:MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science which treats of the motives and the rules of human actions ; and of the ends to which they ought to be directed.
In contemplating the general history of animated na ture, we make no hesitation in setting down the habits of an individual as characteristics of the species, on the grounds that creatures similarly constituted, possessed of the same organs, and impelled by the same instincts, must have the same dispositions and feelings. The hu man race presents a remarkable exception to this ob servation ; and the varieties which it exhibits in external appearance are not half so numerous or striking, as the contrasts which we observe in moral conduct and feeling.
Were mankind placed in circumstances precisely similar; were they possessed of the same extent of men tal powers, and the same degree of natural feeling,— we could scarcely conceive a diversity of sentiment or conduct to be possible. But when we consider the in finite variety which prevails in the external circum stances, and undoubtedly also in the mental powers of man, instead of wondering at the contrariety of views and feelings, we have greater reason to be surprised at their general harmony and agreement. The differences seem to be only accidental ; and, even where they are most apparent, a principle of congruity may generally be discerned, which leads to the same end, though by the employment of different means ; and brings the most anomalous appearances within the ordinary range of human feelings.
There must, then, be some strong leading principles in the constitution of man, or in the ordinary arrange ments of Providence, to preserve order amidst such discordant materials, which, in many instances, seem directed not only against the comfort, but against the very existence of society.
According to some, this object is accomplished by the continual interference of Providence, to rectify the dls orders which the passions of men have produced. We are not much inclined to object to this doctrine. We would receive it with this qualification, however, that it wise arrangement, continually upheld by the Being who first contrived it, is to be considered as a direct display of divine providence. But, admitting this, we
contend, at the same time, that a provision is made, in the nature of things, (not from any necessity of nature, but by the will of the author of nature,) for maintaining the equilibrium of the moral world, and for restraining the vices, as well as influencing the feelings and the con duct of men.
It cannot be a random principle which produces such uniform results ; nor can it be a very abstruse one, since its influence is universal, and is felt, with various degrees of force, in every stage of human so ciety. But though the general complexion of human manners bespeaks the operation of a principle common to human nature, there is nothing with regard to which men are less agreed, than the name and nature of that principle which produces such extensive effects. Men differ both as to the object which constitutes the su preme good, or chief felicity of their nature, and also as to the means by which it is most likely to be secured. They do not sufficiently distinguish between the prin ciples which impel to action, and the objects to which they look for gratification. They arc both indiscrimi nately called motives; and, certainly, when any object acquires paramount importance in the imagination, it operates as a motive in regulating the whole conduct. It is, however, in all probability, only a confirmed pre judice, arising out of a perversion of the original im pelling principle, which is merely a vague appetency of our nature, calling for gratification, but not directing us, with infallible certainty, to a specific object, nor to the mode and measure in which it ought to be enjoyed. There is another thing, therefore, to be attended to in moral discussions, besides our elementary feelings; for, after adopting the instincts, desires, and passions, im planted in our nature, as the elements of action, we must examine how far these principles have been legitimately exercised, and consider in what instances they have been carried too far, or have fallen short of what they might have fairly achieved.