The British and French following after them found the abandoned country a wilderness. Every art of a shrewd and unfeeling foe had been used to make it a desert, incapable of supporting any kind of shelter for hostile arnues. Under international usages it is allow able. to destroy what could have been con sidered useful to the enemy in carrying on his war. In the past this had been construed as applying to public property, roads, bridges and private property that obstructed the line of fire. By no nation had it been interpreted as giving the right to destroy orchards, churches, farm ing implements, and other means of industry. The Germans had given the rules their broadest interpretation. No building of any lcind was left standing, trees of all kinds, orchards, even the young trees that would afford shelter to no living thing larger than a hare, were cut down systematically, and the graves them selves had been rifled. The towns and villages were stripped of their able-bodied inhabitants, who were sent into the back areas to work in support of the German cause. Household furni ture was carried away or broken up and de stroyed. The Germans, obsessed by the phrase, °This is war,x' had lapsed into barbarism, throwing away all the restraints that civiliza tion had put on the conqueror's impulse to mistreat his victim. German newspapers re counted die excesses of German soldiers in this moment with pride; and the outside world has not had any evidence of a protest by any German preacher of Christian living, or others whose profession was to uphold htunane ideals in Germany.
The devastation of this region cost Germany dearly. It is true it made it difficult for the Allies to fight across the devastated area; but they had only to attack in adjoining sectors. In a military sense, therefore, it was of slight advantage to the perpetrators. But its bearing on the morale of the Allied soldiers was tremendous. Here before their eyes was an argument the most ignorant could understand. It transcended the party differences, die pro letarian unrest, and the many other impulses which might undermine the will to fight to the utmost. The Germans had just offered their antagonists a drawn peace and had been refused in disdain. The Siegfried line announced that the German reply was °Hammer away until you change your mind?' How foolish to do a thing at that very moment which only strengthened the will of the enemy to continue to spurn a compromise! 4. The Battle of Arras.— When the Ger mans retreated, General Haig had already begun to renew the process of gradual encroachments, as in the later stages of the battle of the Somme. He wished to apply the same process to the Siegfried line, believing it would be pierced, but yielded to the wishes of General Nivelle, who had. succeeded joffre in the chief command of the French armies. Nivelle's plan was to deal heavy blows at each flank of the new German line and he aslced Haig to attack on the north at Arras, he himself proposing to strike on the Aisne. Haig was not under
the orders of the French commander-in-chief, but he recognized the more important character of the French fighting in their own country and put away his own plan and adopted that of his colleague. Arras was the northern pivot of the Siegfried line. It was nine miles south of Lens, the city of coal pits, and in the interval was Vimy Ridge, all but taken by the French in 1915 when they fought a companion battle to the British battle of Loos. It was the highest point in the vicinity of Lens and overlooked a large part of the sector. Haig massed his artillery and infantry in order to carry this sector, 12 miles wide. On 4 April he opened a bombardment that was more intense than any which had been delivered on any battlefield of the war. For four days it fell on the Gerrnan positions, and when the infantry went forward on the 9th they found the first line German trenches in a state of ruin. The second was better held but it was taken after hard fighting. Next day the battle was carried against the third line, which yielded to fierce attacks in which there was much band-to-hand fighting. In these three days the British advanced from two to four miles on a front of more than 10 miles. Vimy Ridge was carried by Canadian troops, and the strong fortress Icnown as the Harp was taken with the aid of tanks. It was necessary, however, to halt at this point until the artillery could be moved up. 'The three days of fighting netted 12,000 prisoners and 150 guns, and they left the Germans with a gaping hole in their vaunted impregnable line of de fense.
During the succeeding days active prepara tions were made for contmuing the battle. Engineers constructed roads through the con quered region, while the infantry tned to widen the gap by eating away the lines on each side. The process was made difficult by rain which fell steadily. The Germans brought up rein forcements, and delivered a strong attack astride the Bapaume-Cambrai road, 15 miles south of Arras, hoping to draw off the British troops to that place. The effort was unavailing, for the assault along the road was disastrously repulsed. On 16 April General Nivelle began his great offensive on the Aisne which did not yield the results expected. As his situation be came unfavorable it was necessary for General Haig to aim his blows at strategic points in order to force the enemy to concentrate for their projection and thus save Nivelle from great pressure. In this way the battle of the British was deflected from the inunediate ob jectives, which might have been taken in the new type of battle Haig had adopted and delivered against positions he could have little hope of taking.