In Constitutions. The object of construc tion is to give effect to the intent of the peo ple in adopting it ; this intent is to be found in the instrument itself; Miller, Const. U. S. 100; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill (N: Y.) 35. The whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part ; it is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as part of the law ; if different portions should seem to conflict, the courts should harmonize them, if practicable, and should lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some idle and nuga tory ; Wheeling Gas Co. v. City of Wheeling, 8 W. Va. 320; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine 584, Fed. Cas..No. 10,460. It must be presumed that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 188, 6 L. Ed. 23; as understood when the instrument was framed; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691; technical words are pre sumed to have been employed in their tech nical sense. Where two provisions of a con stitution are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and local posi tion will prevail; Quick v. Whitewater Town ship, 7 Ind. 570.
It is to be borne in mind that in the con struction of the federal and state constitu tions a different and indeed an opposite rule is applied. The former, being the frame work of a government of delegqted powers, is subject to the general rule that a power to be lawfully exercised under an act of congress must be either expressly conferred or necessarily implied from some power granted. On the other hand, the state con stitutions are not grants of power, but limi tations on the residuum of absolute sovereign power which remains after subtracting that portion of it surrendered to the federal gov ernment. Accordingly, in construing a state constitution to ascertain whether a legisla tive act is valid, the only questions are whether that which it directs or authorizes is forbidden or whether it is included in the powers vested in the federal government.
The first resort is to the natural significa tion of the words in their order and gram matical arrangement ; if they embody a definite meaning which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same instrument, there is no room for construction. This rule is said to apply to contracts, statutes and constitutions; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 9 Sup. Ct. 651, 32 L. Ed. 1060. See Manthey v. Vincent, 145 Mich. 327, 108 N. W. 667. If there is an ambiguity, the whole instrument is to be examined in order to determine the meaning of any part ; State v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636, 39 S. W. 270, 38
L. R. A. 208, 59 Am. St. Rep. 515; People v. Metz, 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201.
When a constitution gives a general pow er or enjoins a duty, it also gives by implica tion every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one by the performance of the other ; Field v. People, 2 Scam. (3 Ill.) 79, 83; Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 111 S. W. 726.
The object for which a constitutional grant of power was given will have great influence in the construction; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
The safest rule is to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties and rights, with all the lights and aids of contemporaneous history; and to give to each word just such force, consistent with its legitimate meaning, as will fairly secure and attain the ends proposed ; Prigg v. Penn sylvania, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 539, 10 L. Ed. 1060; the subject or context and the intention of the framers in inserting a word in the feder al constitution are all to be considered; Mc Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579; the mischief to be prevented, as disclosed in the history of the country, will be considered ; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 410, 7 L. Ed. 903. Every word must have due force and appropriate meaning ; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 614, 10 L. Ed. 579; but the same words have not necessarily the same meaning when found in different parts of the same instrument; their meaning is controlled by the context; Chero kee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25.
As aids to construction, the courts may refer to historical circumstances attending the framing and adoption of the constitution and the consequences attendant upon one construction or the other ; Pollock v. Trust Co. (income tax cases) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; they may look to the history of the times ; id. Interpreta tion must be in the light of the common law ; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890; a clause stricken from the draft may be referred to as an aid in'the construction of the remaining clauses ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cra. (U. S.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
Provisions of the constitution of the Unit ed States are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, but are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is not to be gathered simply from the words and a dic tionary, but by considering their origin -and the line of their growth; Gompers v. U. S., 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. -.