Tactics

TACTICS. The art of war differs from the science of war as action differs from theory. The second discovers the princi ples upon which the art of waging war is founded, and the first applies these principles according to conditions by means of the instrument of war—the forces employed to impose the will of one antagonist upon the other, whether this will is the will of an organized Government, or of a single man. Of all instruments of war man himself is the archetype, he is his own general, his own intelligence service, and he possesses power to move, guard and hit From these natural powers are developed five essential tactical functions, namely, command, reconnaissance, security, mobility and offensive action; or planning, finding, pro tecting, manoeuvring and actual fighting. It is by the last of these that a commander finally imposes his will on his enemy through fear of destruction. These functions when combined may be divided under the headings of strategy and tactics ; but in practice these two parts cannot be so easily separated, since strategy is the art of protected movement from which tactics, the art of protected offensive action, is developed. Whilst the one places an army in the best position to overcome its enemy's re sistance, the other has for its object the economical development of pressure, so that movement in the desired direction may be maintained. Consequently it will be seen that whilst strategy aims at developing tactics, in its turn the aim of tactics is the development, or completion, of a strategical movement. In brief, the primary tactical function of battle is to generate mobility (strategy) through protected offensive action (battle).

The Decisive Point.

At once the question arises: Is it pos sible to lay down definitely the direction in which movement should be made? That is, can a commander off-hand decide on the decisive point of attack, that point which if struck in force will lead to the most economical destruction of the enemy's fight ing power? The answer is "yes," for logically and historically it may be proved that the back of a man, or the rear of an army, is the decisive point to attack ; that is, the point at which an enemy if struck can develop the least resistance and pressure, that is, where he is least well protected and least able to hit out. The validity of this statement can be readily proved by examining the organization of an army.

A modern army consists of three main tactical forces, namely, a reconnaissance force (cavalry), a protecting force (artillery), and an attacking force (infantry), these three forming the fight ing body. Behind this body is situated the brain and internal or

gans, namely, the command, and the services of supply, mainte nance, repair and evacuation. The body has power to hit and to guard, but of itself it possesses no power to co-ordinate its move ments, or to supply itself and simultaneously maintain its tactical organization. Consequently, if it is deprived of its command, it is paralysed, and if deprived of its supplies, starved into sur render, or compelled to disperse. As neither the command nor the services possess power of exerting pressure or resistance phys ically, they form the decisive point of attack and defence. It fol. lows, therefore, that whatever system of attack is adopted, whether it be a frontal attack, a flank attack or a rear attack, the object of both sides is to destroy the power of command of the opposing side, either directly through an attack on this command, or indirectly by an attack on the body, or stomach, which it con trols.

Offensive and Defensive Action.

To attack presupposes offensive action, and this in its turn introduces defensive action, either to protect the attack or resist it. When the art of war is of a high order, the offensive and the defensive are so interwoven as to be inseparable, but as this degree of perfection has through out military history been the exception rather than the rule, these two modes of fighting may be considered separately. The passive defence, that is a defensive which does not include mobile of fensive action, has been justly condemned, yet it must be remem bered that when in the form of purely defensive bodies of troops, or of fortresses, or fortified positions, it has been combined with mobile forces, it has more often than not proved itself a necessary operation. The active defence, that is the occupation of a position with a view to persuade an enemy to attack it, and then, when he has exhausted himself, counter-attack from it, has Played as important a part in war as the offensive itself. The adoption of such an attitude depends entirely on circumstances, and each case must be judged on its own merits. Generally speak ing, the active defence carries with it advantages of time, place and terrain, but for the moment it resigns the initiative by seldom being able to restrict the strategic mobility of the attacker.