Debates in congress are not appropriate sources of information as to the meaning of a statute, but reports of legislative commit tees may be referred to in order to throw light on its intent ; Binns v. U. S., 194 U. S. 486, 24 Sup. Ct. 816, 48 L. Ed. 1087, approv ing Briggs v. U. S., 143 U. S. 357, 12 Sup. Ct. 391, 36 L. Ed. 180 ; recourse cannot be had to discussions in Parliament which precede the passing of an act ; [1906] 2 K. B. 716. Such resort was had in Edger v. Board of Com'rs, 70 Ind. 331; and in Blake v. Bank, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 307, 23 L. Ed. 119, a badly expressed and apparently contradictory rev enue act was interpreted by reference to the journals of congress, where it appeared that the peculiar phraseology was the result of an amendment made without due reference to the language in the original bill. The statements of individual members cannot be referred to ; 3 Q. B. D. 707 ; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387 ; County of Cumberland v. Boyd, 113 Pa. 52, 4 Atl. 346.
Such debates may show the conditions ex isting at the time the legislation was enact ed ; Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734. In case of ambiguity, resort may be had to the report of the senate committee where the provision originated, which can be a guide to a true interpretation ; Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 333, 29 Sup. Ct. 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013, following Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525. Resort may be had to the history of the times when the act was passed, but cannot be had to the speeches of members when it was adopted ; U. S. v. Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007. But it was held by Lord Bramwell, 8 App. Cas. 501, that the courts cannot look at the history of an act, but only at its language. It was, however, said by Halsbury, L. C., that "it is quite legitimate to refer to the history" of a period "to understand what was the subject matter with which the leg islature was then dealing" ; [1896] A. C. 504. A court may place itself in the position of the authors of the words to be interpreted at the time they were written ; [1906] 2 K. B. 716.
The duty of the court in construing a stat ute which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves its constitutionality, includes the duty of avoid ing a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided ; U. S. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527, 53 L. Ed. 836. Prof. Roscoe Pound (1912 Tenn. Bar Ass'n) quotes Prof. John C. Gray as "putting the
matter very well thus: `A fundamental mis conception prevails and pervades all the books as to the dealing of the courts with statutes. Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was to discover what the meaning of the legislature really was. But when the legislature has had a real intention, one way or another on a point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises as to what its intention was. If that were all that the judge had to do with the statute, interpretation of the stat utes, instead of being one of the most diffi cult of a judge's duties would be extremely easy. The fact is that the difficulties of so called interpretation arise when the legisla ture has had no meaning at all ; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it ; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the legisla ture did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind had the point been present.' " The change of conditions as well as of the meaning of words in their ordinary use fre quently creates difficulties in the application of statutes which in England led to the pas sage in 1889 of the General Interpretation Act, intended to cover the whole subject of statu tory interpretation. A synopsis of its provi sions, together with an instructive collation of words having a marked difference in their ordinary and judicial meaning, will be found in Ordronaux, Const. Leg. c. xi. In this country the subject has not been so compre hensively treated, but there will usually be found in the general statutes of each state a chapter defining the meaning of certain words as used in the statutes.
As to acts declaring the meaning of a prior act, see STATUTE.
In Contracts. There must always be ref erence to the surrounding circumstances and the object the parties intended to accom plish ; New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. R. Co., 116 Ind. 60, 18 N. E. 182 ; Illges v. Dex ter, 77 Ga. 36 ; Words may be understood in a technical or peculiar sense when such meaning has been stamped upon them by the usage of the trade or place in which the con tract occurs. When words are manifestly in consistent with the declared purpose and ob ject of the contract, they may be rejected; 2 Atk. 32. When words •are omitted so as to defeat the effect of the contract, they will be supplied by the obvious sense and inference from the context. When words admit of two senses, that which gives effect to the de sign of the parties is preferred to that which destroys it ; Add. Contr. 45; Cowp. 714.