On the side of Sicily, our commanders, though pressed by the court of Palermo, refused to make descents on Calabria, which could lead to nothing but partial insurrections, followed, on the return of a superior force, by the death of the most zealous of our partisans. We took, however, in June 1809, the small islands of Ischia and Procida, near the coast of Naples ; and, in the autumn of 1810, re= pelled an attempt of Murat to invade Sicily. A body of nearly 4000 Italians, who had landed on this occasion, were driven back with loss—a failure which, joined to our decided naval superiority, put an end to all attempts of the kind.
The hostility of Russia consequent on her connec tion with France, produced a menaced invasion of Sweden, now our only ally in the north. To aid in repelling it, Sir John Moore was sent to Gotten burgh with a body of 10,000 men. This force did not land ; but the general, repairing to Stockholm, entered into communications with the king, and had the mortification of finding that prince wholly in capable of rational conduct, and bent on projects which would necessarily involve the sacrifice of the British troops. On this he lost no time in returning to Gottenburgh, and soon after brought back the ar mament to England, to be employed on a more pro mising service.
The influence possessed by Bonaparte over Spain had long inspired him with the hope of overawing Portugal, and of obliging that country to dissolve her alliance with England. To this hope the humi liation of Germany, and his new alliance with Rus sia, gave double strength ; and, in the latter part of 1807, the most peremptory demands were made on the court of Lisbon. To part of these, implying the exclusion of British merchantmen from the harbours of Portugal, compliance was promised ; but the de mand of confiscating English property, or detaining the English resident in Portugal, was met with a de cided refusal. A French army now marched to wards Lisbon, and threatened openly to overthrow the house of Braganza ; but the latter, after some momentary indications of indecision, took the deter mination of abandoning their European dominions, and proceeding to Brazil. This spirited, and by many unexpected measure, was carried into effect in the end of November, and Lisbon was forthwith oc cupied by French troops. A few months after the transactions at Bayonne occurred, and the general declaration of hostility by the Spaniards to Bona parte. Our cabinet now determined to postpone all other projects to that of a vigorous effort on Spain and Portugal. With that view, an armament of 10,000 men collected at Cork, and said to be in tended for Spanish America, sailed in July to the Peninsula, and offered its co-operation to the Spani ards in Galicia. They, however, thought it best that we should confine our aid to Spain to arms and money, directing our military force against the French army in Portugal. Accordingly, our troops,
after passing an interval at Oporto, were landed to the southward, in Mondego Bay, where, after re ceiving the co-operation of a farther division of British, and of a few Portuguese, they proceed ed on their southward march to Lisbon. The first actions took place with French detachments at the small town of Obidos, and at Roleia. Nei ther were of importance : the French, inferior in number, retreated ; but their commander at Lis.. bon was Junot, an officer trained in the school of revolutionary enterprise, and disposed, like most of his brethren at that time, to make light of British land forces. He determined forthwith on offensive operations, advanced from Lisbon, and, reaching the British army on 21st August, at tacked it in its position at the small town of Vimiera. The 'force on either side • was about 14,000 men. The French marched to the onset in columns, with their wonted confidence, but they had to encounter an enemy equally firm as Germans or Russians, and far superior in arms, equipment, and activity. A part of the• opposing lines advanced to the charge, and not only crossed bayonets, but, what very rarely happens, maintained that despe rate conflict for several minutes, when the French gave way. Equal success attended our efforts in other parts of the line, and the loss of the enemy was 3000 men, and 13 pieces of cannon. The ob ject now ought to have been to follow up our suc cess, before the French should recover themselves, and fortify the almost impenetrable mountains on the road to Lisbon. In vain did Sir A. Wellesley -1 urge this, first on Sir H. Burrard, who had now taken the command, and next day on Sir H. Dalrymple, who arrived and replaced him. Reinforcements were dully expected ; and, till their arrival, neither of these officers could be persuaded to incur hazards for the attainment of an advantage which, from their unacquaintance with localities, they were not com petent to appreciate. A precious interval was thus lost. The French occupied the passes, opened their negotiation in a tone of confidence, and obtained, by the treaty called the Convention of Cintra, a free re- , turn to France on board of British shipping. The ministry, though disappointed, determined to defend this Convention; judging it indispensable, partly from the communications of Sir II. Dalrymple, more from its bearing the unqualified signature of Sir A. Wel lesley, who was, even then, their confidential military adviser. The public, however, called for inquiry ministers felt the necessity of acceding ; the three generals were ordered home from Portugal ; and, after a long investigation, and divided opinions, the chief error was found to lie in the loss of the twenty four hours which followed the battle of Vimiera.