INTERPRETATION. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieber, Leg. and Pol. Hermeneutics.
The "true meaning" of any signs is that meaning which those who used them were desirous of expressing. A person adopting or sanctioning them "uses" them as well as their immediate author. Both parties to an agreement equally make use of the signs declaratory of that agreement, though one only is the originator, and the other may be entirely passive. The most common signs used to convey ideas are words. When there is a contradiction in signs intended to agree, resort must be had to construction,—that is, the drawing of conclusions from the given signs, respecting ideas which they do not ex press. Interpretation is the art of finding out what the author intended to convey; construction is resorted to in comparing two different writings or statutes. Construction is usually confounded with interpretation ; but in common use, is generally employed in a sense that is properly covered by both when each is used in a sense strictly and technically correct; Cooley, Const. Lim. 70. Quoting this passage, it is said in U. S. v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 29 Sup. Ct. 123, 53 L. Ed. 230, that while, abstractly, there may be a difference between the two words, yet in "common usage" they have "the same signifi cance." A distinction between the two, first made in the Legal and Political, Hermeneu tics, has been adopted by Greenleaf and oth er American and European jurists. Her meneutics includes both.
Close interpretation (tnterpretatio re striota) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the formation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of inter pretation has generally been called literal, but the term is inadmissible. Lieber, Herm. 66.
Extensive interpretation (interpretatio ex tensiva, called, also, liberal interpretation) adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word.
Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio excedens) is that which substitutes a mean ing evidently beyond the true one: it is, therefore, not genuine interpretation.
Free or unrestricted interpretation (•nter pretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the gen eral principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior prin ciple.
Limited or restricted interpretation (in, terpretatio limitata) is when we are influ enced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones. Ernesti, Institutio Infer pretis.
Predestined interpretation (interpretatio predestinate) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views or desires. This includes artful inter
pretation (interpretatio vafer), by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended.
The civilians divide interpretation into : Authentic (interpretatio authentica), which proceeds from the author himself ; i. e. of a law, by the legislature.
Usual (interpretatio usualis), when the in terpretation is on the ground of usage.
Doctrinal (interpretatio doctrinalis), when made agreeably to rules of science. Doc trinal interpretation is subdivided into ex tensive, restrictive, and declaratory : exten sive, whenever the reason of a proposition has a broader sense than its terms, and it is consequently applied to a case which had not been explained; restrictive, when the expressions have a greater latitude than the reasons ; and declaratory, when the reasons and terms agree, but it is necessary to set tle the meaning of some term or terms to make the sense complete. See Holland, Ju rispr. 344.
There can be no sound interpretation-with out good faith and common sense. The ob ject of all interpretation and construction is to ascertain the intention of the authors, even so far as to control the literal significa tion of the words; for verba ita suet in telligenda ut res magic valeat quam pereat. Words are, therefore, to be taken as those who used them intended, which must be pre sumed to be in their popular and ordinary signification ; unless there is some good rea son for supposing otherwise, as where tech nical terms are used; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 188, 6 L. Ed. 23; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 678 ; Settle v. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y. 281; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; quoties in verbis nulls est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba ftenda est. When words have two senses, of which one only is agreeable to the law, that one must prevail; Cowp. 714 ; Washington & I. R. Co. v. Nay. Co., 160 U. S. 77, 16 Sup. Ct. 231, 40 L. Ed. 346 ; when they are inconsistent with the evident intention, they will be rejected; 2 Atk. 32; when words are inadvertently omitted, and the meaning is obvious, they will be supplied by inference from the con text, see Gran v. Spangenberg, 53 Minn. 42, 54 N. W. 933; a superfluous negative may be omitted when the meaning is apparent ; Wa ters Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S. 159, 29 Sup. Ct. 270, 53 L. Ed. 453. When lan guage is susceptible of two meanings, one of which would work a forfeiture, while the other would not, the latter must prevail; Jacobs v. Spalding, 71 Wis. 177, 36 N. W. 608.