At the commencement of the French Revolution, the sovereigns of Europe regarded their subjects with a sus picious and apprehensive eye, as much more likely to as sist than to repel the French ; and instead of endeavouring to bring them over to form a common cause with them selves, still farther irritated and alienated them by their conduct. Besides, the people were too eager to receive the soldiers of a nation, which had solemnly declared, that they made war only on the palace, but brought peace and liberty to the cottage. A very short experience convinced the sovereigns, that their surest defence against France was in the confidence and loyalty of their people ; while the people fatally experienced, that, by being liberated from the dominion of their native princes, and placed un der the government of France, they only exchanged one ty ranny for another,—a tyranny to which they had been long accustomed, and which was relieved by many acts of pro tection and kindness, for one which was novel,—which broke in upon those comforts that the former tyranny had left them, and which, as being inflicted by stangers, and with all the insolence and profligacy to which unparalleled success had given rise, was infinitely more oppressive and intolerable. Thus suffering under a common evil, the sovereigns and people of Europe were made sensible, that their interests were more closely connected than they had previously imagined, and were disposed and prepared to co-operate in the recovery oC their liberty and indepen dence. An opportunity only was wanting for the spirit of hatred and vengeance against France to burst forth into ac tion ; and this opportunity was afforded by the man himself, against whom it was chiefly to be directed.
The events of the peninsular war may justly be regarded as forming another subordinate cause of the destruction of Bonaparte. This war most decidedly proved that the French soldiers were not invincible ; that even when op posed by an inferior force, they might be conquered ; while the genius and the successes of Wellington pro claimed to Europe, that the most celebrated of the French Marshals had at length met with their master ii. all the art of war. Thus, even before the Russian camI•lign, the charm of French invincibility was broken. But the war in the Peninsula gave another. cheering lesson to the con tinent of Europe ; for it taught it what could be effected by a people resolved not to submit to their invaders, though that people struggled under the disadvantages of a wretch ed government, and received little assistance even from their own regular army.
Such appear to have been the principal causes which led to the liberation of Europe.
The condition and character of the French nation, at the period when Louis XVIII. ascended the throne, is an ob ject of investigation, not less interesting or important than that which we have just been examining.
It was supposed by many, that the reverses of Bonaparte in Russia, and the dreadful misery which, by his ambition and obstinacy during that campaign, he had inflicted on his surviving soldiers, would have completely rooted out their confidence and attachment to him. So far, however, was
this from being the case, that even the additional proofs of his falling fame and fortune, and the additional experience of misery, nearly equal to that of the Russian campaign, supplied by the campaigns of 1S13 and 1814, neither de prived him of the attachment and confidence of his sol diers, nor materially weakened the military spirit of France. Indeed, at the period when Louis ascended the throne, the military might justly be regarded as the most important and efficient part of the population. They had been so long accustomed to regard themselves as superior to their coun trymen, and possessed such a large portion of the esprit de corps, and such facilities of acting in concert, that though for ming but a small portion of the population of France, no sovereign could long be safe, who was decidedly unpo pula• with them. And it was utterly impossible that they could regard Louis with any other feelings but those of mingled contempt and hatred:—of contempt, because his constitutional indolence, increased by the inactivity of age and infirmity, and by the habits of a literary life, rendered him disinclined and unfit for a military life ;—of hatred, be cause, had he been inclined and fit for such a life, the very charter by which he held his throne from the allies, and the mass of the French people, absolutely forbade him to fol low the career of that man, under whom they had been bred. In short, the military were attached to a life of what they called glory, that is, to a life of conquest and plunder, —their thoughts, feelings, and habits, were all moulded in conformity to such a life. But the allies had invaded France, had dethroned Bonaparte, and had seated Louis in his stead, for the express purpose of putting an end to the mi litary career of France. How then could the Marshals, the officers, or the soldiers of Bonaparte be friendly to the reign of Louis ? The mass of the French nation were weary of the reign of Bonaparte, and exhaustad by the measures of that reign: They were anxious for peace and repose. Hence they looked forward to the government of Louis with satisfac tion and pleasure ; not from any hereditary attachment to the family of the Bourbons, nor from any remembrance of what France had been under them prior to the Revolution. Louis was preferred by them to Bonaparte, because under the former they anticipated the annihilation of the conscrip tion, the restoration of peace, and the enjoyment of some portion of civil and political liberty. But it is impossible that they could have freed their minds from all apprehen sion, that, along with the restoration of the Bourbons, pro perty might be rendered insecure ; feudal privileges and tythes might be yes ivcd ; and those abuses re-established which, in some measure, had driven that family from the throne. By the mass of the French nation, therefore, by all the landed proprietors, by the farmers, and by the pea. salary, all the measures of Louis's government would be •vatched with suspicion and anxiety.