Tactics

Folard and Marshal Saxe.

It is a curious fact, yet one which cannot be disputed, that throughout the history of tactics when genius and leadership are wanting there has been a general tendency for military organization to return to its simplest form— the phalanx. This is what happened during the opening years of the 18th century, for though pikes had vanished, the phalangial idea is solidity, and as the English and German excel in this peculiarity the French suffered reverse after reverse. The crude ness of the phalangial order was clearly grasped by the chevalier de Folard who, in 1727-30, published a translation of Polybius fully sprinkled with his own ideas. Of this book Frederick the Great said : "Folard has buried diamonds in a rubbish-heap." This criticism is just, since the chevalier's ideas, though very confused, started a tactical argument of column versus line which only reached its solution in 1791. Folard attempted to establish a connection between fighting in line, column and in skirmishing order. He was supported by Marechal de Saxe, who had not time, however, to put Folard's ideas into practice; in place he re-introduced fighting behind de fensive posts, and made use of artillery to an extent unequalled since the days of Gustavus Adolphus. The result was that the Germans, Dutch and English suffered one defeat after another, since a phalangial army is incapable of maintaining its cohesion over obstructed ground.

Frederick the Great.

Frederick the Great now entered the tactical arena, and turned his attention to manoeuvre with a view to outflanking the phalanx. He divided his infantry into com panies, established a definite drill, and formed his line of battle in three ranks. His cavalry were deprived of their fire-arms, and were taught to charge boot to boot and to rely on the arme blanche. So successful was he in their instruction, that there can be no question that the cavalry of Zieten and Seydlitz were the most efficient since the days of Alexander. Though completely successful in his Silesian Wars (174o-42 and it is not until the Seven Years War (q.v.) (1756-63) that his genius was fully manifested. In the early battles of this war, the Austrians dispersed their guns along their entire front, and made all efforts on the part of the Prussians of no avail. At Lowositz (1756) Frederick's cavalry were repulsed by gun fire, and so also were his infantry at Prague (q.v.) in 1757 and Kolin (q.v.) in 1757.

Frederick now saw that artillery was the superior arm, and proved it at Rossbach (q.v.) and at Leu then (q.v.) in 1757. In these two battles the demoralization of the enemy was handed over from the infantry to the gunner. Not only did Frederick realize that artillery should prepare the in fantry attack, but that it should search out the enemy where the terrain concealed him, conse quently he increased his howitz ers to one-third of his total guns, and massing them brought them against the defender's flank. Leuthen is probably the finest example of the Frederician tac tics. The Austrians, less well drilled, deployed, but he marched

straight forward deploying his advanced guard only. Then wheel ing the main body to the right he placed it at right angles to the enemy's left and deployed it in echelon in oblique order. The Austrians were fixed, since they were unable to manoeuvre. On their left flank, now in confusion through attempting to form a new front, Frederick converged the fire of all his guns. Under this fire his infantry advanced to the assault, and his cavalry manoeuvred on the rear of the enemy. At Torgau (q.v.) in 1760, one of his most daring battles, he separated his army, and whilst Zieten and his cavalry held the enemy's front, the bulk of his army took the Austrians completely in reverse.

Such were his battles, classical actions drawn from the study of classical history, for Leuthen was modelled on Leuctra (q.v.). In brief, his system is expressed in his favourite maxim—"To bring one's own strength against the enemy's weakness." Like Alexander he refused one wing and assaulted with the other, the refused wing acting as a reserve to that part of the line not used for the shock. The assaulting wing consisted of an advanced guard, an artillery mass, an infantry mass and a cavalry mass. When the enemy stood in the open his guns smote them, and when he sought shelter by ground his howitzers pounded him to pieces.

Rise of Light Infantry.

As a gunner Frederick stands supreme, and further, he knew well the value of the cavalry charge and the infantry assault, but he never seems to have grasped the value of a well-trained light infantry for protective duties, and for preparing the act of distraction, for only towards the end of his reign did he raise a few battalions of fusiliers. In spite of this neglect, the times demanded a change towards infan try flexibility. Folard had advocated it, Saxe had proved it at Lauffeld (1747), Henry Lloyd wrote about it in his "History of the Seven Years War," and so had Guibert, the most far-sighted tactician of his day in his "General Essay on Tactics" (1751). In 17o2 the French had raised several "Compagnies Franches" under the duc de Bellisle, and in 1725 the English raised the Black Watch, a form of irregular police "for the protection of the country against robbers." It was, however, during the Seven Years War that the new infantry order took form. In Europe Moratz, Trenk, Nadasty and Frankini raised bands of Croats, Pandours and other ruffians who fought as independent riflemen, and in America, Bouquet, Rogers, Howe and Montgomery demonstrated their extreme value when well led and trained against the red Indians. After this war, all these lessons were lost sight of. The glamour of Frederick's great battles blinded the military eye; soldiers sought his secret in his drill and not in his ideas, and pre pared for themselves a rude awakening in the wars of the Ameri can Rebellion and the French Revolution.