Tactics

This self-contained stability of cavalry is most noticeable dur ing the Crusades, for the Christian casualties are remarkably small. At the battle of Hazarth (1125) Baldwin's losses are only 24 men, whilst the Turks lose 2,000, at Jaffa 0190 2 Crusaders are killed on the one side and 700 Turks on the other. The Cru saders' mobility is, however, restricted since the Turkish cavalry is for the most part unarmoured, and consequently extremely mobile. In order to overcome this difficulty, it was found neces sary to dismount many knights and form them up on foot ; in other words to establish a phalanx which not only offered the Turkish horsemen a target to hit at, but also a base of operations and harbour of refuge for the mounted knights. This change in tactical organization, which is fundamental, enabled the Crusaders to develop mobility from a protective base, not a static en trenched camp, but a movable body of men who could occupy and hold the positions won by the charge. Here we find the germs of a new infantry, for this procedure was copied in western Europe.

With the advent of plate armour in the 13th century mobility is sacrificed to protection ; for though it is still possible to dis mount the knight, so heavy has his armour become that when once dismounted he is unable to move over muddy or broken country. At the battle of Tagliacozzo (q.v.) in 1268, Conradin's Ghibelline knights are so heavily armoured that Charles of An jou's cavalry, after exhausting them by repeated charges, roll them out of their saddles by seizing them by the shoulders. As armour increases in weight natural obstacles play a more and more im portant part in the battlefield. At Bannockburn (q.v.) in Bruce takes up his position behind a stream, and Edward II.'s knights are bogged just as in Flanders tanks are ditched 603 years later.

The Influence of the Bow.

A definite change in tactics now sets in. At Dupplin Muir (q.v.) in 1332 Baliol and Beaumont did not beat the earl of Mar by reckless charges, but by skilful weapon co-operation. The majority of their knights were dis mounted and formed into a phalanx, the flanks of which were pro tected by archers, whilst only 4o mounted knights were kept in reserve for the decision. The earl of Mar charged the phalanx, which remained stable; his knights were immobilized by the archers on the flanks, and annihilated by Baliol's squadron. This battle is the birthday of a new era in tactics—the tactics of the bow, pike and lance combined. It forms the mould in which all the English operations of the Hundred Years War (q.v.) were cast, a war which proved disastrous to the gallant but insubordinate chivalry of France, as Crecy (q.v.), Poitiers (q.v.) and Agincourt (q.v.) testify. From the battle of Poitiers onwards cavalry falls into a rapid decline, the French knights learn nothing, and as the bow and pike destroy them a new weapon arises in the crude bombards of the i4th century, which are about to revolu tionize the whole art of war and introduce the infantry cycle.

The Influence of Gunpowder.

The rise of infantry was due as much to social as to military reasons. Feudalism which restricted their use was attacked by trade as well as by gun powder. The increasing wealth of the 14th century had brought the cities into conflict with the Barons, and the result was not only a widespread series of Burgher wars but a steady increase in the infantry arm which was, however, powerless to attack the feudal strongholds until artillery came to its assistance. During

the second half of the Hundred Years War this difficulty was over come, for it was due to the artillery of Charles VII. more than to the visions of Joan of Arc that the English were ultimately driven out of France. This monarch provided himself with a train of artillery against which mediaeval fortifications proved a poor protection, and next we find cannon used in the open field, as happened at Formigny (q.v.) in 145o. To all intents and purposes this battle closed the Hundred Years War.

Meanwhile the hand gun, or Couleuvrine, was being turned to advantage by Ziska, in the Hussite Wars. For long it had been the custom to laager the baggage wagons in rear of the battles of knights. Ziska now turned this laager into a mobile fortress which he garrisoned with archers, cross-bowmen and hand gun ners. Once the knights had shattered themselves against it, he would issue out with his cavalry and destroy them. Thus he won the battles of Deutschbrod (1422), Aussig (1426) and Taus The Influence of Artillery.—Whilst the Swiss maintained their pikes and their phalangial formations which had proved so effective since the battle of Sempach (1386), during the second half of the 55th century such extraordinary progress was made in artillery that the wagon fortress (wagenberg) proved useless. The dismounted English and French knights once again took to horse, and as ordnance began to accompany infantry, more and more could foot soldiers work independently of cavalry and wagon forts. The close of the i 5th century and the opening of the 16th saw the three arms we know to-day, namely, cavalry, artillery and infantry assuming tangible form. In France the infantry are poor on account of the strength of the feudal system. In Switzerland they become decadent as they refuse to change their shock tac tics. In Spain they become highly efficient, a result of their strug gle with the Moors, and under Gonzalo, who armed his foot with sword and buckler ; against the Swiss and the German Land sknechts, in 1502, near Barletta, he repeated the Roman tactics of Pydna ; for as Machiavelli says : "By the help of their bucklers and the agility of their bodies, having got under their pikes, and so near that they could come at them with their swords, the Spanish had the day with the slaughter of most of the Swisses." The Development of the Musket.—As artillery forged ahead, and at the battle of Ravenna (q.v.) in 1512 broke away from the close support of infantry, and by taking the enemy in flank played a decisive part in winning victory for the French under Gaston de Foix, a rapid evolution in the handgun set in. In 152o the Spanish adopted the portable arquebus fork which stood them in good stead at Pavia in 1525. In this battle fought between the French under Francis I. and the Imperialists under Lannoy, we find a remarkable tactician, namely, the marquis de Pescaire drawing up a skirmishing line of 1,500 Basque arqui busiers who, according to BrantOme, "most wonderfully, though cruelly and villainously, discounted with much ease the power of the French cavalry." In the wars between Charles V. and Francis I. the bow and cross-bow disap pear. Artillery, owing to the development of fire-arms, is neglected, and seldom do we find more than one gun to i,000 men.