But all these signs of approaching misfortune to Louis, were ambiguous, or trifling, compared to those which might have been gathered from the conduct, the feelings, and the power of the military. To them the King had delivered himself up, even more completely than he had done when he first ascended the throne : Soult was min ister of war, and consequently had an opportunity of form ing any plans which his former attachments might sug gest. Ile had, indeed, taken the oaths of fidelity to Louis ; but weak and credulous must that man have been, who ,Cd nut faith in the oath of a soldier of the revolutionary ••ne of the most fundamental and cherished maxims that military glory was of such paramount b, justify any means by which it could be lcmlired. The King, therefore, had cast himself, bound :and and mot, into the power of his enemies, while he had -.eglected to make friends of the people.
In the mean time, Bonaparte, in the isle of Elba, was nearly forgotten ; when, to the astonishment and dismay, not only of the French King, but of all Europe, lie sud denly landed near Cannes, in France, on the 1st of March. The arrangement of the plan, in conformity to which he was invited, or induced to land in France, is not accurately known. The following circumstances, however, arc eithor well substantiated, or highly probable :—Almost imme diately after his departure from France, his numerous par tizans, especially among the soldiery in the southern pro vinces of the kingdom, began to talk in mysterious terms of the violet season, and to express a strong wish for its arrival. To those who compared and considered these terms, it was soon evident that Bonaparte was expected in France at the return of the violet season ; but it was not easy to ascertain whether this expectation was grounded on any promise he had made, or plan which they knew was forming, or whether it was vaguely taken up by his ad mirers. The expectation, however, grew stronger and more general as the spring approached : there is good reason to believe that the ministers of Louis were inform ed of it, and that it would probably be realized : but what measures of precaution could be expected from men who were either leagued with Bonaparte, or who were so ignorant of the state of France, and of the character of the sovereign of Elba, as to see no danger to their sovereign from either ? It is not so easy to trace the framers of the plan for bringing back Bonaparte, or the arrangements that were made for carrying that plan into execution. We know, however, that Louis was disliked, both by the military and republican party ; and it is highly probable that the restora tion of Bonaparte was planned and achieved by them in conjunction. The former naturally wished for their Em peror, in the expectation that he would enable them to wipe off the disgrace of defeat ; the latter wished for him only as a sovereign, who would free them from Louis, and whom they hoped, by the strength their party had acquit.
cd, they could afterwards bind down to the observance of a free constitution.
Bonaparte had been attended to the isle of Elba by com missioners from the allied powers ; but soon after his arrival there, they all left him except Colonel Campbell, the British commissioner, who seems to have remained, however, not in any official capacity, or directly charged with the custody of Bonaparte. During the temporary absence of Colonel Campbell, Bonaparte sailed from Porto Ferrajo, on the 26th of February, with about 1000 men, very few of whom were Frenchmen, the rest being Poles, Corsicans, Neapolitans, and Elbese. Generals Bertrand and Drouet accompanied him. It was soon apparent, that the soldiers in France, if they did not flock to his standard, would not, however, oppose his progress ; and that most of the Marshals were traitors to to whom they had taken the oaths of allegiance. Massena commanded in the department where Bonaparte landed ; but though he issued a strong proclamation against him, he did not march to oppose his progress ; on the contrary, it appears, that be dispatched sonic of his troops in an opposite direction from that in which he was advancing. Grenoble was the first military depot and garrison town at which he arrived ; here a corps under General Marchand was posted : the general was faithful, but the soldiers, on a short address from him, joined his ranks. So quick and unmolested was his progress, that on the 8th of March he reached Lyons.
As soon as the intelligence of Bonaparte's landing was known at Paris, the fatal consequences of Louis having put such implicit faith in his Marshals were but too apparent. Soult, indeed, as minister of war, issued an address to the army, in which he denounced Bonaparte as a traitor, and as the author of all the calamities of France ; but by this very address, and by subsequent official notices, he contrived to announce to all France, the progress Bonaparte had made, the little opposition lie had met with, and the formidable nature, as well as the probable successful result of his en terprize ; while he utterly neglected taking the proper measures to apprehend him, and is even suspected of hav ing stationed different corps in such a manner, as to serve as the protectors of Bonaparte, where the populace might have risen against him. Marshal "Macdonald was not faith less to Louis, but he was not active in his behalf; and the troops with whom he marched against Bonaparte re fused to act. Of all the traitors to their sovereign, Mar shal Ncy was the most unprincipled : he voluntarily came forward with an offer of his set-vices to take Bonaparte, dead or alive: troops were placed under his command for that purpose : he advanced apparently against him ; but on the 14th of March, when Bonaparte had reached Lons le Saulnier, he joined him, and issued a proclamation to his army, in which he describes the Bourbons as unfit to reign, and recommends his troops to join the great Na poleon.