Tactics

The Decline of Greek Tactics.

The tactics employed by the Diadochi, his successors, were of a high order, for in spite of the fact that, during the last few years of Alexander's reign, the Mace donian army had become partially Orientalized, this though it detrimentally influenced its morale had actually enhanced its tac tics by increasing its fire power. Archers were more extensively used, especially horse archers, and this brought siege and field ar tillery, in the shape of catapults and balistae more and more into use, especially under Demetrius Poliorcetes, the son of Antigonus.

In spite of inventions, tactical organization deteriorated and strategy advanced. Walled towns had now lost much of their defensive power, and the numerous combatants, all depending upon mercenary soldiers, made alliances and military combina tions necessary. Command now took a more modern form, the commanders-in-chief—Antigonus, Seleucus, Ptolomy, etc., fre quently planning the strategy of a campaign, and handing over tactical control to a hired subordinate. Morale steadily decreased as it must in ill-paid mercenary armies, and battles were fre quently won by buying over the enemy's troops on the field it self. Though it is not possible to prove it, lack of trust in the cavalry and infantry compelled commanders more and more to rely on war elephants and artillery. Whatever was the cause, both came into general use, and by the time of Philopoemen battle fronts were sometimes covered by a veritable bombardment of bolts, arrows and balls, fired from catapults and balistae, as for instance at the third battle of Mantineia (q.v.) in 207 B.C. Yet the deterioration of tactics was progressive, and by the dates of the battles of Cynoscephalae (q.v.) in 197 B.C. and Pydna (q.v.) in 168 B.C. they had so far retrogressed that the phalanx of Philip and that of Perseus had returned to the Spartan model, a wall of pikes with vulnerable flanks incapable of manoeuvring over broken ground. The exquisite combination and co-operation of arms which distinguished Philip of Macedon's army had been utterly forgotten.

The Early Legion.

The early Roman legion was very similar in organization to the Spartan phalanx. It was a city militia con sisting originally of some 3,00o milites, or foot soldiers, and 300 equites who were not so much cavalry as well-to-do mounted in fantry. To it were added a number of velites, or untrained light

infantry. Its tactical formation was phalangial. Though this army was well suited to battles of push of pikes on the plains, it was ill suited to mountain warfare. The disaster suffered at the Caudine Forks (321 B.c.), and the long drawn out Samnite wars (343-290 B.c.) appear to have compelled the Romans to give up the purely linear formation of the phalanx, and substitute for it a more flexible one. The legion was divided into 3o maniples placed chequerwise in three lines—hastati, principes and triarii. The third line was composed of veteran troops held in reserve.

To compare the legion at its prime, that is after the 2nd Punic War, with the phalanx in its decadence, or even with the phalanx under Pyrrhus (28o-275 B.c.), is absurd. Though Pyrrhus was an able general he depended more on the use of elephants than on organization. Philip of Macedon's model had by his day alto gether deteriorated, and by the date of the 2nd and 3rd Mace donian Wars (2oo-194 and 176-168 B.c.), the Macedonian army had thrown back to the old Spartan model, yet it is interesting to note that both at Cynocephalae and Pydna it was a rear at tack which decided the day in favour of the legion.

The 2nd Punic War.

When Hannibal invaded Italy in 218 B.C. the Roman legionaries. were little more than a raw militia; yet, when he was defeated at Zama (q.v.) in 202 B.C., they were veterans ready to conquer the world. Sixteen years of incessant warfare had taught them, under such leaders as Claudius Nero, Marcus Livius and Scipio Africanus, how to wage war, but curi ously enough it never taught them Hannibal's open secret (also Philip of Macedon's and Alexander's), namely, that cavalry is the decisive arm. It is true that Scipio Africanus realized this, and by launching Massinissa's Numidian horsemen on the rear of Hannibal's troops, won Zama, but throughout Roman history cav alry was seldom their decisive arm, they mainly depended on in fantry, and increased the rapidity of their movements by a won derful network of roads. This is clearly shown years later at Carrhae (q.v.) in 53 B.C. and Pharsalus (q.v.) in 48 B.C. In the last mentioned battle Pompey's cavalry were disgracefully led, and even Julius Caesar, one of the great captains, never handled cavalry as it was handled by Alexander or Hannibal.