couraging our government from new efforts. tria was preparing to attack the allies of Bonaparte in Germany, and the Spaniards, though repeatedly beaten in close action, continued a destructive war fare in the shape of insulated insurrections. Sir Arthur Wellesley was accordingly sent with a fresh army to Lisbon, and General Beresford with a com mission to discipline the Portuguese forces. They found the French threatening Lisbon in two direc tions ; from the east, with a powerful force under Victor ; from the north, with a less numerous body under Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced against the latter, drew near his rear guard on the banks of the Douro, drove it over that river, and crossing im mediately after, forced Soult to a precipitate retreat from Oporto. Returning to the southward, our com mander obliged the force under Victor to draw back ; and having, some time after, effected a junction with a Spanish army, took the bold determination of moving forward in the direction of Madrid. The French now sent reinforcements to the army of Victor, and the op posing forces met at Talavera de la Reyna,- a town to the north of the Tagus, near the small riverAlberche. The British force was 1g,000; that of the Spaniards above 30,000; the French army amounted to 47,000.s Lord Wellington was too distrustful of the discipline of his allies to venture an attack on the French, but he saw no imprudence in trying, as at Vimiera, the chance of a defensive action. Stationing the Spa niards on strong ground on the right, he occupied with the British a less strong, but yet favourable po sition, on the left. Against the army thus posted, the French advanced in the afternoon of 27th July, driving in our van, and attacking an eminence on our left. This eminence, the key of the position, would have been assailed from the beginning, by Bonaparte, with a formidable column, but the rifle corps and single battalion sent against it by Victor were soon driven back by our troops. A second at tack, made in the evening by three regiments of in fantry, was at first successful, but it was 'soon re pelled by a fresh division .of British. The .main
body of the French, surprised at this failure, waited impatiently for morning to renew the attack ; they advanced, marched through a destructive fire to the top of the rising ground, approached our cannon, and were on the point of seizing them, when our line rushed forward with the bayonet, and drove them down with great loss. Their commanders now de termined to suspend all attacks on the Spaniards, and to bring a mass of force against the front and flank of the British. A general attack took place at four in the afternoon, and the troops directed against the height, now consisted of three divisions of infantry, or about 18,000 men. Crossing the ra vine in their front, the first division scaled the height amidst volleys of grape-shot ; but its general fell, a number of officers shared his fate, and retreat be. came unavoidable. No attempt was now made to carry the eminence in front ; attacks were made on its left and right, but all were ineffectual. Our greatest loss was sustained in an unsuccessful attack by our cavalry on two squares of French infantry in the plain; the 23d light dragoons were here almost annihilated. The loss of the Spaniards was only 1200; that of the British above 5000; that of the French (De Rocca's Memoirs) nearly 10,000.
Notwithstanding this signal success, it became ne. cessary for the allied army to retire ; the French di visions, in the north-west of Spain, having united and begun to march in a direction which would soon have brought them on our rear. Our army crossed the Tagus, and held a southwest course till reach ing Badajos, where it remained during the rest of the year, in a position which covered that fortress, and showed the Spaniards that we had not abandon ed their cause, however dissatisfied with their co. operation, and convinced of the impracticability of combining offensive operations with such allies.