Interpretation

ed, sup, ct, construction, statute, letter and statutes

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An act passed. just after a constitution is adopted is a contemporary interpretation of the latter, entitled to much weight ; Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 5 Sup. Ct. 739, 28 L. Ed. 1137.

See CONSTITUTIONALITY.

In Statutes. Where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 671, 9 Sup. Ct. 651, 32 L. Ed. 1060. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the leg islative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion; Lau Ow. Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47, 12 Sup. Ct. 517, 36 L. Ed. 340. They should be so con strued, if practicable, that one section will not destroy another, but explain and sup port it; Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 242, 13 Sup. Ct. 244, 37 L. Ed. 152.

"Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which the makers had in view, for qui beret zn liters, hceret in cortice. In Bacon's Abridgement, Statutes 1, 5 ; Puffendorf, Book 5, chapter 12; Rutherford, 422, 527; and in Smith's Commentaries, 814, many cases were mentioned where it was held that matters embraced in the general words of the stat utes, nevertheless were not within the stat utes, because it could not have been the in tention of the lawmakers that they should be included. They were taken out of the statutes by an equitable construction. . . . In some cases the letter of a leg islative act is restrained by an equitable con struction ; in others it is enlarged ; in others the construction is contrary to the letter. The equitable construction which restrains the letter of a statute is defined by Aristotle, as frequently quoted iu this manner : `13qtui tas est correctio legis generaliter Wm qua parti deficit.' " Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 510, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, opinion by Earl, J.

"All laws should receive a sensible con struction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injus tice, oppression or an absurd consequence.

It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. Thp common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not extehd to the sur geon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1 Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not ex tend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire-`for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' " U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482, 19 L. Ed. 278, quoted in Church of Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 461, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226.

The objects and purposes of a statute and the conditions of the enactment must be borne in mind so as to effectuate, rather than to destroy, the spirit of the intent. The purpose of the copyright statute is not so much to protect the thing as to protect the right of reproduction, and the statute should be construed in the character of the property to be protected ; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 28 Sup. Ct. 72, 52 L. Ed. 208, 12 Ann. Cas. 595.

"All laws should receive a sensible con struction. General terms should be so limit ed in their application as not to lead to in oppression or absurd consequence. It always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its lan guage which would avoid results of that character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter ;" Jacob son v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 39, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Cas. 765, citing U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482, 19 L. Ed. 278; Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47, 12 Sup. Ct.' 517, 36 L. Ed. 340.

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