The will of God, where it is known, must always be the rule of conduct. Let it but be fairly established that a precept has proceeded from heaven, and it would be needless to argue where it would be impious to resist. But there are a great many cases to which this deter minate rule cannot be directly applied. Even the reveal ed law of God does not afford a direct rule for the moral conduct of man, in many instances where it is of essen tial consequence that he should decide with prudence. Ile is, therefore, under the necessity of employing. his reasoning faculties in order to connect the case which puzzles him, with some general principle, or to trace its alliance with some recognised law.
At first view, it might appear desirable, that no doubt should ever exist on a moral question ; and that we should be instantly enabled to decide with certainty in every case, where we are called to appear as moral agents. But this is not the way in which the author of our nature trains us to knowledge and to virtue. Our intellectual faculties are sharpened by the necessity im posed upon us of unravelling the studied involutions of nature. Some connecting principle is always presented to us as a clue to direct our steps, nr some analogous fact occurs as an illustration : and before we reach the object which we have in view, we are generally raised above it ; having travelled through a labyrinth of know ledge, whose hidden treasures we have been compelled to explore. By this means we perceive that the truth which, in the outset, we proposed as the ultimate object of our researches, is only a link in the chain of causes which connect matter with its creator. Something si milar occurs in moral investigations. A doubtful point is cleared up by tracing its connection with others more fully established, or with acknowledged axioms in the constitution of our nature ; and we are thus led to the temple of truth through a path beautifully diversified, which affords pleasure and instruction at every step, and beguiles the tediousness of the way by the many inte resting objects which are successively presented to our view.
Thus, the same law, which, in physics, leads us to general principles from individual facts, might, by a careful process of moral generalization, conduct to re sults no less certain, could we disentangle our reason from our passions, and subject our feelings to our judg ment. Ample materials are furnished to assist us in these researches: and as moral truths are infinitely more important than any physical results, the beneficent au thor of our being has afforded more numerous helps to conduct us to conclusions so essential to our happiness. Instinct, reason, judgmeni, conscience, point to the same goal ; and though they are all sometimes so bewildered as to miss the right road, yet they possess in themselves a principle of rectification, which both points out their error, and incites to fresh attempts to discover truth, happiness, and duty.
Besides the intimations which spring up within our own breasts, and which are confirmed by the general habi tudes of human nature, we may learn lessons of morality from the instincts of the lower animals ; and the con stancy, fidelity, gratitude, and parental affection, which, in many instances, they display in such an eminent de gree, cannot fail to strengthen our moral perZeptions. Many beautiful illustrations in the sacred Scriptures are founded on this idea ; and we are frequently exhorted to draw moral and religious instructions from the instincts and habits of the lower animals. " Go to the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways, and be wise ;" we arc here directed to an excellent example of industry and fore sight. u Consider the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns, yet your hea venly father feedeth them ; are not ye much better than they ?" These plain facts afford an excellent argument for trust in Divine providence.
Nor is this all : our moral feelings arc, to a certain ex tent, regulated by the physical constitution of our bodies, and by the circumstances in which we are placed; and whenever we fall into extremes, either of deficiency or of excess, we find monitors within and around us, to sti mulate our languid affections, or to repress our head long desires.
Although all these intimations of duty, which arc so profusely scattered around, would in themselves be in -sufficient to afford a universally applicable rule of duty; (because our prejudices disqualify us from drawing sound and accurate conclusions ;) yet they are powerful auxiliaries in moral reasoning, and afford essential aid even where conviction is produced by other means. A moral precept, confirmed by miracles, may, neverthe less, be contrary to our limited views, or depraved af fections : in that case, we are compelled, rather than in clined, to submit. But let it be shown that the precept in question is exactly conformable in spirit, design, and circumstances, to what we observe and approve in other cases, and then all opposition must appear unreasonable, and we must stand condemned by our own and our own consciences. In fact, it is not demonstration that we so much stand in need of in moral reasoning, as persuasion. The grand truths of morality are sufficiently palpable to command the conviction of the conscience and reason; but something more is necessary to give them a firm hold on our feelings. In subjects of pure science, where nothing but reason is concerned, nothing but reason requires to be satisfied ; and a demonstration silences for ever all doubts and conjectures. But the case is wholly different in morals and religion : these sciences are intimately blended with our feelings: and tvhen they inculcate disagreeable truths, or unwelcome precepts, our passions and prejudices will, most pro bably, be up in arms to resist the convictions of reason.