The battle of Arras lasted from 4 April to 17 May, and it was followed by three weelcs of intermittent attacks of a minor nature. It resulted in the advance of the British line on a front 22 miles long, for the most part to a depth of four miles. Six miles of the Siegfried line was talcen in this movement, a thing the Germans had thought could not happen. It was at Bullecourt, two miles from Queant, where the Drocourt-Quiant, or Wotan, line left the main system, that the Siegfried line was first cut. The feat was performed by Australian troops on 3 May, who not only passed the trenches themselves but took the series of con crete machine-gun positions behind them. Then they repulsed a counterattack that seemed for a time completely to master them. With the Ger mans surging up on three sides of them until they were huddled in barely 500 yards of trenches, they stood their ground until support arrived and slowly won the adjacent space until they had elbow room. Against them were sent the famous (Cockchafers,D of the 3d Prussian Guard division, to win back the lost section of the impreg.nable line. The British guns promptly placed a close barrage behind them, while the Australians left their trenches and charged into the advancing Prussians. Caught between the barrage and the Australians the 'Cocicchafers° took refuge in the abandoned trench by which they had approached, where they were all but destroyed. The incident settled the fate of the Bullecourt position. Within a week another mile was sliced off the Siegfried line, just south of Bullecourt, and means were found to make the gain secure. When the battle ended the British had taken more than 20,000 prisoners and 257 guns. The German losses were estimated at 350,000 which was in excess of the estimated British losses.
The most significant thing in the battle, how ever, was the fact that it confirmed to the Allies their confidence in the battle for limited ob jectives as a means of eating steadily through the strongest defenses the Germans could con struct It confirmed the lessons of the later fighting in the battle of the Somme. Here was a method by which the Germans could be de feated, if the Allies would follow it long enough. It was only necessary to persist until the hne was worn thin. Steady fighting and the in fliction of losses would finish the task in good time. And so the British took heart. They felt that the result was assured.
5. The Second Battle of the Aisne.— When General Haig struck at the northern end of the Siegfried line near Arras he acted in agreement with General Nivelle, who was about to strike at the southern end at Laon. The task of the Frenchmen proved harder than the task of the British; for Laon is situated on a plain pro tected by very strong positions which the Ger mans had well fortified. Ten miles to the west and 10 miles to the south ran the battle line; for the city was in the great angle of the lines. Due west it was protected by the Forest of Gobain whose strength the French had felt in their pursuit of the retreating Ger mans early in April. Rebuffed here Nivelle turned his attention to the south and east of Laon. But here the Germans had the advantage of strong positions. Their line ran along the heights that border the Aisne River, limestone spurs in which an excellent trench system had been cut. Nature had so arranged them that one commanded the other, so that if the French took the nearest they would come under fire of other positions. This line of heights began at the Ailette, a small stream seven miles north of the Aisne, and stretched away to the east, passing around the angle in the line, to the vicinity of Craonne, a distance of 25 miles.. On the crest of the heights ran
from east to west for a distance of 16 miles the celebrated Chemin des Dames. It was an ex cellent artery of communication behind one of the strongest positions in France.
General Nivelle decided to brealc through this line and take Laon. He had won fame in the war by hard and brilliant blows. The slow and methodical fighting of Haig was not in keeping with his temperament, which was ardent His best work had been the recovery of the positions north of Verdun in two swift and powerful blows for which the most elaborate and accurate preparations were made. He proposed to follow a similar method on the Aisne and on a much grander scale. But there was this difference. At Verdun he used the method of the limited objective, while on the Aisne he proposed to smash through the line and reach Laon on the second day of his battle. Since each part of the opposing defenses commanded the adjoining part so completely, he determined to attack in force all along the line at the same instant. Not only along the heights north of the Aisne, but far eastward to the high ground that runs away to the east of Rheims he decided to carry his battle. Along a front of 50 miles he proposed to launch the flower of the French army in one grand charge.
On 6 April began the bombardment that pre pared the way for the actual attack. It lasted with increasing fury until the 16th when the infantry went over the top at 6 A.M. on a day that groaned with a storm of sleet and snow. Important advances were made at various points and 11,000 prisoners were taken It was net doing badly but it did not lead the French to the gates of Laon. Next day the snow-storm with a driving wind continued, but the French soldiers did not falter. They held stoutly to what they had won, despite heavy counterattacks and even made gains in the region of their advance on the 16th. Far to the right, east of Rheims, where the Germans were placed on a strong series of hills, between Nogent l'Abbesse and Moron villers, the battle waged fiercely. This position did not actualy bar the way to Laon, but it was a bulwark behind which the Germans would organize dangerous flank attacks if the French should advance in the direct line to the Laon plain. It was a weak point in General Nivelle's plan that it demanded so many difficult things to insure success. The attack on the Moron villers position was entrusted to General An thoine. He had 75,000 men to carry a position seven miles wide defended by 80,000 infantry and an artillery force of 1,000 guns. He him self was trained as an artillery officer and well knew the need of artillery in carrying the position before him. He massed a vast number of guns against the German position which con sisted of three lines of defense, one at the foot, another on the slope, and another at the crest of a ridge that ran across his area of battle and had strong commanding positions on each side. General Anthoine Imew that his guns had first to destroy the German positions, and he did not neglect his barrages tiarough seven en tire days. The infantry went forward at dawn on the 17th and penetrated the first German line with little difficulty. On the flanlcs it stopped at the second line, but the centre burst through that barrier and seized and held the crest of the slope before it. Next day the centre secured its advanced position and the flanks worked away to extend their lines up the slopes. The 19th and 20th brought heavy counterattacks, but the French held their positions for the most part. From the 21st to the 28th there was fighting for local gains only. The battle seemed to have come to a breathing spell.