In the spring of 1814, in the short space of two pears, Bonaparte was compelled to abdicate the throne of France, and to confine himself to a paltry island in the .Mediterra neon : his armies, beaten, dispersed, captive, or destroyed, were no longer capable of supporting or protecting him ; and France, which for upwards of 20 years had poured her plunderers over the continent of Europe, became the seat of a war,.in which she was degraded, conquered,—her capital at the mercy of the conquerors, and indebted for her independence, and her ancient and legitimate territory, entirely to the moderation of thoS'e conquerors.
It is not possible to imagine any topic, calculated more deeply to interest the mind, than the contrast which these events afford : Were the intervening period not specified, we should be apt to conclude, that such an essential and wonderful change of affairs, could not have been wrought out, but after the lapse of many years. The causes which produced this unparalleled change, in such a very short period of time, are naturally sought for ; and, fortunately for the gratification of curiosity, as well as for the more important purposes of history, considered as philosophy teaching by example, these causes are not difficult to be ex plained.
An observation of the Marquis of Wellesley, in the House of Lords, respecting the character of Bonaparte, will open up to us the most important of these causes. Bonaparte was a man, he observed, who would create unto himself great reverses. In him existed not merely that restless and insatiable ambition, which he possessed in common with most conquerors ; but an obstinacy so blind and over powering, as to convert even his great military talents in to the causes of his ruin. It is scarcdly possible to con ceive any chain of events, spread even over a period of ma ny years, which could have blasted the power of the con queror of Europe so utterly and hopelessly, as his own fool-hardiness and obstinacy did in the short space of a few months, during his campaign of Russia. When we say utterly and hopelessly, we mean in reference to his charac ter ; for, could experience have taught him wisdom and moderation, not even his losses in Russia could have driven him from the throne of France. But in the campaign of 1813, he again created unto himself great reverses ; san guine, ambitious, and domineering, when partial and tem porary success attended his arms ; faithless and unprin cipled during the negociations into which the allies entered with him, and obstinate when he met with defeat. By ad
vancing to Moscow at the commencement of a Russian winter, and continuing in that city so long, he destroy ed nearly the whole of hiS army. By obstinately clinging to Dresden, till the allies had actually cut him off from France, he brought on the battle of Leipsic, which com pleted the destruction of a second army. The same scenes were repeated during the short campaign of 1814, when his means were fewer, his opponents more numerous, and his ruin nearer at hand : still he might have been saved,— the allies would have left him on the throne of France : to their terms be listened when unsuccessful ; hut no sooner had he gained even a doubtful and hard bought victory, but he most foolishly and fatally for himself, but most for tunately for Europe, allowed his ambitious faithlessness to become so apparent, that the allies were convinced that his dethronement was absolutely necessary to the repose and independence of Europe.
But though Bonaparte was the principal cause of his own destruction, yet there were other causes co-operating, which would indeed have been ineffectual of themselves, but which, aided by the man against whom they were di rected, became formidable and successful.
At the commencement of the French Revolution, the sovereigns of Europe, for a short time, united against it ; but narrow and blind self-interest, mutual jealousy and ap prehension, and an imperfect knowledge of the evils with which it was fraught, dissolved the confederacy. After wards they were stimulated or goaded by England to an unwilling and unequal contest. At length fatal and dearly bought experience convinced them, that the only means of preserving even the name of independence, and the rem nant of power that France had left them, was by cordially and zealously uniting against her. This union, however, could not have been effected during the plenitude of Bo naparte's power ; but after that power was reduced by the obstinacy of the possessor, their union became essentially conducive to the restoration of European independence.