But there are many laws of our nature which are not moral laws at all. It is a law of our nature to eat when we are hungry ; it is a moral law which says, Thou shalt not steal. In this view, the law of our nature is totally distinct from the law of moral obligation. The former at ises from instinct or appetite, or from prejudice, to which custom has given the force of a law. The law of nature is limited by the moral law, which defines the boundaries of our enjoyments. This moral law is neither instinctive nor intuitive ; it can only be discover ed by reference to revelation, to experience, or to ob servation of the obvious designs of providence. It is true that moral laws are also laws of our nature, that is, they are framed by the author of our nature for our happiness and improvement ; but they become obliga tory on our conscience, only in consequence of our re ferring them to the will of a superior, to whom we owe allegiance, and who is entitled to it from his uniform kindness and benevolence, as well as from his sovereign power and authority.
.The ideas of right and wrong are acquired at such an early period, and confirmed by such a course of con stant discipline, that we are apt to consider them as in stinctive feelings, or as original independent intimations of conscience ; and the opinions which tend to modify or controvert this doctrine are generally viewed with some suspicion, as being conceived to have a tendency to shake the eternal foundation of moral virtue. In so far as our particular opinions are concerned, this alarm is entirely groundless ; for we most zealously contend for the eternal unalterable distinction between right and wrong ; but, we contend, that the mind does not possess in itself any particular power or faculty which decides, suo jure, on the moral fitness of actions; and that its decisions on this important point must be set tled by showing the conformity, or non-conformity, of any action with the general order of nature, to which our feelings, faculties, and powers, are adapted. By this means, we perceive that the distinction between right and wrong is not fanciful, nor casual, but fixed and permanent, having its foundation in the ordinations of providence, which God has made us capable of ob serving, and which are presented to us every day, and every hour, that we may be trained to the functions of moral beings.
What use is there, then, for a moral sense, to perceive what is every moment of our lives pressed on our no tice, and rendered familiar to our understanding by a thousand instances ? Is it a moral sense which teaches parents the duty of loving their children ? No, it is an instinctive feeling ; it is exactly the same with that which regulates the lower animals, who might, with as good reason, urge their pretensions to a moral sense, on the ground of parental affection ? Is it a moral sense which enforces the duty of conjugal fidelity, and shows the beauty of this virtue ? No, this duty results from perceived necessity and expediency. Is there a
moral sense which tells us that polygamy is improper ? No, but we soon perceive it to be so from the burden and inconvenience, the jarring and discomfort which necessarily arise from a double or divided family. We should like to see how the impropriety of this practice could be evinced on the principle of a moral sense. On our principles there is no difficulty ; for, besides the personal inconvenience which it produces, we can show that the order of nature is in favour of monogamy ; the birds of the air, and the beasts of the field, separate into pairs, and during the season of their loves remain faithful to each other ; and the same lesson is inculcated on the human species by the proportion between the sexes ; an argument which the author of our religion did not disdain to employ, when he said, he that made them at the beginning made them a male and a female. Is it a moral sense which proclaims the virtue of patri otism ? No ; we are trained to it from our infancy, in consequence of those powerful associations which arise from common laws, and common religious feelings, and common protection, and common interest, all which ce ment the population into one body, and knit the soul of the community into one common feeling. Does any moral sense teach us our duty to God ? No ; our feelings often revolt from this duty, whilst our reason can point out a thousand arguments to enforce it.
Our readers will perceive that we have been arguing against a moral sense, only in the light in which it has been viewed by several eminent modern philosophers, such as Butler, Reid, Stewart, Soc. as a distinct power of the mind, enabling it to perceive the moral beauty or turpi tude of actions ; and whilst we dismiss it, in this sense, as totally unnecessary, we have endeavoured to shew that there is a radical and essential distinction between right and wrong, fixed by an unalterable law, which we are compelled to recognise, because we cannot recede far from it without ruining our happiness.