The pause was accompanied by a feeling of depression. In reality the progress was not discouraging. In 12 days 20,780 prisoners had been talcen with 175 guns. In view of the neces sity that the German strength should be eaten down by the hammering process this was not a bad showing; but it caused great dissatisfaction, mainly because Nivelle had talked so confidently about breaking the line on the first day. that the French people were seized with despair be cause the brilliant program was not realized. His losses had been heavy, but not beyond the normal cost of such gains under such con ditions. But the murmuring was a serious thing. It indicated a lack of confidence at a time when discouragement was dangerous.
On 28 April the Premier, M. Ribot, visited the battle front with M. Painlex* the Secre tary of War, and held a conference with the general in command. The result was that Gen eral Nivelle was removed from his position and General Petain took his place as commander-in chief on the northern and. northeastern sectors, where the main battle was being fought. At the same time General Foch became chief of staff, a position for which he was eminently fitted by training and temperament. General Nivelle's plan of battle was a survival of the prevalent idea of the early months of the war. It looked to a break through the line, as in the strategy of other days, with a sweep around the rear and the capture or stampede of a con siderable portion of the opposing force. It failed because under existing conditions it was impossible to take all the lines of defense before reinforcements could be brought up to fill the gap that an intense attack had made. The new strategy looked to wearing down the man power of an opponent. A brealc through was reserved for the time when the line should be too thin to resist longer. Petain believed in the new strategy, and so did Foch, with a slight difference. From the time Petain controlled the military policy the battle along the Aisne en tered a new stage, in which the purpose was to take limited objectives.
No further hopes were entertained of taking Laon. It would be sufficient to complete the struggle for the heights as a means of bettering the enemy's position, and not, as Nivelle in tended, as a preliminary step to a move on Laon. Thus Petain took up his work. He saw that it was necessary to talce Craonne and the California Plateau that ran west of it, com manding the view of the region to the north as far as the plain around Laon. He decided also to finish the winning of the positions for which Anthoine had been fighting around Mo ronvillers. The second of these tasks was com pleted in a gallant charge after an intense bom bardment on 20 May. The first demanded a more extended battle. The days of 4 and 5 May saw bitter fighting for Craonne and the Cahfornia Plateau. To rush up the slopes un der fire from the machine guns of the Germans, to dig in on the crest and to repel successive counterattacics were tasks for which the French infantry were fitted by long campaigning. Hav ing obtained a foothold, the next thing was to extend their lines until the whole of the plateau was held, an end that was achieved by the mid dle of the month. On the 16th the French were in possession of most of the famous Chemin des Dames, from its eastern end at Craonne to its western end near Fort de Malmaison. On the
20th the Germans delivered a great counter stroke along this whole line, but it failed with heavy German losses. From that time the bat tle front became quiet.
Reverting to the original plans of General Nivelle, we shall recall that after the Germans fell back to the Siegfried, or Hindenburg, line a design was formed to smash in each end of this line, and that General Haig undertook the task at the northern end while Nivelle un dertook it at the southern end. The results were the battles of Arras and the Aisne. Both failed of their ends. Although fought fiercely and with moderate success for the Allies, they left unshaken the pivots at which they were aimed. They inflicted severe losses on the enemy,. considerably more than half a million casualties. This was their only value; for the slight gains of territory were without signifi cance in the main trend of the war.
6. The Third Battle of Ypres.— When General Haig began the battle of Arras he po.st poned a plan he had made for a strong offensive in the Ypres sector with the general design of breaking through the German defenses, recov ering the Belgian Coast and turning fhe invaders out of Belgium. As soon as the French opera tions on the Aisne ceased he proceeded to put this scheme into execution. Twice before had the British sustained heavy battle in this sec tor. On each occasion they were weak and were forced to hang on by sheer sticking abil ity with great losses. In these battles they were forced back on Ypres until on the east they stood hardly two miles in front of the town, while the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, three miles south of it and commanding the surround ing plain for seveml miles, fell into the hands of their opponents. The existing situation was annoying, and if the Germans should have the opportunity to assume the offensive in large numbers they would be in position to start with a great initial advantage in some forward move ment. The attack about to be described did not yield the British the Belgian Coast, but it en abled them to gain important ground east of Ypres, ground which, if held by the Germans in their April drive of 1918, would have car ried them in the initial attack a long way to ward the Channel ports. General Haig's first procedure was to attack the Wytschaete-Mes sines Ridge and thus remove the menace that hung over Ypres on the south. This position, which was a salient, was six tulles long on the top of the ridge, but the German lines that ran around its western slope were 10 miles long. It was defended with three lines, one at the base of the western slope, one on the crest of the ridge and another along the base of the salient, which was well down the eastern slope of the ridge. A mile further east was a fourth line, passing through the town of Wameton, on the Lys. Besides these lines were many con crete machine-gun posts, redoubts and battery positions, skilfully placed to enfilade every pos sible avenue of approach. To take the third line was to hold the ridge: to penetrate the fourth was to break through the existing system of German defense.