GREAT BRITAIN.
the word BRITAIN, in the Encyclopedia, the history of our affairs, as well as of the more in teresting events on the Continent, is brought down to the renewal of hostilities with France, in 1808. We now resume our narrative from that period, dividing it under the following heads : War with France and her allies, until the general pacification of 1814.
War with the United States, from 1812 to the beginning of 1815.
Return and second overthrow of Bonaparte.
Parliamentary and domestic history from 1808 to 1820 ; followed by a short notice of the affairs of Ireland.
I.—War with France and her Alliesfrom 1808 to 1814.
On the Continent of Europe, the only great ope ration was the invasion, or rather occupancy, of Ha nover. War was declared by us on the 18th May, and the French troops had advanced from Holland, and entered the electoral capital by the 5th June. To attempt resistance would have been folly ; but in a season when soldiers were so much wanted in Eng land, and so great an expence was incurred in train ing them, it was matter of regret that the Hanove rian troops, in number about 15,000, should not have been marched down to the coast, and embark ed in a body, instead of being disbanded and obliged to pledge themselves not to serve against France un til exchanged.
On the side of France the aspect of war was dis played in a great encampment at Boulogne, and in the dispatch, from all the ports along the coast, of flotillas of boats to join the armament preparing in that central rendezvous. These petty convoys seemed to have instructions to tempt our cruisers to attack them, and to draw them, at fit occasions, un der the fire of land-batteries. The main object of Bonaparte was to excite alarm; a course, which, however politic toward some countries, was certain ly ill-judged in regard to one where the executive power, in its inability to coerce, often seeks support in the apprehensions of the public. The general impression of dread facilitated the measures of de fence, and led to an unparalleled extent of the Vo lunteer System. Never did a country exhibit so many of the middle and higher classes under arms as England and Scotland in 1808; and never did indi viduals, in these stations, make more personal sacri fices for the object of national defence. The result
was effectual to as great a degree as the situation of the individuals permitted. The volunteers made as near an approach to regularity of discipline as was practicable in the case of men full of' ardour, and submitting for a season -to the restraint of military service, but necessarily devoid of experience in the field. The error lay in carrying volunteering too far ; for the system ought never to have been allow ed to extend to a length that absorbed no incon siderable part of the time and money of men whose lives were too valuable be indiscriminately ex posed, and whose proper aid to the public cause was the tribute of their industry. The volunteer system was of real use only in as far as it promoted cor diality in the common cause, and by assuring the maintenance of tranquillity at home, enabled govern ment to dispose of the regulars in the field.
The plan of collecting flotillas of boats, from East to West, in the central depot of Boulogne, was con tinued by Bonaparte, during two years, from the middle of 1803 to that of 1805. A great parade was made of the number of troops ready to embark, and of the determination to encounter all hazards; but there was no efficient support by ships of war, until, in the spring of 1805, the sailing of squadrons for the West Indies took place, first from Rochefort, and afterwardi from Cadiz. These, it was calculat ed, might excite alarm for our colonies, and induce government to send thither a part of the men of war hitherto reserved for home defence; after which the hazardous attempt of a descent might have entered seriously into the calculations of the French ruler. That it did so at this time was positively affirmed by him in conversations held in 1814 with English gen tlemen in the Island of Elba ; but these conversa tions, to minutes of which we have had access, were marked by Bonaparte's usual misrepresentations, for he attributed the non-execution of the attempt en tirely to the threatened coalition on the Continent, and would not acknowledge that it was impracticable, —a matter of nautical calculation, when our Govern ment kept our Channel fleet at home, instead of sending it, as he had anticipated, to the West Indies.