Whilst backwoodsmen and redskins were picking off the British red-coats, and whilst Simcoe, Tarleton and Ferguson were striv ing their utmost to counter them by raising light infantry, the marechal de Broglie, in 1778, at the camp of Vaussieux carried out experiments in line and column, showing that the evolutions of the first were heavy and difficult, and of the second flexible and speedy. Mesnil Durand advocated massive columns, Guibert battalion columns. Then came the French Revolution, all tactical shibboleths were cast to the winds ; cohesion disappeared, and man took to natural fighting, that is skirmishing, and though the Revolutionary armies, utterly lacking in discipline were frequently beaten, in 1794 an A.D.C. of the duke of York was compelled to acknowledge that "No mobbed fox was ever more put to it to make his escape than we were." Though in their first campaigns the French looked upon columns solely as reservoirs for skir mishers, it soon became apparent that skirmishers should be used for the act of distraction, and that columns should be used for the act of decision, artillery being employed to co-operate with the skirmishers. Thus was re-established the tactics of the successive employment of arms.
In his Italian campaigns of 1796-97 we find full use made of line, column and skirmishers. At Lonato and Castiglione, the French work in battalion columns at deploying intervals, the columns being of double companies covered by skirmishers. At Rivoli (q.v.) it is much the same. At the crossing of the Taglia mento (1797) demi-brigades are used, the centre battalion being deployed, and the flanking battalions kept in double company columns with skirmishers in front. Such a formation enabled considerable frontal fire to be delivered without uncovering the flanks to cavalry attack. After 1800 we find a change, the act
of distraction passing more and more from the infantry to the artillery. It was not that the French infantry were falling off in value, as has frequently been stated, for probably as late as 1812 they were equal to those of 1796. It was because Napoleon, like Frederick, had begun to realize that artillery is the superior arm. Even at Castiglione and Rivoli he massed the few guns he had. When guns are allotted to divisions as they were to Augereau's corps at Eylau and to Ney's at Friedland the infantry are repulsed. But after Aspern (q.v.) in 1809 Napoleon fully grasped Frederick's system, and increased his guns from two to three to each i,000 infantry. He also created a central artillery reserve of 126 guns, and allotted a reserve artillery to each corps d'armee. From Wagram (1809) onwards "it is the number of pieces rather than that of battalions which henceforth serves as the measure of the relative strength of armies." Thus writes Napoleon : "The better the infantry, the more one must husband it and support it with good batteries. . . . The invention of powder has changed the nature of war: missile weapons are now become the principal ones : it is by fire and not by shock that battles are decided to-day.
• • • The power of infantry lies in its fire. In siege warfare, as in the open field, it is the gun which plays the chief part ; it has effected a complete revolution. It is with artillery that war is made." Curious ac it may seem, it was Napoleon's lack of appre ciation of the value of the howitzer which caused him heavy casualties at the battle of Borodino (q.v.) in 1812, and decisive defeat at that of Waterloo (q.v.) in 1815.
Wellington.—In Napoleon's early campaigns we find the active defence playing an important part, for example at Rivoli and Arcola (1796), but once the emperor became the man of destiny, the reincarnation of Alexander, of necessity the offensive replaced this more cautious system of waging war. Yet fate must have it otherwise, for once he had decided that the gun was the decisive weapon, as he did of ter Aspern, he was immediately con fronted by a general—Wellington—who made the active defence the backbone of his tactics. The method adopted by the Iron Duke and his generals was simplicity itself, and it invariably succeeded. It consisted in selecting a good covered position behind which the main force of infantry was deployed, and in front of which was extended a line of skirmishers trained on the system taught by Sir John Moore at his camp at Shorncliffe in 1803 1805. The French advanced in columns, company behind com pany, covered by skirmishers, and were met by musket, rifle and artillery fire, and severely mauled. When they neared their objective, the English rose from behind their cover, fired a volley, rushed forward lapping round the columns, and charging them in front and both flanks. The battle of Busaco in 1810 is probably the most perfect example of these tactics. At Al buera (q.v.) in 1811 the English attacked a mass of columns on a hill with the same result. Again were these tactics repeated with decisive effect at Salamanca (q.v.) in 1812 and finally at Waterloo.