For the attack the British had an army under Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson containing 20 divi sions, in all about 250,000 infantry, besides ar tillery, engineers and other troops. The French had two armies to the south of the British, one commanded by General Fayolle and another by General Micheler. The first took an active part in the initial stages of the battle and had an in fantry strength of a little more than 50,000 men, while the second did not come into the struggle until it had passed into its later stages. Under Fayolle, who was an excellent com mander, were the famous 20th corps—the Iron Corps— which saved the day at Nancy in Sep tember 1914, and turned the tide at Verdun on the fateful 26 Feb. 1916, and an equally famous unit, the Colonial Corps. They were consid ered the flower of the French shock troops. In artillery the French were well supplied, and they had been using it long enough to know how to get the best results out of it. The British had a larger supply than ever before, but not as much as the situation required. Nor had they yet learned how to use it with the most precise re sults. Their troops, newly organized and well trained in the camps of instruction, lacked actual experience in large-scale fighting. They were especially weak in co-ordination of infan try and artillery service, showing themselires so eager to go ahead in the battle of the Somme that they often ran into their own barrages. In the latter part of the battle the supply of artil lery was larger, which illustrates the disadvan tage the British were under in having to begin the fighting before all their preparations were made.
The Germans on the opposite side were parts of two field armies, one commanded by Rupprecht, crown prince of Bavaria, and the other by Gen. Otto von Below —not to be con fused with the von Billow who fought at Kluck's left in the battle of the Marne. For purposes of strategy, however, von Below was under the direction of Rupprecht, as Fayolle and Micheler were under the direction of Foch, who commanded the northern great section of the French line. The Germans had about 20 divisions in the sector attacked, but they were continually shifted during the battle. It was said that each side put in more than 100 divi sions while the engagement lasted.
General Haig opened the battle on 1 July 4after the fiercest artillery bombardment of the war.4 Reniembering that the failure at Neuve Chapelle was because the breach in the enemy line was too narrow and at Loos because the supports were not sent forward quickly enough, he now attaciced on an 18-mile front and as sembled a great ma,ss of troops to follow up the success of the first moment. He expected the artillery to level the opposing trenches, as on former occasions. The Germans, however, had constructed their dugouts so deep that they were safe from a fire that leveled the trenches on the surface, and when the barrage lifted the defenders came to the surface with their ma chine guns, which were in great numbers, and opposed unbroken lines to the attacicing parties all the way from Gommecourt to Fricourt.
The British advanced with their traditional courage, singing and jesting in the assurance that they were going to occupy abandoned trenches. They were met with a withering fire but did not falter, rustling forward to the work of the moment in succeeding waves. Then the German guns opened on the areas behind them, cutting off the supports and making it as un safe to retreat as to go forward or to remain stationary. The hours of the slaughter of brave men that now followed can best be under stood by saying that at the end of the day the British losses amounted to 50,000, or more, and that the German lines on the section indicated stood intact. Southeast of Fricourt, however, there was better success. The German trenches were penetrated for a mile on a seven-mile front and 3,500 prisoners were talcen, with a number of machine guns and other materials. It was a bad return for the effort made, and the cost was so heavy that for weeks the authori ties did not dare let all the facts be known at home.
The French also attacked on 1 July from Maricourt to Fay. The Germans had talcen no extraordinary precautions against them, think ing the Verdun fighting had left them too much exhausted to be feared. The attack, there fore, delivered with the best French troops and supported by artillery that had learned its les sons well at Verdun, was unexpectedly success ful. It went forward nearly two miles on the entire front, and yielded 6,000 prisoners. Al though the net result of the day's fighting was small, General Haig did not falter in his pur pose. Setting his teeth with British determi nation he began to hammer away at the part of the line which had yielded to his initial blow, and for five months ate his way into it. He did not break through, as the British public ex pected in the beginning, but he forced the Ger mans to readjust their lines to the northward and eventually to move back on all that front on which they had stood so steadily during the first shock of the battle. To the Germans the initial attack was a victory. They concluded that the British effort was measured by the re sults of the first day's fighting and argued that the onslaught at Verdun, apparently so near to victory, could go on. They were soon unde ceived. The continued assaults of the British were adapted to the experience gained on 1 July. There was to be no more assaulting a long line but the artillery fire was to be con centrated on small sections, as the Germans were doing at Verdun. The area of activity was small, about 50 square miles, but nearly 1,000, 000 inen fell in that area, and after the bitter experience of 1 July the British losses were not excessive.