The tract of country to the north of Lisbon is not above twelve miles in breadth, having the sea on the west and the Tagus on the east ; the ground is ex tremely mountainous, and accessible only by passes, which were occupied by our troops and batteries. Massena felt all the strength of this position, and the repulse at Busaco made him beware of a second encounter on disadvantageous ground. It was now for the first time that the impetuoutt bands of Bona parte stopped short in their career ; the armies re mained opposite to each other above four months, during which the French were greatly straitened for provisions and forage, being obliged to get con voys of. biscuit under escort from France, while the command of the sea procured abundance to the Bri tish. Still Massena persisted in keeping his posi tion, hoping to combine his operations with the army of Soult, advancing from the south-east of Spain,— an army which was but too fortunate, having attack ed and taken by surprise a Spanish camp on the banks of the Guadiana. A number of boats had been constructed by Massena to cross the Tagus and co-operate with Soult, but in the beginning of March, intelligence arrived that a convoy of biscuit long expected from France had been intercepted by the Guerillas. There was now an end to all offen sive projects, and there remained only the alterna tive of retreat ; it began on 5th March ; the British followed, and the movements of either army, during a very long march, afforded an admirable exempli fication of the rules of war. Our advance was so prompt, that the French were often obliged to move hastily from one position to another; but they kept their best troops in the rear, collected in solid bo dies, and affording no opening to our vanguard. The retreat lasted a month, and closed near Al meida on the frontier of Spain. The French, how ever, were soon again in a condition to act, and ad vanced to relieve Almeida, of which we had now be gun the siege: the chief fighting took place on 3d and 5th May, near a village called Fuentes d'Ho nore, but all their efforts were ineffectual, and Al meida was left to its fate: the chief part of the gar. risen, however, found means to escape by a noctur nal march.
Meanwhile the south, or rather the south-west of Spain, was the scene of very active operations. A body of Spaniards and British, marching northward from Gibraltar, approached the south-west extremity of the line occupied by the French troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz. General Graham com manded the British, and on 5th March, at noon, was drawing near to the close of a long march, when he received intelligence of the advance of a French force. Knowing the height of Barrosa, which he had just left, to be the key of the position, he im mediately countermanded his corps, and had pro ceeded but a short way, when he found himself un expectedly near to the enemy, whose left division was seen ascending the hill of Barrosa, while their right stood on the plain within cannon shot. To re treat was wholly unadvisable ; an immediate attack was determined on, though unsupported by the Spa niards, and inferior to the enemy. A battery opened against the right division of the French, caused them considerable loss, but they continued to advance, until a charge with the bayonet drove them back with great slaughter. With the other division on the ascent of the hill, there took place a similar conflict with a similar issue; both sides fought with courage, and both sustained a heavy loss; that of the British was above 1200; that of the enemy nearly double. The action lasted an hour and a half: our success was owing partly to the effect of our guns, but more to the firmness of the troops, who showed themselves determined rather to fall than yield.
About the same time, but at a distance of 200 miles to the north of Cadiz, the important fortress of Badajos fell into the hands of the French. This painful intelligence reached Lord Wellington when following up the retreat of Massena ; and no time was lost in detaching a body of troops to the south of Portugal to enable Marshal Beresford to advance and form the siege of Badajos. This called from the south the army of Soult, 20,000 strong; on their approach, Marshal Beresford raised the siege of Ba dajos, and marched to meet the French near the ri ver Albuhera, or Albuera, with a force numerically superior, but among which there was only 8000 Bri • tish. Our army awaited the attack in a position as
good as a country, in general level, afforded ; but our general, in an evil hour, entrusted to the Spa niards a rising ground which formed the key of that position. The French columns succeeded in driv ing them from it, and were about to rake with their field-pieces all the allied line. A British division marching to attack the enemy with the bayonet, were unfortunately turned by a body of lancers, who, amidst the smoke from the firing, had ap proached unperceived. Our loss was very great here, and there remained only one fresh division, which advancing gallantly to the charge, and, being supported by the other corps, drove the French with great slaughter from the field. The battle lasted five hours, and so great was the loss, that of the British force engaged, nearly one half were killed or wounded; the French had fought with equal bravery, and their loss also was very great. Lord Wellington reached the army some time after, and determined to renew the siege of Badajos; breaches were made in the walls, and two attempts at assault were hazarded (6th and 9th June), but in vain ; the advance of the French army from the north, in con.. Bert with that of the south, necessitated the raising of the siege. Here ended the active operations of the year ; our army remained some time encamped in the central part of Portugal, after which Lord Wellington marched northward and threatened Ciu dad Rodrigo, but retreated before a superior force collected by the French.
The campaign of 1812 commenced very early, Lord Wellington investing Ciudad Rodrigo on 8tb January. The siege was pressed with activity, and a breach being made, the town was carried by storm on 19th January, though with a great loss, particularly in officers, among whom was General Mackinnon. So prompt had been our operations, that the French army approaching to the relief of the place, would not at first believe its capture. Soon after, Lord Wellington turned his forces to the south and invested Badajos, already the scene of such obstinate contests. Here, also, the opera tions were pressed with great rapidity, that they might be brought to an issue before the arrival of the French army from Cadiz. On the night of 6th April, Badajos was attacked on several points by es calade ; but we were repulsed in every direction ex cept at the castle, which was fortunately carried, and, commanding all the works, the consequence was the surrender of the town next day, after a siege which, short as it had been, cost us very near ly 5000 men. Secure on the south, Lord Welling ton now marched towards_ the north, and detached Sir Rowland Hill to make a sudden attack on the French station at Almaraz, where the bridge over the Tagus served as the chief military communica tion between the northern and southern army. The expedition was successful, the entrenchments being stormed and destroyed. Lord Wellington now marched against the French army in the north, commanded by Marmont, and reached Salamanca on 16th June. The forts in that town being taken after some sharp fighting, the French retreated to the Douro, but being soon reinforced, resumed the offensive, and obliged our army to retreat in turn. These movements continued several weeks, Lord Wellington being obliged to yield ground to his op ponent, but ready to attack him on the commission of any material fault. Such an opportunity at last occurred on 22d July, near Salamanca, when the French, rendered confident by our continued re treat, extended their left, and presented an opening, which was instantly seized by their vigilant adver sary. Columns were sent forward against the ene my's left and centre ; the former succeeded com pletely, the latter met with much opposition. Great gallantry was and heavy loss sustained, on both sides; at last the French centre and right were both driven from the field. The darkness prevented our making prisoners, but a body of cavalry joining in the night, the hostile rear-guard was attacked next morning, and obliged to surren der. Our loss was about 3000 British and 2000 Portuguese, that of the enemy in killed and wound ed was at least equal, and we took between 6000 and 7000 prisoners. The British force in the field was 22,000.