"It is a dangerous assumption to suppose that the legislature foresees every possible result that may ensue from the unguarded use of a single word, or that the language used in statutes is so precisely accurate that you can pick out from various acts this and that expression and, skilfully piecing them together, lay a safe foundation for some re mote inference. Your Lordships are aware that from early times courts of law have been continuously obliged, in endeavoring to carry out loyally the intentions of parlia ment, to observe a series of familiar precau tions for interpreting statutes, so imperfect and obscure as they often are. Learned vol umes have been written on this single sub ject." Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Nairn v. University of St. Andrews [1909] L. R. 147, A. C.
"No statute is completely intelligible as an isolated enactment. Every statute is a chapter, or a fragment of a chapter, of a body of law ;" Ilbert, Legisl. Meth. & Forms 254.
Reference may be had to the title of an act; Church of Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 IL S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226.
In construing a tariff act, when it is claim ed that the commercial use of a word dif fers from its ordinary significance, in or der that the former may prevail over the lat ter it must appear that the commercial des ignation is the result of established usage which was definite, uniform, and general at the time of the passage of the act; Sonn v. Magone, 159 U. S. 418, 16 Sup. Ct. 67, 40 L. Ed. 203.
Statutes, if penal, are to be strictly, and if remedial, liberally construed; Bish. Writ. L. 193; Dwarris, Stat. 246 ; that penal stat utes should be strictly construed, see U. S. v. R. Co., 222 U. S. 8, 32 Sup. Ct. 6, 56 L. Ed. 68; but the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is not violated by allowing their words to have full meaning, or even the more extended of two meanings, where such construction best harmonizes with the con text, and most fully promotes the policy and objects of the legislature ; U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 386, 18 L. Ed. 830. The ap parent object of the legislature is to be sought for as disclosed by the act itself, the preamble in some cases, similar statutes re lating to the same subject, the consideration of the mischiefs of the old law, and perhaps some other circumstances; Wilberforce, Stat. Law 99; and the court must be controlled by the power manifested by the act and not by the motive which initiated it ; Berryman v. Board of Trustees, 222 U. S. 334, 32 Sup. Ct. 147, 56 L. Ed. 225 ; but the known policy
of congress in regard to the subject will be considered; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 32 Sup. Ct. 27, 56 L. Ed. 110. Such statutes are to be reasonably construed with a view to effecting their purpose ; U. S. v. R. Co., 212 U. S. 509, 29 Sup. Ct. 313, 53 L. Ed. 629.
All statutes are to be construed with ref erence to the provisions of the common law, and provisions in derogation of the common law are held strictly ; Durham v. State, 117 Ind. 477, 19 N. E. 327; Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322 ; Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 629. But statutes in derogation of the common law are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of congress ; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed. 363. Statutes extending the jurisdiction of the court of claims will be strictly construed ; Blackfeather v. U. S., 190 U. S. 368, 23 Sup. Ct. 772, 47 L. Ed. 1099.
Acts of incorporation and those granting franchises and special benefits to corpora tions are to be construed strictly ; nothing passes by implication ; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 544, 9 L. Ed. 773 ; Bank of Pennsylvania v. Com., 19 Pa. 144 ; so of a municipal grant to an electric railway ; Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. Ry. Co., 204 U. S. 116; 27 Sup. Ct. 202, 51 L. Ed. 399.
A provision of a statute copied from that of another state is construed upon the inter pretation placed upon the statute by such other state ; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Cheat wood's Adm'x, 103 Va. 356, 49 S. E. 489; James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129, 24 Sup. Ct. 222, 48 L. Ed. 377; Mann v. Carter, 74 N. H. 345, 68 Atl. 130, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150; but this does not necessarily include subsequelnt variations of construction by such courts ; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 280, 8 L. Ed. 120; when lower fed eral courts and the highest court of a for eign country construe like acts, the failure of congress to remedy that part of the act may be regarded as an acquiescence by con gress in such judicial construction ; White Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1, 28 Sup. Ct. 319, 52 L. Ed. 655, 14 Ann. 628.
An amended act is to be construed as if it had read from the beginning as it does with the amendment added to it ; Black, Interpr. 357. The old act, so far as re-enacted, stands from its original date and the new stands from the date of the amendment. All of the old which is omitted in the new is repealed ; id. 358.