Thenceforth a majestic river, unfordable, sel dom crossed by bridges, and subject to terrible floods, the Vistula forms one of the most serious military obstacles in Europe in its course northward to the Baltic. In the 19th century it had been further strengthened as a defensive position in its middle course by the construction of fortifications near its ban,.. at Ivangorod, at Warsaw, and at Novo Georgievsk where the Narev joins the Vistula. As a fur ther protection against attack from East Prussia other forts (Zegrje, Ostrolenlca, Lonna, Osso wietz and Grodno) had been stretched eastward from Novo Georgievsk to Kovno. These for tresses formed Russia's famous Narev-Bobr Niemen line of defense. It derived such addi tional strength from the swamps, ponds and forests to the north that Hindenburg twice failed in his efforts to break it.
On the south, however, toward Galicia there was no such g.00d line of defense. The bound ary was purely artificial. Here Russia was left vitally open, between Lublin and Cholm, to an Austrian thrust from the southwest which could strike behind Warsaw and the Vistula, and advance on Brest-Litovsk, as was to happen in 1915. Owing to this danger and to the belief !of Russian artillery experts that the Vistula !fortresses were out of date, it was decided by Sukhomlinov, Minister of War, after the Russo Japanese War, that Russia's main line of de fense should be moved 75 miles eastward, from the line of the Vistula to the famous Brest Litovsk line. This is formed by the Niemen and Bug Rivers. It is protected in the north by the Niemen-Bobr-Narev rivers and for tresses, and in the south by the fortresses of the Volhynian triangle— Rovno, Dubno and Lutsk. Unfortunately, in accordance with Sulchomlinov's plan, the old fortified outworks of the Vistula line were destroyed in 1912, be fore the new Brest-Litovsk line had been com pleted. But this mistake did not prove as fatal as might have been the case, because Ger many's plan of crushing France first, before turmng east to deal with Russia, gave Russia not only time to mobilize behind the Brest Litovsk line as planned, bnt even to change her plan, begin a forward movement in Poland, and make a vigorous offensive in East Prussia and Galicia.
2. Russian Mobilization and Commanders.
— Russian mobilization, for which the prelimi nary orders were probably given on 25 July 1914, took place more rapidly than the Germans had supposed possible. It was accompanied by great demonstrations of national enthusiasm and patriotism. The people felt that this was a war of defense against the hated German im perialists who had so long been threattning Russia outwardly and exploiting her inwardly through commerce, industry and office-holding. The prohibition of the use of vodka at the same time saved the Russian peasant from his greatest weakness and undoubtedly, for the time at least, added to the efficiency and speed with which mobilization was accomplished. It was complete, so far as the first armies were concerned, by the middle of August 1914, and gave Russia nearly 2,000,000 troops available on the Brest-Litovsk line. In addition to these there were 2,000,000 more men ready in Siberia and the Caucasus, and many millions more who could be eventually mustered into reserve formations and sent to the front, if arms could be found for them.
The man selected as commander-in-chief of all these forces was the tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Nicholas. He was a striking figure, power fully built, and well over six feet in height. In spite of his 59 years, he was full of energy and force. Having received his military educa tion at the famous General Staff Military Academy at Petrograd, he afterward had seen extensive experience in cavalry commands. As inspector-general of cavalry before the war he had come to know most of the cavalry leaders and practically all the prominent officers. Severe and fiery in teraper, he nevertheless had the respect and sympathy of the troops he was to command. He was every inch a soldier, and his appointment as commander-in-chief was highly hailed with enthusiasm by the whole Russian press and people. Sukhomlinov as signed to him as his nearest assistant, that is, as chief of the general staff, General Yanushke vitch, only 42 years old, but believed to be a brilliant strategist—a second Moltke. He had had, however, very little war experience and was to disappoint sadly the hopes which had been placed in him. The real strategic ability in the Russian command lay in the half dozen army group leaders and staffs like Alexeiev Brussilov, Ivanov, Russky, Komilov arid others — men who had risen by virtue of sheer ability and learned war in the bitter experiences of the Manchurian campaigns.
From the moment it became clear that Ger many was striking her raain blow first against France and was merely standing on the de fensive in the east until France could be crushes', Russia decided to change her original strategic plans. She gave up the idea of standing on the defensive behind the Brest-Litovsk line. To aid her hard-pressed French ally she decided to undertake two great offensives, one into East Prussia, the other into Galicia. This was good strategy. An invasion of East Prussia was expected sooner or later to force Germany to send troops to the Eastern Front and thus relieve the German pressure on France in the west Similarly an early invasion cf Galicia, which the Germans did not expect, would check or defeat the Austrian inva:lion of Serbia, and would also have a demoralizing effect on Austria's hold on her oppressed Slav and Rumanian subjects. If Russian troops were able to reach the Carpathian passes and threaten an invasion of Hungary, Hungarian allegiance to the Central Powers might begin to weaken. Russian success on these two flanks to the north and the south was also the necessary prelimi nary, as has been pointed out above, to any great advance by the Russian centre westward through Warsaw. Such an advance was desir able, if possible, to protect Russia's own mining and industrial cities in the western part of the Polish salient, and to threaten those of her enemy across the border in Silesia. For these offensives the Russian forces were organized into five armies arranged in two army groups, each under a commander-in-chief with his own staff.