broke out he instantly offered his services, but after three weeks of waiting he heard nothing. Then on 22 August came a dispatch giving him command of the German armies in East Prussia—in the region which he had long studied and lmew so well. He arrived by special train on the Eastern Front in the afternoon of 23 August and be gan at once one of those rapid concentrations of troops for a surpri.se attack for which he soon became so famous.