The Oriental Battle.—During this early period, strategy may be considered as purely one dimensional. There was little idea of manoeuvre. Armies set out with one thought, namely, to meet each other on some plain, or in some valley, and fight it out. There they extended into parallel lines, and the one with the greatest front normally won, because its wings meeting with no opposition were able to overlap its less extended adversary. As these wings had to move the furthest, when cavalry was employed, as in Persia, they were placed on the flanks of the infantry, and in front of this line frequently swarmed archers and slingers. The infantry were massed in solid squares from 3o to Too ranks deep, and if chariots were used they were drawn up in front of the foot soldiers, or in the intervals between them. When once the line of battle was ready, the light infantry cleared the front, the chariots charged the enemy to demoralize him, the infantry fol lowing them up to gain a decision. Meanwhile the cavalry attempted to sweep round the enemy's flanks, not so much to attack its adversary's rear as to pillage his baggage wagons. Given equal discipline and armament, and remembering that the infan try battle line was rigid and could not manoeuvre, these tactics leave little to be desired. Military superiority was based on num bers ; which side could wash round, rather than manoeuvre round, the flanks of the cther, this was the tactical problem. To hold men in reserve was futile, because this would have meant a shortening of the front of attack, and to manoeuvre squares of some i o,000 men standing on a 2ooyd. frontage was not possible with the drill of this period.
Marathon and Plataea.—Though Aristides names Pala medes as the inventor of tactics, Nestor appears to have been the only general during the Homeric period who possessed tactical insight. He grouped the Greek army according to families to inculcate a spirit of rivalry, and divided it into a right, centre and left, placing his bravest warriors in the rear rank. From the Tro jan War (1193-1184 B.c.) on to the first Messenian War 723 B.c.) no further innovation seems to have taken place, but in this war we find Euphaes, the Messenian general, hand somely beating the Spartans by a well-exe cuted rear attack carried out by his cav alry. In spite of this admirable manoeuvre, one long known in the East but seldom well executed, the Spartans learnt nothing, the tactics of Euphaes on the field of Am phaea (73o B.c.) remained a sealed book to them, and no further progress was made in tactics until Miltiades, either intention ally or accidentally, won the battle of Mar athon (q.v.) in 490 B.C., by a double devel opment. Resting his wings on two small streams which prevented the Persians outflanking him, he made his centre weak and his wings strong with the result that when his centre was driven back his wings clinched inwards and took the Persians in flank. At the battle of Plataea (q.v.), fought in 479 B.c., though the Persians under Mardonius were taught a costly lesson when their cavalry attempted to charge unbroken infantry on the slope of a hill, the Greeks were taught an equally severe one when they believed that they could meet cavalry on any ground. The result was that it was only after this third invasion of the Persians that the Greeks, little by little, began to realize the importance of the mounted arm.
The Peloponnesian War.—The Peloponnesian War (431 404 B.c.) though it produced no general of the first order, shows a distinct advance in tactical knowledge. The sieges of Plataea B.c.) and of Syracuse (415 B.c.) are a definite step forward in these operations. At the battle of Olpae in 426 B.C. Demosthenes, in command of the allies, defeated a superior Spar tan army by a well-planned rear attack. Placing an ambush of 400 light troops behind the Spartan left wing he allowed his enemy to wash round both his flanks, whereupon the ambush fell upon the rear of the enemy's left wing, and put the whole army to flight. In his turn Brasidas, a Spartan, possessing none of the narrow ness of his countrymen, by his rapid marches and sudden attacks, such as at Amphipolis (424 B.c.) showed that the value of mobil ity and surprise was fully realized by him. The main tactical lesson of this long war was the necessity for a well-trained light infantry for manoeuvre, seeing that cavalry were hard to come by in Greece. This, in the 4th century B.C. led to the reforms of Iphicrates. Hoplites were not only expensive to equip but immo bile on any but unbroken ground, so Iphicrates lightened their equipment and produced a body of men known as peltasts, with whom he seriously injured the allies of the Lacedaemonians in the Corinthian War, and in 392 B.C. annihilated a Spartan Mora of 600 men.
The Development of the Oblique Order.—An interesting period in tactics is now entered, and one of rapid growth following on the footsteps of rapidly expanding culture. For centuries past there had been a tendency for the front of an attacking phalanx to drift towards its right, the reason being as Thucydides writes : "Because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next on his right." This drift brought the right wings first in contact with their enemy, the left wings being somewhat refused; thus the parallel or der tended towards an oblique order of attack. The tactical meaning of this drift seems to have been fully grasped by the Theban general Epameinondas.
At the battle of Leuctra (q.v.) in 371 B.C. at the head of 6,000 to 8,000 men he met ii,000 Lacedaemonians under Cle ombrotus. He changed the normal centre of gravity of the attack from right to left and so surprised his enemy and simul taneously reduced the chance of his right being defeated. He drew up his battle line, probably eight deep, and on its left marshalled a column of 1,500 men 48 deep. To secure the outer flank of this column he placed there the Theban Sacred Band, and in front of his left he drew up his cavalry squadrons. Ordering his right to move slowly and his left rapidly forward, he refused the Spar tan left and destroyed the Spartan right ; then he wheeled his column inwards, and took the whole of his enemy's army in enfilade, winning a battle of mind against some of the toughest muscle which ever took the field. Nine years later at Mantineia (q.v.) he repeated these tactics with signal success, but his death on the field robbed his victory of decisive results.