Irmdenburg saw that the two Russian armies had not yet established touch with each other. There was still time to strike theni separately, first Samsonov and then Rennen kampf. Accordingly he drew in with all pos sible speed the troops in front of Rennen kampf and massed them against Samsonov's colunms, advancing into Allenstein on 27 Aug. At the same time he sent the greater part of the fresh forces which he brought from Ger many southward on the railroad from Eylau toward Tannenberg to crush in Samsonov's left flank. These German troops attacked before Samsonov's supporting column could come up to afford protection to the two central columns. By this unexpected attack Samsonov's whole left flanlc was bent back and thrown into con fusion. Some effort was made by the Russians to retrieve the situation under the supposition, false as it soon turned out, that this first attadc from the west toward Tannenberg was the main German attack. But meanwhile Hindenburg had shifted a large part of his troops around the edges of the quadrilateral through Eylau and Allenstein to Ortelsburg. Here from the cast they attacked and crushed in Samsonov's right flank which had been left as unprotected as his left flank.
By the evening of 28 August Samsonov's position was desperate. The head of his two central columns had been driven back from the neighborhood of Allenstein where Gourko in his ride behind the German lines found only scattered dead. The sides of the central col umns had been crushed in by Hindenburg's two attacks from the west and the east, and his rear was being enveloped by an encircling movement of German troops who were cutung off all chance of retreat. The two outside corps which were to have protected his flanks had not ap peared, and in fact he had lost all touch with them. Thus surrounded, the 80,000 men of the two central corps were driven in upon them selves into the shades of Tannenberg. wood, absolutely helpless and unable to use their artil lery. In the swamps and forests they fought desperately, but without any possibility of find ing their way back to the Russian frontier. By 31 August practically all of the Russian soldiers in the two central corps, aside from ihose who were drowned or trilled, had to lay down their arms and surrender, and Samsonov himself perished in the rout The first German reports gave 3D,000 as the number of Russian prisoners taken in the battle of Tannenberg, but by the end of August the nun--ber had risen, with but slight exaggeration, to 90,000. Hindenburg's victory was so immense that the German official reports were at first received with incredulity abroad, but fuller details only confirmed the magnitude of Russia's disaster. Tannenberg was the most complete and decisive victory which the Germans won in the whole war.
Hindenburg sprang at once from the obscurity of a general in retirement into the position of the greatest Gexman hero of the war, and his. fame was deserved; for he had outmanceuvred his enemy and made the best use of all the means at his disposal.
On the Russian side Samsonov did not sur vive the battle for whose loss he was in part to blame. He had made the mistake of advanc ing the headquarters of the central corps even though he was entirely without information as to the movements of the corps on his flanks. He had supposed they would hold in check atty enveloping or flanlung movement which the Germans might attempt In reality these corps on the flanks were never in proper close touch with the two central corps (for which failure the army commander, Zhilinsky, was in part responsible) and instead of checking Hindem. burg's troops, they began to retreat to Russia as soon as they felt strong German pressure..
During the battle they not only failed to give support to Samsonov's two central corps, but they did not even keep him informed of their movements. Several times during the battle of Tannenberg, Samsonov had inquired anxiously if any news had been received of the corps on the flanks. Each time the answer was in the negative. Samsonov was in part to blame for moving his headquarters so far to the front that he infringed one of the elementary rules of military strategy, that which provides that the commander of an army shall choose as his head quarters some spot where Information can be readily brought to him and whence he can com municate with all the forces under his com mand.
Hindenburg did not attempt any pursuit of the few scattered remnants of Samsonov's army. It was not worth his while. Instead, he shifted his troops rapidly to the northwest to try to cut off Rennenkampf's army and envelope it, just as he had enveloped Samsonov's. Rennen kampf, on learning of Samsonov's catastrophe, should have prepared to retreat at once; but he hesitated. He declined to admit at first that the disaster at Tannenberg had rendered his own position untenable, and sealed the fate of the Russian invasion of East Prussia. But as it began to be clearer that Samsonov's army was annihilated, and as reports began to come in of increasing German forces threatening his own left flank and line of retreat, he seems to have completely lost all self-control. He at last gave orders for the retreat which should have been given earlier. Then he fled in a motor-car for the Russian frontier, leaving his forces to get through the hazards of their difficult retreat as best they migHt. His army lost 30,000 in prisoners before it could reach its line of defense in Russia. Such was the humiliating end to the Russian invasion of East Prussia.