Impossible things cannot be required. The subject-matter and nature of the context, or its objects, causes, effects, consequences, or precedents, or the situation of the parties, must often be consulted in order to arrive at their intention, as when words have, when literally construed, either no meaning at all or a very absurd one. The whole of an in strument must be viewed together and not each part taken separately ; and effect must be given to every part, if possible ; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26. Assist ance must be sought from the more near be fore proceeding to the remote. When one part is totally repugnant to the rest, it will be stricken out ; but if it is only explana tory, it will operate as a limitation. As to the interpretation of a deed where the grant ing and habendum clauses are repugnant, see 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) note, 956. Reference to the Lew loci or the usage of a particular place or trade is frequently necessary in order to explain the meaning ; 2 B. & P. 164; 3 Stark. Ev. 1036; Gracy v. Bailee, 16 S. & R. (Pa.) 126. A court should read a written contract according to the obvious intention of the parties, in spite of clerical errors or omissions which can be corrected by perus ing the whole instrument ; Monmouth Park Ass'n v. Wallis Iron Works, 55 N. J. L. 132, 26 Atl. 140, 19 L. R. A. 456, 39 Am. St. Rep. 626; Chrisman v. Ins. Co., 16 Or. 283, 18 Pa c. 466.
Words, however general, may be limited to the subject-matter in connection with which they are used ; general words may be restricted to the same general genus as the words which preceded them ; and where for many years words have received a judicial construction, it is reasonable to suppose that the parties so used them, and the courts would resort to such sense in reaching the meaning of the parties ; 12 App. Cas. 484.
The enumeration of certain powers in re spect to particular subjects in a written in strument is a negation of all other analogous powers with respect to the same subject-mat ter ; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 437, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46 L. Ed. 264.
When the language of the contract is am biguous, the interpretation of it by the par ties is entitled to great, if not controlling, influence ; Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U. S. 121, 7 Sup. Ct. 1057, 30 b. Ed. 1110; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100, 33 Sup. Ct. 967, 57 L. Ed. 1410 (a municipality) ; as shown by subsequent acts ; New York v. Board of Tax Com'rs, 199 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 705, 50 L. Ed. 65, 4 Ann. Cas. 381; before any controversy has arisen; Fitz gerald v. $ank, 114 Fed. 474, 52 C. C. A. 276; even if at variance with the literal meaning of the contract ; District of Co lumbia v. Gallaher, 124 U. S. 505, 8 Sup. Ct. 585, 31 L. Ed. 526. Such construction is of more importance than the absolute meaning of the phraseology ; Smith v.
Crane, 169 Mo. App. 695, 154 S. W. 857; and will be accepted as the proper one ; McMil lin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500,,72 Atl. 240 ; but it is said that this rule does not apply if the contract is free from ambiguity; Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Atl. 166, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1078, 133 Am. St. Rep. 877; In re Myers' Estate, 238 Pa. 195, 86 Atl. 89; Russell v. Young, 94 Fed. 45, 36 C. C. A. 71; in such case it cannot be affected by volun tary payments by one party to the other, through mistake, clearly not required by its terms and not demanded by the other par ty; Sharp v. Behr, 117 Fed. 864.
In Central R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U. S. 480, 28 Sup. Ct. 592, 52 L. Ed. 896, the interpretation placed by the court upon even a compact between two states, was said to have "the very powerful sanction of the conduct of the parties and of the existing condition of things." Where a seller agreed to deliver a large quantity of cement "in car load lots f. o. b.," and it had uniformly provided the cars, it was held that this was a practical construc tion of the contract imposing that duty on the seller ; Davis v. Cement Co., 134 Fed. 274 affirmed 142 Fed. 74, 73 C. C. A. 388.
In case of doubt, a party will be held to that meaning which he knew the other party believed the words to bear, if this can be done without making a new contract ; Brent v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 174 Fed. 877.
Words spoken cannot vary the terms of a written agreement ; they may overthrow it. Words spoken at the time of the making of a written agreement are merged in the writ ing ; 5 Co. 26; 2 B. & C. 634 ; parties cannot testify as to their intention or the meaning of a written contract; Gardt v. Brown, 113 Ill. 475, 55 Am. Rep. 434.
No representation, promise or agreement made, or opinion expressed in previous parol negotiations as to the terms or legal effect of the resulting written agreement can be permitted to prevail over the just interpreta tion of the contract, in the absence of some artifice which concealed its terms and pre vented the complainant from reading it ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 87 Fed. 63, 30 C. C. A. 532, per Sanborn, C. J. But where a writing is ambiguous or there are repugnant clauses, it is proper to consider all the negotiations leading to the contract, the subject-matter, the purpose to be effect ed, the consideration passing between the parties and all the surrounding circumstanc es when the contract was made ; McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500, 72 Atl. 240 ; and prior negotiations, though merged in the contract, may be resorted to to determine whether the parties intended stipulations for delay as a penalty or liquidated damages ; U. S. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U. S. 105, 27 Sup. Ct. 450, 51 L. Ed. 731.