Wc are not to seek, then, for the law of moral ac tion solely in the mind itself; this would carry us back to the innate ideas of Descartes; the mind collects it partly from its own feelings and faculties, partly from the bodily capacities and functions, and partly from the order of nature, or the circumstances by which we are surrounded, which arc ordered and disposed by the author of our nature, and influence materially our feelings, our opinions, and our actions. By comparing all these things together, we learn to distinguish between what is local or accidental ; and what is fixed and permanent ; and we perceive distinctly that the line of conduct resulting from the knowledge thus acquired, is not only consistent with the will of heaven, as intimated by the course of Provi dcncc, but is also perfectly consistent with our own hap pine-,s. It is only by this enlarged view of the subject, that we learn to correct the narrowness of private feel ing, and to consider our own happiness as identified with the public good. An individual who looks not beyond himself, would be disposed to view many things that befal him as exceedingly wrong, and to regard them with the strongest disapprobation ; but when he considers these things as happening by the fixed ordinations of Pro vidence, and that, of course, they must be useful in their general tendency, though disastrous to him, he then views himself as a fellow-subject under the same moral government, and learns to approve whatever promotes the plans of the Supreme Legislator. lie then learns that true self-love and social are the same ; and he learns, moreover, that to be virtuous, and to consult his own in terest, are, in fact, synonymous expressions. Partial views of expediency, or limited conceptions of God's moral government, or turbulent and ungovernable pas sions, may often make these expressions appear not only different, but opposite ; hut they are identified by the nature of things, and the appointments of heaven. And we are inclined to think with King, that the disagree ment of authors respecting the criterion of virtue, is rather apparent than real that " acting agreeably •:ature or reason, when rightly understood, would per fectly coincide with the fitness of things ; the fitness of things, as far as these words have any meaning, with truth ; truth, with the common good ; and the common good with the will of God." It follows, from what we have already advanced, that whatever tends to promote the best interests of man must be right, and conformable to the will of heaven ; and that, in searching for a rule of moral conduct, we will always find it to coincide exactly with that which promotes the real happiness of man; Much misconcep tion has arisen on this subject, from confounding the motives with the rules of action. Were there no sinful bias in human nature, and no tendency to excess in its original passions, the motives and the rule would always coincide : in that case, whatever man willed would be right, and his own inclinations would be an infallible rule of right conduct. But as it is evident that the passions often act with undue violence, and arc directed to im proper and illegitimate ends, the only rule that we can have fur the management of them is, to consider the consequences which they produce, in their various bear ings on our character, our present happiness, and our future hopes. If they contradict any intimation which we have received from the word of God, or the light of nature, we have reason to feel alarm : but if these are not contradicted, whilst our present happiness and re spectability are promoted, we have the concurrence of every species of evidence to prove that the passions, or appetites, or desires, have been legitimately indulged, and directed to proper ends. We do not see any rule, then, by which we can judge of the proper degree in which any appetite or passion ought to be indulged, but by the expediency of the results to which it leads ; and having learned by experience and extended knowledge what is most conducive to our own and the general good, we henceforth conclude that this is an object of rational pursuit ; we studiously dismiss every motive that would divert us from the attainment of it ; and the rule and the motive are again brought to coincide, as must have been the case in a state of perfect rectitude.
Mankind act at first without minutely calculating consequences, or having any regard to remote expedi ency ; for they are trained to action either by authority, which they dare not disobey, or by instinctive feelings, which they are not inclined to resist. In this way. they often acquire habits which stick to them through life, and which they seldom examine, with a view to ascertain whether they be founded in truth and reason. When,
however, they have been lcd to think, they soon begin to perceive that the habits which they have acquired, and the feelings which they have blindly obeyed, arc re ferable to a general law, whose utility they are forced to recognise.
This is the general situation of mankind ; they are, from their infancy, moulded by education, and trained to moral habits insensibly and involuntarily ; but not acci dentally; lo revery system of moral education has a foun dation in nature, though it may be strangely distorted by circumstances, and scarcely reducible to the ordinary habitudes of moral action. \\Then once their knowledge is extended, and they are able to examine the foundation on w hich their actions rest, they either find them, or en deavour to make them, consistent with that general plan which reason compels them to recognise, and to ascribe to an intelligent and benevolent ruler, whose laws they feel themselves bound to obey.
Those feelings, then, must be pronounced worthy of moral approbation, which give rise to actions which arc salutary in their consequences, useful to ourselves, and beneficial to society ; and calculated alike to promote our present happiness and our immortal hopes.
This is nearly, if not altogether, the doctrine of Ex pediency, as taught by Paley, which has been so gene rally condemned, and so little understood. It is the very principle, however, which seems to regulate all the pro ceedings of the Almighty ; the tendency of the whole being to promote the general good ; and could we de tect any thing in the economy of Providence, decidedly malignant in its aspect and tendency, we should be forced to exclude benevolence from the list of the divine per fections. But as we pronounce the ways of God to be good, from perceiving that the result is beneficent, can we hesitate to pronounce our approval of human actions, when their tendency coincides with the plans of Provi dence, and when their end is to promote the general good ? But there are some who seem as if they never Gould be satisfied, unless virtue and interest are set at variance, and happiness and duty rendered inconsistent. They seem to be influenced by the same principle as the Religionists, who seek for merit by austerities abhorrent to nature ; or as the worthy Father, who wished he had been commanded to believe what was impossible, that he might have had it in his power to give a satisfactory evi dence of his faith. Who can hesitate to explode such notions as hurtful follies ? And we aver, that they do not think more soundly, who imagine that virtue must be inconsistent with their present interest and happiness. In prosecuting a course of virtuous conduct, we may be compelled to forego some temporal advantages, which may fall to the lot of persons whose consciences are less scrupulous than ours ; but this involves no forfeiture even of present happiness, since we have more satisfac tion in the approbation of our consciences, or in the hopes of future reward, than we could have enjoyed from the gratifications which we voluntarily renounce, after a due calculation of consequences.
If, therefore, by what is expedient, we understand not merely that which promotes our present interest, and private gratification, but that which is most con ducive to the general happiness of ourselves and others, for time and for eternity, we may certainly consider this kind of expediency as a test of the virtue of hu man actions, unless it can be proved that God has given some other rule inconsistent with these principles. But this is impossible; the Author of our nature is not such an unreasonable taskmaster, as to command the per formance of duties from which we can derive neither profit nor pleasure. H:s precepts are sanctioned not only by the paramount authority by which they arc en joined, but also by their own reasonableness ; by their adaptation to our circumstances ; and by their tendency to promote our true happiness. We have thus every conceivable inducement to virtuous conduct, since it is found to be not only conformable to the will of heaven, and to the law of conscience and of reason, but also perfectly consistent with the best interests of man. To suppose that what is expedient, in the extended sense in which we have understood the term, can by any pos sibility be wrong, would be to subvert at once all our ideas of the moral government of God, which can be understood only by the perceived tendency of the plans of Providence to promote some good and beneficent end. We may surely, then, judge of the moral charac ter of human actions by their tendency to promote the best interests of man ; and we may find the origin of moral approbation, by applying to the actions of men the same criteria by which we judge of the wisdom and good ness of God.