MINOR OPERATIONS.
1. Supplementary Engagements Early in During the first half of 1916 the bat tle of Verdun overshadowed the fighting in an other parts of the Western area. Into this struggle were drawn the best of the French forces; for it was here that the fate of France seemed at stake. It was the evident purpose of the German High Command to deal France a death-blow and that done to turn at leisure against the British in the northern section of the line. To use a term common in German newspapers, France was to be *bled white.* The result showed how wisely the French High Command husbanded French resources, doing the greatest amount of damage with the smallest amount of loss. The end of the strug gle saw the French badly shaken, no doubt, but still strong and only awaiting a period of re cuperation to go on with the struggle.
In making their plans the Germans counted on a state of unreadiness in the British army. It is true that the number of Britons in arms was 5,000,000, and it is true that munitioning had progressed to a remarlcable degree; but the New Army laciced something in training for the vast task of the war. As a machine it needed *tuning up* and concentration at some point at which the weight of men and material could be made to count. Everywhere there was an ex pectation that it would soon talce the offensive on a grand scale, but it could not be ready until the summer. Perhaps, if the Germans had not forced the fighting at Verdun the grand of fensive would have been delayed unftl the au ttunn, when there would have been a mighty co operatifig attack by the armies of the two nations. By striking one of them early in the year the Germans wisely anticipated such a dou ble attack.
The inactivity of the British during the bat tle of Verdun led to some criticisms. German influences in neutral countries indulged in sneering remarks about the willingness of the British to let France sacrifice-herself, evidently hoping to create dissension between the Allies. Probably some echoes of this attitude appeared in the French press; but the responsible organs of opinion in France understood the situation too well to be caught by such a bait. In one respect the British gave material help to their Allies: Early in the year they took over the Arras sector previously held by the 10th French Army under General d'Urbal, so that their lines extended from the Sonune River to Pilkem at the northern limit of the Ypres salient, a distance of 81) miles. Beyond them was a short sector in the hands of the French and beyond that the Belgians held the line to the sea. The extension of the British lines to the Somme, besides releasing the 10th French army for serv ice elsewhere, gave the British some solid ground for their future operations and thus made their work nruch easier, when it began, than it had been in the flat and soggy area around Ypres.
In fact, during this mterval the. British were malcing steady preparations for a great attack in the region just north of the Somme. Weelcs were spent in collecting guns and ammunition in that section and in organizing the intricate sys tem of transportation behind the lines that was necessary to enable the army to move prop erly in a large-scale modern battle. The Ger mans seem to have known that some such an attack was imminent, for they did not weaken their lines before the British troops but deliv ered several sharp holding blows m that quar ter. One of their plans was to organize a strong mobile artillery force which traveled up and down the sector, shelling trenches at vari ous places and opemng the way for sharp in fantry attacks. The British troons called this artillery force ((the flying circus.) These iso lated attacks did not alter materially the rela tive positions of the two sides in the north, al though the net result was probably with the Germans. But they afforded the newly-organ ized British army some valuable training, for they were on a larger scale than the trench raids which had by this time become of almost nightly occurrence. Most of them were deliv ered in the Ypres sector, where sharp local ac tions occurred from February to May, one side attacking and receiving a counterattack, only to be succeeded by the reverse process a little later. The net result of these affairs was prac tically nil. It was an unpleasant business, as the surface of the earth was a broad mud-sluice interrupted by numerous shell-holes, into which the soldier who slipped was liable to drown. It is told of one coluinn that was sent forward to cover a distance of 200 yards that it took hours to cover it with no other obstacle in their way than the mud. The sufferings of the men were great, and especially those of the British, whose positions were generally on the plain, while their adversaries were on the hills and had the range of their trenches and lines of supply. As the time approached when the British could be expected to be ready for their great offen sive, the Germans made a series of sharper thrusts in the Ypres salient. Some writers have spoken of them as the third battle of Ypres. The term is not applicable to operations that call to mind the first and second great effort at this place, where the design was to brea1c through to the Channel ports. In this case the object was merely to retain the British forces in this section and prevent concentration on the Somme.