In all investigations, then, into subjects of morality and religion, it is not enough that our own reason be sa tisfied ; the point to be enforced must be made familiar to our senses; must be reconciled to our prejudices, and shown to be consistent with those notions which we are compelled to admit as primary and incontrovertible facts. Hence, we find, in general, that illustrations in moral subjects are more effectual than reasoning ; and familiar views, drawn from an induction of obvious facts, are more satisfactory than the most elaborate abstract speculations.
In another part of this work, (See LOGIC,) we have shown how much our intellectual perceptions arc in fluenced by the order and course of nature ; and that those mental features which appear most singular, are impressed on the mind by that invariable order, w hich the Almighty has established among his works. This regular order both facilitates the acquisition of know ledge, and, by its frequent occurrence, stamps it, in in delible characters, on the human mind. The same ob servation applies to our moral feelings. The law of God is, indeed, the ultimate rule ; but that law is writ ten, to a certain degree, on our own hearts, because the very instincts which he has given us compel us to ob serve it ; and our experience soon teaches us, that we never can infringe, with impunity, those rules which are indicated by the constitution of nature. God has written his law, not only on our hearts, but on the face of nature ; and his revealed law is only the enforce ment and illustration of principles which were always in operation, and might always have been discovered, had not the sins of man enfeebled and obscured his reason*.
Next to the revealed law of God, then, we would be disposed to say, that nature is our surest guide ; we do not mean merely the feelings of human nature, which are evidently under a corrupting influence, but the nature of things, that is, the arrangements of provi dence, and the constitution of the external world. These are the aids which the Almighty has given to direct us to the knowledge of his will, and to strengthen that revelation which our ignorance rendered necessary. We conceive that this representation is confirmed by Scripture. At the very time that God was giving a positive revelation to Israel, he appealed to their own in terest, and told them that the law which he ordained was for their own good. Deut. vi. 24.
And farther, that he might not seem to impose strange and arbitrary precepts, having no foundation but in his own despotic will, he told them, that the law which they were commanded to observe was perfectly conformable to the intimations of their conscience and reason. This
commandment, which I command thee this day, is not hid den from thee, neither is it far of :—bat the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.
Our intellectual and moral faculties, though most closely allied, admit nevertheless of an obvious distinc tion. It is the province of the intellectual faculties to receive impressions, to perceive relations, to examine our attainments, and to see if they have been legitimately acquired : and if it shall be found that we have viewed things as they are actually presented in nature, and have combined them according to those analogies and relations which the author of nature has established, we have nearly exhausted the philosophy of the human mind. The moral faculties have a farther, and most important office to perform : for it is their province to decide how far the things which are presented to our senses, or suggested to our feelings, are conducive to the general happiness of our nature, and to what ex tent we may enjoy them consistently with our duty as moral agents. Those original impulses of our nature, or those desires and feelings of want which are born with us, put in motion the intellectual machinery of the human mind ; they direct it to certain objects of gratification ; and when these are obtained, it is a mat tar of feeling to decide on the degree of enjoyment which has been received. If, instead of enjoyment, the result has been pain, we are forced to conclude, that the object which has produced this effect, is not intend ed for gratification ; or that we have not applied it aright for the purposes of enjoyment.
We are thus impelled to fresh pursuits, and when, at last, we discover that, which yields the desired en joyment to ourselves, without impairing the happiness of others, and which is approved by our reason, whilst it gratifies our feelings, we conclude that we have found the right medium prescribed by the author of our exis tence. These experiments may go a considerable length in ascertaining the rule of moral :conduct; for we are not left to grope at random ; nature and con science are always at hand to direct or to restrain us; and we are surrounded, from our very birth, by moral relations, which train and discipline our minds, involun tarily and unconsciously, to the habits and duties of moral agents.