On the 7th of June, a few days after the assembly of the Champ de Mai, Bonaparte went in state to the palace of representatives, to open the session of the chambers. The oath of fidelity to the Emperor and the constitution having been taken, he uncovered himself for a moment—after wards covered himself—and then addressed them in a speech, or which the most important topics were, the free constitution which Franco had just received,—the formida ble coalition against the independence of the country,—the actual commencement of hostilities, in the capture of a French frigate by an English man of v a r,—and the assem blages that had been formed, and the communications which were carried on, with Louis at Ghent, in the same manner as with the emigrants at Coblentz in 1792. He concluded, by alluding to the probability, that the first duty of princes might soon call him to fight for the country ; that the army and himself would discharge their duty ; while he trusted that the peers and representatives would give to the nation an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism, and, like the Roman senate, swear to die rather than survive the dis honour of France. On the following day, in the House of Representatives, bold and unequivocal proofs were afford ed, that Bonaparte was not now nearly so despotic, or so much feared, as before his abdication ; and that even the military were regarded with more jealousy, and as subser vient to the good of the state. For, on one of the members proposing, that as the title of Louis le desW had been given to Louis XVIII. that of Sauveur de N Patric should be given to Napoleon, he was three times interrupted by calls for the order of the day, and the president at last informed him that he ought to obey them ; and on another member moving, that the army had deserved well of the country, the motion was thrown out, on the express ground, that, till the soldiers had benefited the country, they ought not to receive its thanks and gratitude.
Bonaparte still lingered in the capital, notwithstanding war was actually commenced, and it seemed his policy to attack the English and Prussians, before the rest of the al lies joined them, or invaded France in other quarters. The cause of his delay is not known ; but it probably arose from the unsettled state of the interior of the kingdom, from his apprehensions respecting the republicans in Paris, and from the inadequacy of his means effectually to oppose the allies. That his troops would fight with most desperate courage, he might confidently anticipate ; but there were other cir cumstances, besides their inferiority in numbers, which might damp his hopes : many of those Marshals, who had assisted or participated in his victories, were either along with Louis, or were too coldly and equivocally of his party, to be trusted. Among the former were Berthier,—his most intimate and longest tried friend and companion, and Marmont ;—among the latter were M'Donald. Ney, who might seem to have deserved his confidence, by his most profligate treachery to Louis, was not with the army col lected on the northern frontier to oppose the Prussians and English; nor had he hitherto received any intimation alit he was to be employed : and even Soult had no distinguish ed command assigned him. The force which Bonaparte
had collected for the defence of the immense frontier of France does not appear to have exceeded 250,000 men ; besides the troops in the garrisons, most of which were national 'guards ;—of this force, about 130,000 men were in the Netherlands; and the remainder were principally under Rapp near Strasburg, and under Suchet, on the bor ders of Switzerland and Italy. Of the allies, none were yet come up, except the English, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians under the Duke of Wellington, who might amount to 80,000 men; and the Prussians under Blucher, who pro bably exceeded 100,000 : the former occupied the frontier from the sea to Brussels ; the latter from Brussels east ward. Next to them the Bavarians and Russians were to take their position, while the Austrians, a large portion of whom were engaged at present in hostilities against Mu•at in Italy, and the troops of the King of Sardinia, &c. were to invade France on the south-eastern frontier. Louis had been invited to join the confederacy with what troops he might have with him, but though a great number of offi cers left France and joined him at Ghent, scarcely any of the French soldiers flocked to his standard.
On Sunday the Ilth of June, Bonaparte received addres ses from the two Chambers in reply to his opening speech ; and on the next day, at four in the morning, he left Paris, having nominated Generals Sebastiani, Grenier, Beaumont, &c. to the command of the capital, which had been render ed as strong as its position and nature would allow. On the 14th, he arrived at Avesnes, where he issued an order of the clay, reminding his troops that the 14th was the anni versary of the battles of Marengo and Friedland, and that " to every Frenchman who had a heart, the moment was arrived to conquer or perish." The position of his army was as follows : The Imperial head quarters at Beaumont ; the 1st corps commanded by General D'Erlon, at Solfre on the Sambre ; the 2d corps commanded by General Reille, was at Ham-sur-Heure ; the 3d corps commanded by Gen eral Vandammc, was on the right of Beaumont ; and the 4th corps commanded by General Girard, was at Philippe ville. The Prussian posts were established on the Sam bre; these he attacked at day light on the morning of the 15th, and in the course of the day drove them from the ri ver, and made himself master of the ground from Thuin to Fleurus, a distance of about 16 miles, on the Namur road ; whilst on the Brussels road, he forced back a Belgian bri gade to Quatre Bras, about 12 miles the the Sambre. Bonaparte in this affair evidently had the advantage, and seems to have surprised the allies.