Such was the aspect of the war during two years, in which our naval superiority led to an easy con quest of several of the Dutch and French West India colonies. St Lucie surrendered on 22d June 1803; Tobago, on 1st July ; Demerara and Berbice, on 23d September; Cape Town, the last spot in the French half of St Domingo, occupied by French troops, was made to capitulate to the Blacks, on 80th November. Next year was taken the small Island of Gore on the coast of Africa, and soon after the important Dutch colony of Surinam. On the other hand, we were not successful in our attempts on the French flotillas on their own shores. One of these was directed against a convoy on the coast between.
Flushing and Ostend ; another, on a larger scale, and very different plan, was pointed at the Boulogne ar mament, which it was proposed to blow up by cats. maratts, an attempt no less unsuited to open and ge nerous warfare than the torpedoes of the Americans. Fortune was more favourable to us in encounters with the enemy in the open Ocean, where, in the early part of 1804, a striking proof of the effects of intrepidity was given in the case of a fleet of mer chantmen from China, which beat off, or at least de terred from action, a French squadron under Admi ral Linois, consisting of a ship of 80 guns and three frigates.
. The war hitherto had been with France and Hol land only ; but a new power was now to be added to the list of our antagonists. Spain had been allowed by Bonaparte to avoid participating in the contest, on condition of paying a large annual contribution ; a condition, so contrary, as was alleged, to real neu trality, that, for some time past, our Government had kept a vigilant eye on the expected arrival of her trea sure ships from America. A small squadron of four frigates, sent out to intercept these valuable supplies, met, on 5th October 1804, a Spanish squadron of a si milar number proceeding towards Cadiz. The Span ish commodore refusing to surrender, an engagement ensued, attended with the capture of three of the Span ish frigates, and the explosion of the fourth with the of manylives. This decisive act, approved at borne by the advocates of vigorous measures, was produc tive of the worst impressions in regard to our na tional honour both in Spain and her colonies, and led, soon after, to a declaration of war. Bonaparte was now provided with additional means of threaten ing our distant possessions. A squadron of five sail of the line escaping from Rochefort, landed a body of nearly 4000 men on the Island of Dominica, and burned the chief town ; the Island of St Kitt's es caped with paying a contribution and the loss of some merchantmen. But this was only a prelude to the arrival of a much more formidable fleet, which, to the number of eighteen sail of the line, French and Spanish, reached the West Indies in the end of May, and spread alarm throughout the Islands,—an alarm not dispelled till the arrival of a force inferior by one-third, but commanded by Lord Nelson. The hostile fleet soon after set out on its homeward voyage. Intelligence to that effect was opportunely received by Lord Barham, then at the head of the Admiralty, and a fleet, detached to cruise on their supposed track, had the good fortune to fall in with them on 22d July. An action took place ; two sail of the line (Spanish) were captured ; night closed the conflict, and though it might have been renewed on the succeeding days, an unfortunate indecision on the part of our admiral, Sir Robert Calder, allowed the enemy to escape. They repaired to Ferrol, whence
they soon after sailed with augmented force, and reached Cadiz. To watch them there, or to engage them on their coming out, was an object of the highest moment, and it was to Lord Nelson that the important trust was committed. Joining our fleet off Cadiz, he avoided keeping in sight, and even dispensed with the aid of six sail of the line, which he sent to a dis tance along the coast ; judging that the enemy, when appiised of their absence, would be induced to come out. Accordingly, the combined fleet left Cadiz on the 19th October to the number of 33 sail of the line (18 French and 15 Spanish), commanded by Admiral Villeneuve, and early on the 21st came in sight of the British fleet consisting of 27 sail of the line. The scene of conflict was off Cape Trafalgar, nearly half way between Cadiz and Gibraltar. The enemy, convinced that their former defeats at sea had been owing to the want of concentration and mutual support, now formed a double line, so that any of our ships, attempting to penetrate, should be exposed to the fire of two or of three antagonists. Nelson, while yet distant, perceived their arrange ment, and understood its object. It was new, but he was satisfied that no concentration in the open sea could prevent our vessels from coming to close action with their opponents, in which case the result could not long be doubtful. He made, consequent ly, no alteration in his previous plan, but directed his fleet to advance to the attack in two divisions, one of which, under Admiral Collingwood, intersect ed that part of the enemy's line, which gave it a near ly equal number of ships to encounter, while Nelson with the other division, acted on a similar plan Such was the only general manoeuvre in this great action ; by our superior seamanship, and our ships keeping near each other, we had, in some cases, a local superiority, but the general character of the fight was a conflict of ship to ship, and its decision, in our favour, was owing to that skill in working the guns, to that dexterity in an occasional change of position, and that confidence of success which cha racterizes a naval force in high discipline—advan tages which we had displayed with such success against the Dutch at Camperdown, and the French at Aboukir, and in which we met with no equal opponents till we encountered the Americans. Our loss, amounting to 1600 men, was in part caused by the riflemen in the enemy's rigging,—an ungenerous mode of warfare, which may deprive an opposing force of officers, but can have little effect on the ge neral issue of a conflict. The fighting began at noon, became general in less than half an hour, and lasted from two to three hours ; in the case of a few ships it was longer, but all firing was over by half past four o'clock. Nineteen sail of the line struck ; but unfortunately gales of wind, after the action, wrecked part of our prizes, and necessitated the de. struction of others ; four sail, however, were pre served, and four more, which had escaped, were met on their northward course, on 2d November, and captured off Cape Ortega] by a squadron under Sir Richard Strachan.