But here we must observe, that those circumstances which constitute the rule of moral action do not, by any means, necessarily give us the idea of moral obligation. We can easily perceive, that we cannot exceed certain limits without destroying our own happiness ; a regard to our own comfort, therefore, will compel us to respect those boundaries which nature has prescribed, as neces sary to preserve us from the excesses which ruin our respectability or enjoyments. But there is no more virtue in this titan there is in avoiding the fire which has burned us, or the food which has impaired our health, or the person who has injured or betrayed us. We are merely obeying a law which we dare not violate, from apprehension of the consequences ; and which has the force of a statutory enactment, to secure the submission even of those who may dislike the injunction. 1Ve can not conceive how it is possible that there should be any idea of moral obligation, without the idea of accounta bleness to that Being who created the universe ; who implanted in our nature those faculties which enable us to act, and to judge ; and who has established that order of nature which we are compelled to re spect. Take away the conviction of this accounta bleness, and there is no distinction between virtue and vice ; and nothing is left but a sordid calculation of the consequences which may affect our present comfort. A man's visible interest would then be his only rule, and there would be none of those high-toned principles, which make the nil conscire sibi the proudest distinction of human nature : the object would then be, to preserve a good name rather than a clear conscience ; the most profligate would be sensible of no baseness; and the most abandoned wretch would lift his head erect, so long as he could conceal his turpitude from the world.
In order, then, to obtain a moral principle of suffi cient efficacy, man must consider himself as amenable to the laws of the Supreme Governor; and he must seek to know his will by all the means by which he has been pleased to make it known to men : he ought grate fully to avail himself of the light of revelation, and he ought not to disregard those intimations which arc pre sented in the order and course of nature ; he ought to consider them as so many auxiliary hints to strengthen the obligations of virtue ; and even as useful to ascertain many points of importance, which are not settled by a positive rule, but may easily be reduced to a general law.
Holding these views, we cannot subscribe to the opinions of Butler, and Mr. Stewart, (who is very much influenced by him,) that nothing farther is necessary to show the obligation of the law of morals than the bare recognition of its existence. " Your obligation to obey this law," says Butler, " is its being the law of your na ture." But, according to the usual conceptions of men, wherever there is a law, there is a lawgiver ; and it is not the law itself, but the power and authority of the law giver, which enforce its obligations. Allowing, then, that the law of our nature were ever so clearly recog nized, it could not be viewed as an object of moral ap probation, were we persuaded that it was the result of fate, or of accident. It is only as proceeding from an intelligent cause, and from a being who has willed and planned our happiness, that we can admire and love the law under which we act ; for it is then only that we con sider it as an intimation of the will of a being who is the sovereign arbiter of our fate, and who will undoubtedly, some time or other, give full efficacy to the laws which he has established.
" Every being," says Mr. Stewart, " who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe ; notwith standing he may be in total ignorance of a future state." This is the same idea as Butler's; and we apprehend it brings consequences after it which neither of these writers would have been very ready to admit ; for, on their principles, it may be equally affirmed, that a per son totally ignorant of the being of God, or one who denies his existence, may feel all the obligations of vir tue ; and that an atheist may be the most virtuous person in the world. This must be the natural consequence of making virtue the result of a moral sense; for such a faculty should convey its intimations to the mind as in falliably as perception ; and the atheist and the believer should equally feel its power.
The common sense and experience of mankind revolt at such an idea ; and, till modern times, neither moralists nor legislators have ever imagined that there is a moral sense in man of sufficient efficacy to regulate his con duct, independent of the belief of a God, and of a fu ture state. The practice has always been to impress on the minds of men a conviction, that the moral precepts which they were required to obey were the laws of the gods, and that they must be accountable at their tribunal for the neglect of them. This appears to us to be not only good policy, but sound philosophy ; and to lay the only sure foundation on which we can ultimately rest the feeling of moral obligation.
A man who has no idea of a God or of a future state, may, nevertheless, be trained to a certain course of con duct conformable to the general views of the society in which he lives. If he acts in opposition to these views, he will be blamed or punished ; for he then breaks through the rules of the confederacy ; and he may be expelled from the community, as we are told the rooks do with their pilfering companions, when they are de tected in the act of carrying off the materials of their neighbours' nests. To avoid punishment or shame, then, is sufficient to induce conformity to established rules and customs ; another motive will be furnished in the praise which attends every man who respects public opinion ; and he who is forward in defending the rights of the community, will be courted and applauded for the protection which he affords. Here, then, is a standard of approbation and disapprobation, founded in public opinion, which is often iniquitous and absurd, when con sidered in reference to higher principles, or the rights and interests of other communities; and we have thus a moral condition, if it can be so called, of human nature, without any reference to a moral governor. We be lieve that many large communities exist in this state, fettered by inveterate prejudices. and referring to them with promptitude as the laws of their nature.