The duplication of forces and of organization was undoubtedly a source of delay and waste of effort. Kitchener has also been reproached for his reluctance to replace the voluntary system by conscription, but this criticism overlooks how deeply rooted was the voluntary system in British institutions, and the slowness with which lasting changes can be effected in them. If Kitchener's method was characteristic of the man, it was characteristic of England. If it was unmethodical, it was calculated to impress most vividly on the British people the gulf between their "gladia torial" wars of the past and the national war to which they were committed.
While a psychological landmark, the battle of Ypres is also a military landmark. For, with the repulse of the German attempt to break through, the trench barrier was consolidated from the Swiss frontier to the sea. The power of modern defence had tri umphed over attack, and stalemate ensued. The military history of the Franco-British alliance during the next four years is a story of the attempts to upset this deadlock, either by forcing the barrier or by finding a way round.
On the Eastern front, however, the greater distances and the greater differences between the equipment of the armies ensured a fluidity which was lacking in the West. Trench lines might form, but they were no more than a hard crust covering a liquid expanse. To break the crust was not difficult, and once broken, mobile operations of the old style became possible. This freedom of action was denied to the Western Powers, but Germany, because of her central position, had an alternative choice, and from Nov. 1914 onwards her command adopted a defensive in France while seeking to cripple the power of Russia.
In panic Prittwitz momentarily spoke of falling back behind the Vistula, whereupon Moltke superseded him by a retired general, Hindenburg, to whom was appointed as chief of staff, Ludendorff, the hero of the Liege attack.
Developing a plan which, with the necessary movements, had been already initiated by Col. Hoffmann of the 8th Army staff, Ludendorff concentrated some six divisions against Samsonov's left wing. This force, inferior in strength to the Russians, could not have been decisive, but Ludendorff, finding that Rennenkampf was still near Gumbinnen, took the calculated risk of withdrawing the rest of the German troops, except the cavalry screen, from that front and rushing them back against Samsonov's right wing. This daring move was aided by the absence of communication between the two Russian commanders and the ease with which the Germans deciphered Samsonov's wireless orders to his corps. Under the converging blows Samsonov's flanks were crushed and his centre surrounded. The outcome of this military masterpiece, afterwards christened the battle of Tannenberg (q.v.), was the destruction of almost the whole of Samsonov's army. Then re ceiving two fresh army corps from the French front, the German commander turned on the slowly advancing Rennenkampf, whose lack of energy was partly due to his losses at Gumbinnen and subsequent lack of information, and drove him out of East Prussia. (See MASURIAN LAKES.) As a result of these battles Russia had lost a quarter of a million men and, what she could afford still less, much war material. But the invasion of East Prussia had at least, by causing the despatch of two corps from the West, helped to make possible the French "come-back" on the Marne. Galician Battles.—Away on the southern front, moreover, the scales had tilted against the Central Powers. The offensive of the Austrian 1st and 4th Armies into Poland had at first made progress, but this was nullified by the onslaught of the Russian 3rd and 8th Armies upon the weaker 2nd and 3rd Armies which were guarding the Austrian right flank. These armies were heavily defeated (Aug. 26-30, and driven back through Lemberg. The advance of the Russian left wing thus threatened the rear of the victorious Austrian left wing. Conrad tried to swing part of his left round, in turn, against the Russian flank, but this blow was parried and then, caught with his forces disorganized by the renewed advance of the Russian right wing, he was forced on Sept. II to extricate himself by a general retreat, falling back almost to Cracow by the end of September. (See LEMBERG, BATTLES OF.) Austria's plight compelled the Germans to send aid, and the bulk of the force in East Prussia was formed into a new 9th Army and switched south to the south-west corner of Poland, whence it advanced on Warsaw in combination with a renewed Austrian offensive. (See VISTULA-SAN, BATTLES OF.) But the Russians were now approaching the full tide of their mobilized strength; regrouping their forces and counter-attacking, they drove back the advance and followed it up by a powerful effort to invade Silesia.